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This dissertation investigates how institutional environments and firm resources influence 
firm scope. Building on strategy and international business literatures, I propose that 
institutional environments influence firm scope through the impacts on both the 
development of internal resources and the availability of external resources. In Chapter 2, 
I disaggregate the concept of institutional distance into different dimensions from an 
institutional perspective and empirically test the validity of the multi-dimensional 
approach in the sample of U.S. and Chinese firms by exploring the effects of distance on 
the foreign expansion strategies. The results also show that Chinese firms do have 
different strategic choices from U.S. firms when they invest abroad. In Chapter 3, I focus 
on government and international diversification in emerging economies. Compared with 
partially privatized enterprises (PPEs) and fully privatized enterprises (FPEs), state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) are less likely to go abroad as a result of their risk-averse 
nature. In addition, different types of government corporations rely on different types of 
resources when they invest abroad: while SOEs reply on external resources such as debts, 
PPEs rely on internal resources such as intangible assets. An empirical investigation of 
the FDI activities of Chinese listed firms in high-tech industries between 1991 and 2007 
supports the arguments. Finally, in Chapter 4, I focus on firm capability and related 
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product diversification in emerging economies. I propose that seemingly related 
diversification, a type of diversification focusing on the relatedness of technologies but 
not of markets, will harm firm performance in emerging economies. Moreover, the lack 
of implementation capability also makes it difficult for firms to benefit from related 
diversification. I test these ideas on a population of Chinese firms listed on Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange from 1993 to 2006. Together, this dissertation shows the choice of firm 
scope in emerging economies is different from that in developed countries due to the 
uniqueness of resources and institutional environments. Theoretically, it integrates the 
resource-based view of firm, resource dependence theory and institutional theory to 
explain the role of resources and institutional environments in determining firm scope. 
Empirically, it provides large-sample quantitative evidence in an emerging economy. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Question and Key Constructs 
What is the role of firm resources and institutional environments in determining 
firm scope? It is an important question since both strategy scholars and international 
business scholars are interested in understanding how firms expand their scope by 
entering new business or geographic areas (Buckley & Casson, 1976; Rumelt, 1974).  
Scholars from the resource-based view and institutional theory have approached this 
question separately. It is evident that both resources and institutional environments 
directly influence firm scope (Leff, 1978; Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988). However, 
resources are not exogenous but they are influenced by the institutional environment in 
which a firm is embedded. Thus, this dissertation tries to explain how institutional 
environments influence firm scope indirectly through the impacts on resources, as 
shown in figure 1-1. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1-1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
This dissertation seeks to make a contribution by showing that institutional 
environments can influence both the development of internal resources and the 
availability of external resources. Besides directly influencing firm scope, institutional 
environment can influence firm scope indirectly through their impacts on resources as 
well. In investigating the direct and indirect effects, I also explore factors that have been 
largely overlooked in previous studies, such as state ownership (chapter 3 and 4), 
different types of firm resources including both internal resources (chapter 2 to 4) and 
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external resources (chapter 3), and different dimensions of institutional distances (chapter 
2). 
Before I review the relevant literature and develop my theoretical framework, I 
will first define the three key constructs in my dissertation: resources, institutional 
environments and firm scope. 
1.1.1 Resources  
Resources are “all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge, etc., controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive of and 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness” (Barney, 1991: 101). 
Resource is a broad concept and there are many types of resources, such as physical 
capital, human capital, organizational capital, social capital, and financial capital.  
According to the sources of resources, we can classify resources into two categories: 
internal resources and external resources. Internal resources are resources developed 
within a firm, such as business experience (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), intangible assets 
(Delios & Beamish, 2001), and dynamic capability (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). 
External resources are resources acquired from external environments. Many resources 
that are crucial to a firm’s survival are acquired externally, such as land and capital 
(Hursti & Maula, 2007). In this dissertation, I focus on both internal and external 
resources. More specifically, I examine the impact of internal resources such as 
intangible assets (chapter 2 and 3) and firm experience (chapter 2 and 4), and external 
resources such as financial capital (chapter 3), on the choice of firm scope. 
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1.1.2 Institutional Environments 
Institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the 
humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions” (North, 1990: 3). 
Institutional environment is “the set of fundamental political, social and legal ground 
rules that establishes the basis for production, exchange and distribution” (Davis & North, 
1971). The content and quality of formal (such as laws, regulations, and procedures) and 
informal institutions (such as conventions, customs and norms) and their respective 
enforcement mechanisms determine the strength of an institutional environment (North, 
1990).  
Similar to resources, institutional environment is also a broad term that includes 
multiple dimensions. In this dissertation, I consider two aspects of institutional 
environments: first, the institutional distances among different countries.  Institutional 
distance is the extent of similarity or difference between two countries in terms of the 
regulatory, cognitive, and normative institutions (Kostova, 1996). I disaggregate it into 
eight dimensions and examine its impact on foreign entry strategies (chapter 2). Second, I 
investigate how the unique characteristics of institutional environments in emerging 
economies influence resources and thus firm scope. I focus mainly on government 
because government is an important part of institutional environments that influences 
firm strategy and survival. The influence of government is manifested in many ways: 
antitrust regulation, economic regulation, social regulation, as well as government 
purchases (Hillman, Zardkoohi & Biernabm, 1999). More specifically, I examine how 
state ownership (chapter 3 and 4) and government policy (chapter 3) influence firm scope. 
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1.1.3 Firm Scope 
Firms are characterized by the scope of their activities (Hart & Holmstrom, 2010). 
Firm scope is defined as the number of markets in which a firm operates (Shipilov, 2009). 
In general, there are two dimensions of firm scope: product dimension and geography 
dimension. Product scope is the set of products and services provided by a firm (Chatain 
& Zemsky, 2007) while geographic scope is the set of locations of a firm’s business 
activities (Goerzen & Beamish, 2003).  
These two dimensions of firm scope are of particular interests to management 
scholars. On the product side, the question of what determines firm scope has attracted 
the attention of many strategy scholars (Palich, Cardinal & Miller, 2000; Rumelt, 1974). 
On the geography side, internationalization is the prime focus of studies in international 
business (Buckley & Casson, 1976).  
Both product diversification and geographic diversification are influenced by firm 
resources (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988; Tallman, 1991) and the institutional 
environments in which the firm is embedded (Peng & Delios, 2006). Likewise, firm 
scope also can influence firm resources and institutional environments (Sadrieh & 
Annavarjula, 2005; Zardkoohi, 1985). This dissertation examines both product and 
geographic diversification: chapter 2 and 3 focus on geographic diversification while 
chapter 4 focuses on product diversification. 
The relationship between product diversification and geographic diversification is 
not the focus of this dissertation. However, it is worthwhile to note that the literature has 
not provided a conclusive finding about the relationship between the two. Some scholars 
argue that product and geographic diversification are complementary to each other 
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(Doukas & Lang, 2003; Kim, Hwang & Burgers, 1989), the rationale behind is that 
product and geographic diversification can create synergies that enable firm to 
differentiate their products in different markets with low costs (Hitt, Hoskisson & Kim, 
1997). Others believe that they compete with each other because the great coordination 
and control costs will lead to a substitution between the two strategies (Wiersema & 
Bowen, 2008). There are also studies that found no relationship between product and 
geographic diversification (Tallman & Li, 1996). 
The inconclusive findings regarding the relationship between product and 
geographic diversification are largely due to the contingency nature of the relationship. 
More specifically, firm resources and institutional environments can influence the 
relationship. The type of resources that drives geographic and product diversification is 
an important factor to consider. If it is the same type of firm resources that drive both 
types of diversification and there is no constraint on the supply of the resources, then, we 
could view them as complementary strategies that enable a firm to maximize its 
utilization of resources (Davies, Rondi & Sembenelli, 2001). If the supply of such 
resources is limited, then, we could view these two types of diversification as substitutes. 
Moreover, if product and geographic diversification indeed require different types of 
resources and capabilities, we could expect these two types of diversification to be 
substitute due to the difficulty of replicating and transferring different tacit and intacit 
knowledge, routines and competences (Kumar, 2009). If this is the case, the choice of the 
type of diversification is likely to be endogenuously decided taking into consideration of 
the availability of different resources and capabilities of a firm.  
  6
The relationship between product and geographic diversification is also influenced 
by the institutional environment in which a firm is embedded. If institutional environment 
favors both types of diversification, then, we would expect a positive relationship 
between the two. However, if the institutional environment favors one type of 
diversification over the other, then, one type of diversification will dominate the other. 
For example, the institutional environments in emerging economies generally favors 
unrelated product diversification (Khanna & Palepu, 1997), but not necessarily 
internationalization (Gaur & Kumar, 2009). As a result, we observe more firms with high 
level of product diversification (Li & Wong, 2003; Zhou & Delios, Forthcoming) and 
relatively low level of geographic diversification in emerging economies (Delios, Zhou & 
Xu, 2008b; Gaur & Kumar, 2009). 
To summarize, considering the role of resources and institutional environments 
help us better understand the complicated relationship between product and geographic 
diversification. I will further explain the implications of the findings in this dissertation 
on the relationship between product and geographic diversification in chapter 5 when I 
discuss the implications and future research areas. 
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
This section provides a complete framework explaining the relationships among 
resources, institutional environments and firm scope, as shown in Figure 1-2. These three 
constructs are related and influence with each other. To develop the theoretical 
framework to explain these complicated relationships, I choose three theories as the 
theoretical underpinnings of my dissertation: resource-based view (RBV), resource-
dependence theory (RDT) and institutional theory (IT). All three theories are closely 
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related to the key constructs: resources and institutional environments. And all of them 
have been applied to explain the relationship among resources, institutional environments 
and firm scope. I will first review and compare these theories, and then illustrate how 
they explain the relationships shown in Figure 1-2. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1-2 about here 
------------------------------------- 
1.2.1 RBV, RDT and IT: Review and Comparison 
RBV views firms as bundles of resources (Barney, 1991). Although all resources are 
desirable for a firm’s survival and success, RBV focuses more on the resources that could 
become the sustained competitive advantages of a firm. These resources must be rare, 
valuable, imperfectly imitable, and non-substitutable (Barney, 1991). Such resources 
include routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982), organizational culture (Fiol, 1991), dynamic 
capability (Teece et al., 1997), innovation capability (Henderson & Cockburn, 1994), and 
many others.  
Similar to RBV, resource dependence theory (RDT) also recognize the importance 
of resources in firm survival. The basic assumption of  RDT is that the key to 
organizational survival is the ability to acquire and maintain resources (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). Since organizations are open systems, they rely on external 
environments for resources and the possession of resources creates power (Thompson, 
1967). Although RDT does not provide a clear definition of resources, it does make the 
distinction between organizational effectiveness and organizational efficiency. 
Organizational effectiveness is the “ability to create acceptable outcomes and actions” 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978: 11); it is an external standard of how well an organization is 
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meeting the demands of the various groups and organizations that are concerned with is 
activities. Organizational efficiency is an internal standard of performance; it is about 
how well the tasks are being done. RDT focuses more on organizational effectiveness 
rather than efficiency. The resources in RDT apply to all resources that help firms to 
survive, not just those that can create sustained competitive advantages.  
The key difference between RBV and RDT is the source of resources: while RBV is 
an internally-focused perspective of how organizations specify resource needs and RDT 
is an externally-focused perspective of how organizations obtain these valuable resources 
(Hillman, Withers & Collins, 2009). RBV posits that resources that can create sustained 
competitive advantages have to be internally accumulated by the firm (Dierickx & Cool, 
1989). The strategic factor market1 is largely incomplete when it comes to resources that 
can create sustained competitive advantages because these resources are imperfectly 
imitable. Imitability is related to the characteristics of asset accumulation process: time 
compression diseconomies, asset mass efficiencies, inter-connectedness, asset erosion 
and casual ambiguity (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). It usually takes a long time and a mass 
amount of interconnected and erosive assets input to develop a valuable resource. 
Moreover, the process of asset stock accumulation is often stochastic and discontinuous, 
described as “jackpot model”. There is causal ambiguity in the process. All these 
characteristics make it hard to decide market prices for the resources. Therefore, these 
resources cannot be acquired from strategic factor markets; they have to be generated 
internally. On the contrary, RDT argues that no organization is self-contained; therefore, 
they depend on other organizations for resources. RDT focuses on how organizations 
                                                 
1
 Strategic factor market is a market where the resources necessary to implement a strategy are acquired. 
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manage interdependence with other organizations in the external environment (Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978).  
Both institutional theory (IT) and RDT recognize that external environments have 
ample influence on firm behavior. One of the key arguments in institutional theory is that 
institutional environment provides guidelines for personal as well as organizational 
behavior (Meyer & Rowan, 1977) and therefore, organizations are social as well as 
technical phenomena, and their structures and processes are not shaped purely by 
technical rationality (Ghoshal & Westney, 1993). One of the key differences between 
RDT and IT is that firms are assumed to be more actively coping with external 
environment by changing the power relationship in RDT; while in IT, firms are more 
passively submissive by complying to institutional pressures (Oliver, 1991). 
Although these three theories have different focuses, they share common 
theoretical underpinnings with each other, as shown in Figure 1-3. Both RBV and RDT 
view resources as the key construct; and both RDT and IT recognize the importance of 
external environments. In terms of the internal-external orientation, RBV is internally-
focused while IT is externally-focused, RDT lies somewhere between RBV and IT.  
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 1-3 about here 
------------------------------------- 
1.2.2 Resources and firm scope: RBV and RDT 
RBV and RDT explain relationships #1 and #2 in Figure 1-2. Strategy scholars 
well recognize the importance of firm resources in determining the type of product 
diversification and its performance implication (Montgomery & Singh, 1984; 
Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988). Firms diversify to utilize their productive resources 
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that are surplus to their current operations (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). Since the 
resources that can create competitive advantages usually face market failure, it is hard to 
transfer them through market mechanisms (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). The best way to 
utilize them is to apply them in another business within the same firm. Diversification, 
especially related diversification, is the exploitation of a firm’s internal resources and the 
benefits of diversification come from such resource exploitation (Montgomery & 
Wernerfelt, 1988). In order to conduct effective diversification, firms should have 
relevant capabilities. Firm capability is the ability to perform a task in at least a 
minimally acceptable manner (Helfat, 2007), including the ability of a firm to extend its 
resource base either in a different product market or in a different geographic market. 
Although scholars have found that unrelated diversification harms firm performance in 
developed countries, there is a consensus that related diversification is beneficial to firm 
performance (Palich et al., 2000).  
Similarly, in the area of international business, one of the dominant theories to 
explain globalization is the internalization theory, which views globalization as the 
attempt to protect assets that are subject to market failure, such as intangible assets 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976; Dunning, 1993; Tallman, 1991). Firms will invest abroad to 
harvest from the possession of these resources and the internalization of resources across 
national borders creates multinational enterprises (MNEs). Various studies have shown 
that the possession of resources such as intangible assets lead to higher probability of 
foreign entry (Berry & Sakakibara, 2008; Caves, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992) and 
successful internationalization (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Morck & Yeung, 1992). 
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Existing studies in RBV on firm scope rely largely on the following two 
assumptions: 
Assumption 1: The exploitation of internal firm resources drives diversification. 
Assumption 2: Firm have the capability to benefit from such resource exploitation. 
Both RBV and RDT can explain how firm scope influences firm resources. Firms 
can acquire complementary resources from external environments to better exploit their 
existing resources.  Teece (1986) highlighted the importance of complementary assets to 
the successful exploitation of key resources. He argued that “[i]n almost all cases, the 
successful commercialization of an innovation requires that the [core] know-how in 
question be utilized in conjunction with other capabilities or assets” (Teece, 1986: 288). 
Complementary resources include assets such as specialized manufacturing, 
distributional channels, or even complementary technologies (Teece, 1986). The 
possession of complementary resources is crucial for firms to benefit from the 
exploitation of their existing resources (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002; Wernerfelt, 1984). 
Research has shown that firms can acquire complementary resources both internally or 
externally. The acquisition of complementary resources from external resources through 
means such as acquiring existing firms is one reason that motivates firms to increase their 
scope. For example, Jones and Miskell (2007) found that Unilever successfully acquired 
other firms to gain local knowledge as the complementary resources for their future 
growth.   
RDT has also been applied to explain firm scope. The majority of the work in 
RDT focus on the actions firms take to minimize environmental dependence, such as 
mergers and integration, JVs and other inter-organizational relationships and political 
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actions (Hillman et al., 2009). Therefore, changing firm scope is viewed as one way 
through which firms manage their external dependence. Rather than diversifying to 
utilize their key resources as predicted by RBV, the lack of resources is the diver for 
diversification in RDT.  Firms acquire external resources as a result of diversification. 
Pfeffer (1976) provided three reasons that firms engage in M&As: to reduce competition, 
to manage interdependence with either suppliers or buyers; and to diversify and reduce 
dependence on the present organizations which they rely on. Empirically, scholars have 
found evidence supporting these arguments. Pfeffer (1972) found that firms often acquire 
their transaction partners to reduce interdependency. Similarly, Barney (1990) observed 
that one important goal of M&A is to reduce a firm’s dependence on other firms.  
In the area of international business, resource-seeking is one of the primary goals 
that firms invest abroad (Dunning, 1993). According to Nachum and Zaheer (2005), in 
resource-seeking FDIs, firms invest abroad to achieve cost-minimization motives by 
obtaining resources that are either too costly or unavailable in their home country. The 
most common resources firms are seeking in foreign markets are raw materials and cheap 
labors. Because of the international immobility of labor, wage differentials between home 
and host countries are often considered as a major determinant of FDI (Kimino, Saal & 
Driffield, 2007). Various empirical results have supported the view that lower wage 
attracts FDI. For example, Taylor (2000) found that the wage rates of 39 host countries 
are negatively associated with changes in assets of US-owned subsidiaries. Besides cheap 
labor, raw material is also important driver for resource-seeking FDI. For example, 
Japanese firms have invested abroad to acquire natural resources for their production 
(Park, 2003). 
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In both product diversification and geographic diversification, firms diversify to 
acquire external resources to maintain independence. An important assumption in RDT is: 
Assumption 3: Firms diversify to minimize their dependence on other parties. 
To summarize, in RBV, internal resources serve as the antecedents that predict 
increasing in firm scope; while in RDT, external resources serve as the consequences of 
the increase in firm scope. 
1.2.3 The impacts of institutional environments and firm scope: IT 
IT explains relationship #3 in Figure 1-2. Compared to RBV and RDT, the 
application of IT to explain diversification is more recent. Recent research around the 
world and especially from emerging economies (Delios, Xu & Beamish, 2008a) has 
started to develop an institution-based view on diversification, which complements the 
existing resource-based view on diversification (Peng, 2006). Strategies such as product 
and geographic diversification will be influenced by the institutional environments in 
which firms are embedded (Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson & Peng, 2005).  
Two important aspects of institutional environments have been examined to 
explain firm scope: institutional distance and the unique characteristics of institutional 
environments in emerging economies. The existence of institutional distance increases 
the costs of operating abroad by creating liability of foreignness. The liability of 
foreignness is “the costs of doing business abroad that result in a competitive 
disadvantage for an MNE subunit . . . broadly defined as all additional costs a firm 
operating in a market overseas incurs that a local firm would not incur” (Zaheer, 1995: 
342-3). In other words, institutional distance increases the barrier of foreign entry. 
Accordingly, scholars have long recognized the role of institutional distance, especially 
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cultural distance, in deterring foreign expansion (Benito & Gripsrud, 1992; Grosse & 
Trevino, 1996).   
Other scholars examine how the unique characteristics of emerging economies 
influence firm scope. Many scholars have adopted an institutional theory approach and 
focused on the notion of institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2000b), i.e. the 
institutional weakness of emerging economies (Chakrabarti, Singh & Mahmood, 2007; 
Hoskisson, Eden, Lau & Wright, 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997). This stream of literature 
views unrelated product diversification as an efficient extension of firm boundaries to 
overcome institutional weaknesses. Accordingly, firms pursue unrelated diversification as 
an efficient means of gaining self-generated institutional support. Peng, Lee and Wang 
(2005) proposed that institutional relatedness considerations may motivate firms to 
diversify into conglomerates in emerging economies, while Li and Wong (2003) found 
that firms in China conduct unrelated diversification to better manage institutional 
environment. Similarly, scholars also recognized the unique characteristics of home 
institutional environments in driving geographic diversification. For example, Meyer and 
Boisot (2008) argued that local protectionism and inefficient domestic logistics in China 
prevent firms expanding domestically; as a result, firms invest abroad at an early stage to 
escape from their home institutional environments.  
All of these studies build their conception of the influences on a firm’s 
diversification strategy from the viewpoint that a firm’s social context – its institutional 
environments – can exert an important influence on its strategy formulation and 
implementation.  
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1.2.4 The impacts of resources and firm scope on institutional environments 
The effects of institutional environments on organizations are not one-way. Since 
institutional environments are not static, firms can also influence institutional 
environments. As noted by North (1990:5), “both what organizations come into existence 
and how they evolve are fundamentally influenced by the institutional framework. In turn, 
they influence how the institutional framework evolves”. RBV and RDT collectively 
explain relationships #4 and #5 in Figure 1-2. 
1.2.4.1 RDT and the motivation to influence institutional environments 
Why would firms try to influence institutional environments? RDT provides the 
answer: it is one way that firms exert power over external environments, thus adapting to 
environmental uncertainty (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967).  Since firms 
seek stability and predictability, the most efficient way to reduce uncertainty in 
institutional environments is to try to influence it in a favorable way (Oliver, 1991). The 
reduction of uncertainty will then increase a firm’s chance of survival (Hillman et al., 
1999). 
Resource dependence theorists focused on various active behaviors that firms 
seek to manipulate external dependence or exert power to influence the allocation of 
resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Thompson, 1967). Theoretically, Oliver (1991) 
provided a framework to classify firms’ strategic responses to institutional processes. 
Combining IT and RDT, she identified five different strategic responses: acquiesce, 
compromise, avoid, defy and manipulate. These five responses differ in the active agency 
by the organizations from passivity to active persistence. Manipulation is the most active 
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response because it intends to change or exert power over the sources of institutional 
pressures. It is the attempts of firms to influence institutional environments. 
Within the manipulation tactic, firms can co-opt the sources of the pressure by 
importing influential constituents, influence the institutional values and beliefs and 
criteria of acceptable practices or performance, or control by establishing power and 
dominance over the external constituents that are applying pressures (Oliver, 1991). For 
example, Selznick (1949) showed that outside interests were co-opted by the Tennessee 
Valley Authority and persuaded to support its projects. DiMaggio (1983) showed how 
various art organizations formed lobbying coalitions to influence the funding and support 
allocated to them.  
Perhaps the most commonly used way to influence institutional environments is 
through a firm’s political activities. One of the primary goals of a firm to engage in 
political actions is to change its institutional environment (Sadrieh & Annavarjula, 2005).  
Scholars have examined a wide variety of corporate political tactics (Aplin & Hegarty, 
1980; Baysinger, Keim & Zeithaml, 1985; Keim & Baysinger, 1988). Getz (1993) 
classified firm political activities into seven categories: lobbying, reporting research 
results, reporting survey results, testifying at government hearings, legal actions, personal 
service, and constituency building. Through these political activities, firms hope to 
participate in the public policy process, trying to shape public policy in a way that is 
favorable to them (Hillman et al., 1999). Favorable public policies can provide many 
benefits, such as subsidies, reduced price, and permitted entry into certain industries 
(Marcus, Kaufman & Beam, 1987).  
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1.2.4.2 RBV and the resources of influencing institutional environments 
The benefits of influencing institutional environments, however, do not come 
without costs. Political activities, especially high-track lobbying are uncertain and costly 
(Sadrieh & Annavarjula, 2005). As a result, not every firm has the ability to influence 
institutional environments. To influence institutional environments, it takes a long time 
and a mass amount of interconnected and erosive assets such as human and social capital. 
Moreover, this process is often stochastic and discontinuous and involves causal 
ambiguity. Therefore, the ability to influence institutional environments is a value, rare, 
non-substitutable, and non-imitable resource (Barney, 1991). In fact, the ability to 
influence institutional environments through political intervention is a key resource that 
can be used to gain sustainable competitive advantages (Boddewyn & Brewer, 1994; 
Hillman et al., 1999).  
To create these political resources, many firms develop relationships with the 
government, thus building valuable resources such as human and social capital or 
capability such as access to key decision makers (Lester, Hillman, Zardkoohi & Cannella, 
2008). Tian, Hafsi and Wu (2009) found that Guanxi with government officials help 
Chinese firms effectively implement political strategies. Lester and his colleagues (2008) 
showed that the depth, breadth, and deterioration of former government officials’ human 
and social capital influence the benefits of having them as board members in the sample 
of U.S. firms.    
Firms with larger scope are more likely to influence institutional environments for 
two reasons. First, they have more resources. The resources required to influence 
institutional environments, such as the human and social capital of managers, and the 
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financial capital of the firm, mostly reside in larger firms. RDT posits that power comes 
from the possession of resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). As a result, firms with larger 
scope have more power and resources to influence institutional environments. Moreover, 
the larger the firm scope, the easier it is to absorb the costs of influencing institutional 
environments, such as the costs of maintaining government relationships (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997).  Second, the stakes of influencing institutional environments are higher for 
them. The more firms are affected by government, the more likely firms will try to 
influence the political process in their favor (Hillman et al., 1999). Zardkoohi (1985) 
found a portfolio effect: a diversified firm have greater opportunity to receive favors in at 
least one of the industries it enters. Likewise, a diversified firm has greater opportunity to 
be harmed by government in at least of one of the industries it enters. The rationale is 
similar for large MNEs, which are sometimes actively participating in lobbying as a 
crucial element of the international diplomacy (Sadrieh & Annavarjula, 2005). Given the 
large stakes, large diversified firms are more motivated to engage in activities to 
influence institutional environments. 
Empirically, scholars have shown that large diversified firms are more likely to 
actively conduct political strategy such as lobbying (Sadrieh & Annavarjula, 2005). For 
example, Korean conglomerates generously financed political campaigns (Kraar, 2005). 
The efforts of diversified firms to influence institutional environments are more salient in 
emerging economies because emerging economies are going through changes in their 
institutional environments (He, 2009; Tan, 2005), providing more room for firms to act. 
Intricate relationships between large diversified firms and government are normal in 
emerging economies (Khanna & Palepu, 1997).  
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1.2.5 The impacts of institutional environments on resources: the focus of this 
dissertation 
This dissertation focuses on the impacts of institutional environments on firm 
resources and thus firm scope. It shows that the differences in institutional environments 
make the assumptions described earlier questionable (I will describe it in detail later in 
this section). The relaxation of these assumptions may alter the strategies of firms. As a 
result, it is important to investigate strategic choices such as diversification in different 
institutional environments. In section 1.3, I will describe the research context of emerging 
economies in detail and show how the institutional environments of emerging economies 
differ from those in the developed countries, but before that, I will first introduce the 
theoretical framework of this dissertation. 
The most fundamental proposition that I explore in this dissertation is: 
Proposition 1: Variation in national institutional environments enables and constrains 
different strategic choices. 
 As noted by North (1990: 110), “the economic (and political) models are specific 
to particular constellations of institutional constraints that vary radically both through 
time and cross sectionally in different economies … The models are institution-specific 
and in many cases highly sensitive to altered institutional constraints”. This proposition 
shows the importance and necessity of studying firm strategy in different institutional 
environments.   
Chapter 2 focuses on the construct of distance from the institutional perspective, 
and disaggregates institutional distance into eight different dimensions. I focus on 
distance for two reasons. First, distance creates extra costs in doing business abroad, thus 
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deters foreign entry (Zaheer, 1995). The effects of distance illustrate how differences in 
institutional environments influence firm scope directly. Second, institutional distance 
reflects the variations in institutional environments. The variations provide the grounds to 
examine how institutional environments influence firm scope indirectly by comparing the 
choice of firm scope in different institutional environments. Regarding the first reason, 
chapter 2 investigates the negative impact of distance on international diversification 
strategy. Regarding the second reason, chapter 2 shows that the same distance dimensions 
have different effects on the foreign entry strategy of firms in two different institutional 
environments: China and the U.S. It provides the foundation for further analyses of firm 
strategy in emerging economies in Chapter 3 and 4. Additionally, chapter 2 shows that 
the negative impact of institutional distance on international diversification can be 
mitigated by various firm resources such as R&D intensity and prior foreign entry 
experience. 
After establishing and showing the direct impact of institutional environments on 
firm scope, I further explore how institutional environments influence resources. I then 
explore the following propositions: 
Proposition 2: Firm diversification is driven by resources. 
Proposition 3: Both internal resources and external resources drive firm diversification. 
Proposition 4: Institutional environment influences the development of internal resources 
and the availability of external resources. 
These three propositions guide the analyses in Chapter 3 and 4. Chapter 3 
investigates the impact of institutional environments, especially state ownership and 
government policy, on the globalization of Chinese firms. This chapter shows that firms 
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can rely on either internal resources or external resources to invest abroad, depending on 
their different levels of state ownership. Moreover, it shows that instead of trying to 
reduce their dependence on the government for various resources, managers in state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) increase their dependence on the government by relying on 
external resources provided by the government to invest abroad. In this chapter, I show 
that institutional environments, more specifically government, influence the choice of 
firm scope by influencing the availability of external resources. Chapter 3 relaxes 
assumption 1 and 3 by showing that firms can invest abroad relying solely on external 
resources; and they increase their dependency on the government by investing abroad.   
Besides influencing the availability of external resources, institutional 
environment can also constrain the development of internal resources. A firm’s growth is 
constrained by the resources and capabilities of the firm. As noted by Peng and Heath 
(1996: 498), “the growth of firm is limited by two constraints: (a) its capability to 
articulate and codify its organizational routines and transmit this information to its 
members and (b) its ability to overcome transaction cost and bureaucratic cost problems 
incurred in the course of growth”. 
Chapter 4, then, shows the development of capability to benefit from related 
diversification – one important type of internal resources, is largely missing in firms from 
emerging economies due to the constraints of institutional environments. To benefit from 
related diversification, firms should have two types of capabilities: search and selection, 
and implementation (Helfat, 2007). Search and selection is the capability to recognize 
truly related businesses; and implementation is the capability to exploit resources in 
related businesses. I argue that these capabilities are unusual in firms based in emerging 
  22
economies, due to inexperience and weak investor oversight. The lack of capabilities of 
search and selection will contribute to what I call seemingly related diversification, a type 
of diversification focusing on the relatedness of technologies but not of markets. 
Seemingly related diversification will harm firm performance, especially in emerging 
economies because unlike developed countries where markets are usually assumed to be 
large and homogeneous, markets in emerging economies are small and constrained by 
relationships with customers, government officials, and so forth (Peng & Luo, 2000). In 
such circumstances, markets for technologically similar products may be dissimilar and 
require fundamentally different capabilities. These differences may result in the inability 
of firms to benefit from related diversification in emerging economies. Chapter 4 relaxes 
assumption 2: unlike firms from developed countries, firms in emerging economies lack 
such capabilities to benefit from related diversification, largely due to the institutional 
environment, especially the market conditions and the existence of state ownership.  
The theoretical framework and the connection of different chapters of this 
dissertation are summarized in Figure 1-2. Chapter 2 examines the direct impact of 
institutional distance on firm scope and compares firm strategies in the U.S. and China. It 
lays out the foundation for further investigation. The most important theoretical 
arguments that I make in this dissertation is that institutional environments can influence 
both the internal development of firm resources and the availability of external resources. 
These arguments are examined in chapter 3 and chapter 4. 
Figure 1-4 gives a more concrete illustration of the relationships investigated in 
different chapters. Chapter 2 examines the direct relationship between institutional 
environments and firm scope. It also shows that the existence of firm resources can 
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mitigate the negative impact of institutional distance on firm scope. Chapter 3 examines 
how internal and external resources influence the international diversification of firms. It 
shows that government can influence the availability of external resources, and thus firm 
scope. Chapter 4 investigates how the development of internal resources – the capability 
of benefit from related diversification is constrained by the institutional environments, 
thus harming firm performance. Together, my dissertation shows how institutional 
environments and firm resources jointly determine firm scope. 
--------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1-4 about here 
--------------------------------------- 
1.3 Research Context 
I choose emerging economies as my empirical setting for several reasons. First, 
the institutional environments in emerging economies are sufficiently different from 
those in developed countries (Peng, Wang & Yi, 2008; Wright et al., 2005), giving me a 
large enough variation in institutional environments. The sharp difference makes the 
comparison of the choice of firm scope meaningful. Second, emerging economies are 
developing very fast in the past few years; the investigation of diversification strategy of 
firms from emerging economies itself is an important question (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 
2009). Third, the unique institutional environments in emerging economies have ample 
impacts on a firm’s diversification strategy. For example, diversification could be viewed 
as one way to overcome the institutional voids in emerging economies (Khanna & Palepu, 
1997). Therefore, emerging economies is a good research setting to test the effects of 
institutional environment on firm scope. Fourth, within the broad construct of 
institutional environments, I focus primarily on government in chapter 3 and 4. The 
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impacts of government in business is more prevalent in emerging economies, since many 
emerging economies are transforming from planned economy in which government 
owned almost all firms and controlled many aspects of business (Peng & Heath, 1996). 
Although government in these countries have gradually released the tight control through 
market liberalization and privatization (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Ramamurti, 2000), it 
still remain to be a powerful player in business, through various means such as state 
ownership and government policy. Fifth, the institutional environments in emerging 
economies make the assumptions described earlier questionable. For example, SOEs’ 
reluctance to reduce dependency on the government may be the result of the long-stand 
influence of government on economy in emerging economies (Wang, Zhao, Ning & Yu, 
2009). 
Next, I will describe the research context in more detail. 
1.3.1 Emerging Economies 
The term “emerging economies” was first introduced by International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) in the early 1980s to label the middle-income countries in which 
foreign financial institutions can buy securities (Hoskisson, Johnson, Laszlo & White, 
2005). Over the past decades, the term has been used to include countries that are 
previously labeled as developing countries but with social or business activities in the 
process of rapid growth and industrialization. The scholarly literature has provided many 
different definitions of emerging economies (Hoskisson et al., 2000; Meyer, 2004). For 
instance, Hoskisson and colleagues (2000) define emerging economies as “low-income, 
rapid-growth countries using economic liberalization as their primary engine of growth” 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000: 249). Meyer (2004) defines emerging economies as “mid- or 
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low-income economies with growth potential that makes them attractive for foreign 
investors” (Meyer, 2004: 260). Despite the differences in the definition, almost all 
definitions recognize one characteristic of emerging economies: fast growth. 
The rapid growth of emerging economies has become a global phenomenon in the 
past two decades. GDP from emerging economies grows from $3,573 billion in 1980 to 
$17,881 billion in 2009. In the year of 2009, while the GDP growth rate of advanced 
economies is -3.16%, the GDP growth rate in emerging economies is 2.39% (IMF, 2010). 
Along with the national economic growth, firms from emerging economies are also 
growing rapidly. There have been many large corporations rising from emerging 
economies, such as Tata from India and CITIC group from China. These firms are 
actively involved in both product and geographic diversification. For example, Tata 
group has grown to a conglomerate that conducting business in areas such as information 
technology, engineering, energy, chemical and consumer product.  
1.3.2 Institutional Environments in Emerging Economies 
Although emerging economies are developing fast economically, another defining 
characteristic of emerging economies is their unique institutional environments. In 
emerging economies, many formal institutions, such as laws and regulations that are 
common in developed economies, are absent or do not function well (Khanna & Palepu, 
1997). Khanna and Palepu (1997) identify five factors in institutional environments: 
product market, capital market, labor market, laws and regulations, and contract 
enforcement. They argue that although emerging economies are hardly uniform, they all 
fall short to varying degrees in providing the institutions necessary to support basic 
business operations.  
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In product market, the lack of communication infrastructure, certification agency, 
regulatory authority and extrajudicial arbitration service make it hard for consumers to 
gather product information and also protect their rights. In capital market, information 
asymmetry also occurs because investors refrain from putting money into unfamiliar 
ventures without access to information. The capital market in developed economies 
minimizes problems through various institutional mechanisms such as reliable financial 
reporting and independent financial press. For example, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and other watchdog bodies make it difficult for unscrupulous entrepreneurs 
to mislead unsophisticated investors. However, in emerging economies, almost all the 
institutional mechanisms that make advanced capital market works so well are either 
lacking or ineffective (Ferguson, Lam & Lee, 2002). In labor market, the lack of high 
quality business schools and management institutes creates a shortage of managers. 
Moreover, missing head-hunting firms and relocation services limit the mobility of 
managers (Qu, 2003). The lack of laws and regulations, along with weak contract 
enforcement, makes informal institutions, such as  traditions, convention and codes of 
conduct, important as a complement to formal means of regulating transactions (North, 
1990). As a result, relation-based contracting is prominent in emerging economies (Peng 
& Luo, 2000).  
1.3.3 The impacts of institutional environments on growth strategy 
In general, the lack of well-established product market, capital market and labor 
market in emerging economies, and the lack of government laws and regulations and 
inconsistent enforcement of contracts highlight the uniqueness of institutional 
environments in emerging economies. Many aspects of the institutional environments 
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described above have implications on firms’ growth strategy. Information asymmetry in 
product market where consumers have no redress mechanisms if a product does not 
deliver on its promise creates incentives for firms to diversify, because a diversified firm 
with a reputation for quality products can use its group name to enter new businesses 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997). The inefficient capital market limits the ability of firms to 
raise capital from stock markets and thus firms will have to rely on other sources of 
capital such as bank loans when they diversify (Xiao, 2005). The shortage of high quality 
managers and their limited mobility constrains the ability of a firm to grow since firm 
growth needs the vision and inputs from senior managers (Penrose, 1959). Because 
emerging economies lack effective mechanisms to enforce contracts, firms may 
internalize some of the transactions, thus extending firm boundaries. All these unique 
characteristics of institutional environments in emerging economies suggest the 
importance of investigating growth strategy of firms from emerging economies, which is 
the primary focus of this dissertation. 
1.3.4 China as the research context 
1.3.4.1 Common characteristics 
As the largest emerging economy in the world, China shares with other emerging 
economies some characteristics, such as fast growth and weak institutions. In terms of 
growth, China is one of the leading drivers of economic growth. China surpassed Japan 
as the world’s second-largest economy in the second quarter of 2010 (Hamlin & Li, 
2010), and it is predicted that China will overtake the U.S. as the biggest economy in the 
world as early as 2027 (O'Neill & Stupnytska, 2009). Chinese firms are also growing 
very fast in both product and geographic dimension. Chinese firms has experienced fast 
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growth in term of product diversification: 37% of Chinese listed firms are conglomerates 
in 2002, compared with 14% in 1995 (Zhou & Delios, Forthcoming). China has also 
become the largest outward FDI investor from emerging economies with a total of $61.6 
billion by the end of 2006 (Ministry of Commerce, 2007). 
The institutional environment in China is weak, like most of the other emerging 
economies (Child & Lu, 1996; Tian et al., 2009). Many of the institutions are simply 
missing or not functioning efficiently. For example, the capital market is China has been 
found to be inefficient with inaccurate accounting data and insider trading (Ferguson et 
al., 2002). Similarly, the labor market is not efficient given the lack of markets for 
managers (Qu, 2003). The prevalence of Guanxi in the Chinese community (Peng & Luo, 
2000) shows that informal institutions have been an important substitute to formal 
institutions due to the weakness of formal institutions (Yeung & Tung, 1996). 
1.3.4.2 Unique characteristics 
China, however, has some unique characteristics not shared with other emerging 
economies. In this section, I will discuss the characteristics that are relevant to this 
dissertation, namely the powerful role of the Chinese government. The role of 
government is manifested in mainly two ways, government ownership and government 
policies and regulations. 
Chinese economy from 1950s to 1970s are characterized by central planning and 
economic autarky (Tong, 2009). In such economy, state owned enterprises (SOEs) 
dominate. Inheriting the historic imprints, the continuing prominence of SOEs has 
become a symbol of the Chinese socialist market economy (Tong, 2009). Since the 1990s, 
the Chinese government has begun to privatize a large number of SOEs in Chinese 
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economy. This process, however, is slow and gradual, compared to the privatization 
process in Central and Eastern Europe (Fernandez-Stembridge & Huchet, 2006). There 
are still many SOEs operating in Chinese economy in various sectors. The government 
can influence the operation of these firms through a variety of means, such as the 
appointment and removal of managers, and restructuring and reorganization of SOEs (Ji, 
Lam & Moy, 2005). The prevalence of SOEs and the controlling role of government in 
SOEs is one unique characteristics of China. Chapter 3 of this dissertation shows how 
government influences the globalization strategy of SOEs through state ownership; while 
chapter 4 shows how state ownership exaggerates the negative relationship between 
related diversification and firm performance. 
 Another defining factor of the Chinese economy is that “the rule of the game” is 
different in terms of government policies and regulations (Abrami & Zhang, 2007; Zhang, 
1997). Here I consider the policies and regulations that are relevant to the primary focus 
of this dissertation: expansion of firm scope. The Chinese government has strict 
regulations on business scope of a firm. A firm can only operate within the business 
scope specified in its business license; otherwise, it will be viewed as operating without 
licenses. According to “Measures to investigate and revoke business operating without 
licenses” issued by the State Council on Jan 6th, 2003, the punishment could be the 
revoke of business license and fines as high as half a million RMB. Therefore, whenever 
a firm want to change its product or geographic scope, it has to apply and register with 
the corresponding government agencies within 30 days after the decision has be made, 
according to the “Administration of registration of the scope of business of enterprises 
provisions” promulgated by the State Administration for Industry and Commerce on Jun 
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14th, 2004. The same restrictions apply to changes in the geographic location of firms. A 
firm has to changes its license if it wants to operate in a location different from the one on 
its current business license. These registration and application process usually take 
considerable time and involve multiple government agencies (Chen, 2007; Walton, 2008). 
Besides the strict regulations on changes in product and geographic scope, certain 
industries are classified with “authorized business”, according to the “Regulations of the 
People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Company Registration”. To enter 
these industries, a firm needs to get certain licenses before applying for business licenses. 
For example, to start a hotel, a firm needs to get the “license for special industries” from 
the police station, the “Sanitation permit of public places” from the Department of Health, 
and the “public security permit” from the Public Security Bureau. There are also 
industries that the government does not allow firms to operate, such as the historical relic 
business. 
These regulations create barriers of entry. These barriers do not exist or are much 
lower in other countries (Nee & Opper, 2010; Yau, Lee, Chow, Sin & Tse, 2000). As a 
result, Chinese firms face many difficulties when they try to expand. This, however, does 
not prevent Chinese firms from expanding (Delios et al., 2008b; Zhou & Delios, 
Forthcoming). Firms can overcome these entry barriers through various means. For 
example, the government involvement in these processes highlights the importance of 
Guanxi in business (Peng & Luo, 2000). A firm that maintains good relationships with 
the government will face lower entry barriers than firms without such relationships (Nee 
& Opper, 2010; Xin & Pearce, 1996; Yau et al., 2000).  
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Meanwhile, there are government policies encouraging firms to go abroad, as I 
described in chapter 3. The incentives provided by the government may encourage firms 
to internationalize. Overall, either by encouraging or constraining, government has ample 
influence on business operations of all types of firms through policies and regulations.  
1.3.4.3 Applicability of the findings in this dissertation 
Given the unique characteristics of China, it is important to discuss the 
applicability of the results in this dissertation. I will start from the findings that I believe 
are applicable to other emerging economies and then discuss the ones that are less 
applicable. 
First, fast growth economy is one common characteristic of emerging economies. 
Firms within the fast-growth economy face the pressure to grow. Such pressure will push 
firms to grow, but firms are inexperienced in such expansion, especially in the former 
Soviet countries where firms are used to operate in planned economy (Brown, 1995; 
Pomfret, 2003). The findings in chapter 4 shows that inexperience in firm growth may 
lead to the difficulty of benefiting from related diversification. This finding, I believe, is 
applicable to other emerging economies that are transiting from planned economy to 
market economy, such as the Central and Eastern Europe countries. 
Second, it is well recognized that emerging economies are characterized by 
institutional voids (Khanna & Palepu, 1997). My arguments in chapter 3 suggest that the 
lack of markets for managers make the risk of losing their job extremely high since it is 
hard for them to find another job in the absence of such markets (Brouthers, Gelderman 
& Arens, 2007; Qu, 2003). In chapter 4, I argue that the difficulty of acquiring 
complementary assets is partly due to the lack or inefficiency of such markets. These 
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arguments, I believe, are applicable to most emerging economies with institutional voids 
in various aspects in their economies. 
Third, privatization is an important way through which the government vitalizes 
the state sector (Megginson & Netter, 2001; Zahra, Ireland, Gutierrez & Hitt, 2000). It is 
happening in both emerging economies and developed countries. The findings in chapter 
3 show that partially privatized firms are indeed becoming market-oriented and 
performance sensitive. This finding is largely consistent with the vast literature on 
privatization in both emerging economies and developed countries (Andrews & Dowling, 
1998; de Castro & Uhlenbruck, 1997; Koppell, 2007). 
Fourth, various studies have shown that SOEs suffer from severe agency problem 
(Cauley & Sandler, 2001; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Xia, Li & Long, 2009), because the 
public as the owners does not have the capability to monitor the operations of a firm 
(Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000; Xu, 1996).  Chapter 4 shows that SOEs do suffer from 
agency problem and the problem exaggerates the negative impact of related 
diversification on firm performance. Meanwhile, scholars have shown that SOEs are risk-
averse in different empirical settings, such as Central and Eastern Europe (Carlin & 
Landesmann, 1997; Estrin, 1994). The findings in chapter 3 imply that SOEs are risk-
averse, consistent with the existing literature.  
Fifth, chapter 3 argues market fragmentation within the country makes it difficult 
to expand domestically. In chapter 4, I also argue that market fragmentation contributes 
to the negative impact of seemingly related diversification on firm performance. It is 
important to consider whether market fragmentation is common in emerging economies. 
A close examination shows that large emerging economies would face fragmented 
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domestic market. For example, Russia faces fragmented markets due to its broad 
geographic area (Berkowitz & DeJong, 2001) while India faces fragmented markets due 
to the different language and culture within the same country (Studer, 2008). However, 
smaller emerging economies may have homogeneous domestic markets, thus, the 
findings described above may not be applicable to these countries. 
We should note that China does have several unique characteristics as described 
in section 1.3.4.2. The Chinese government is powerful, as exemplified by the large 
number of SOEs and various government policies and regulations that influence business 
transactions. The question is then, whether it is a difference of a kind or degree. I believe 
it is the latter. If we think the level of government influence as a continuous variable from 
minimum to maximum, China resides on the right hand close to the maximum while 
western countries reside on the left hand close to minimum (OECD, 2007; Randall & 
Telesio, 1995). Indeed, China is unique; however, it does not mean that the findings in 
China have no meanings to other countries. If a country wants to increase its level of 
government involvement in business, it may look at China first as an example and learn 
from China’s experience. Of course, the evolvement of government is path-dependent 
(Caselli & Morelli, 2004; Reid, 2006), and it is unclear whether any country could reach 
a point that is similar to China. But we should also note that every country, especially 
every emerging economy, is unique (Bruton, Ahlstrom & Puky, 2009; Wright, 1997). We 
cannot expect an emerging economy to be representative of all other emerging economies 
in every aspect. 
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1.4 Dissertation Overview 
1.4.1 An Institutional Approach to Cross-National Distance 
To explore the strategic differences between firms from emerging economies and 
developed countries, this dissertation first focuses on their sources: distance. Distance is 
an important construct and international business scholars have been interested in 
understanding the impact of cross-national differences on various variables such as 
foreign entry mode and performance (Barkema, Bell & Pennings, 1996; Kogut & Singh, 
1988; Park & Ungson, 1997). However, these studies yield conflicting results (Slangen & 
Hennart, 2007), possibly due to scholars’ over reliance on Hofestede’s one dimensional 
cultural distance.  
Distance is indeed a multi-dimensional concept; therefore, chapter 2 disaggregates 
the construct of distance from an institutional perspective by proposing a set of 
multidimensional measures, including economic, financial, political, administrative, 
cultural, demographic, knowledge, and global connectedness. It grounds the analysis and 
choice of empirical dimensions on institutional theories of national business, governance, 
and innovation systems. In order to overcome the limitations of the Euclidean approach, 
Chapter 2 calculates dyadic distances using the Mahalanobis method, which is scale-
invariant and takes into consideration the variance-covariance matrix. Moreover, it 
conducts two empirical illustrations. The first illustration empirically analyzes four 
different foreign expansion choices of US companies to illustrate the importance of 
disaggregating the distance construct and the usefulness of the distance calculations.  It 
also examines how the choice of foreign entry is influenced by both internal firm 
resources and external national distance. Factors such as R&D intensity and firm 
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experience mitigate the negative impact of national distance on the probability of foreign 
entry. The second illustration examines the effects of distance on the foreign entry 
strategies of Chinese firms. It shows that the same distance dimensions have different 
effects for firms from China and U.S. This result highlights the importance to study firm 
strategy in emerging economies since firm from emerging economies are indeed different 
in their strategic choices. 
After showing the importance of difference in institutional environments, I focus 
on the product and geographic diversification strategy of Chinese listed firms. 
1.4.2 Government Corporation and Globalization 
Scholars in international business have long been interested in answering the 
question of why firms invest abroad even though they face higher costs in entering 
foreign countries (Hymer, 1976). Various theories have been developed to explain 
foreign expansions, such as internalization theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976), product life 
cycle theory (Vernon, 1979), oligopolistic reaction theory (Knickerbocker, 1973), 
knowledge-based view (Kogut & Zander, 1992) and OLI paradigm (Dunning, 1993). One 
common feature of many theories is that firms must have some proprietary advantages to 
overcome the extra costs of going abroad (Caves, 1996; Hymer, 1976). For example, 
Dunning’s OLI paradigm posits that firms should possess ownership-specific advantages 
and internalization advantages that could be exploited in foreign markets to go abroad 
(Dunning, 1993).  
Empirically, scholars have validated this argument. Many studies have shown that 
the possession of valuable internal resources leads to successful foreign expansions 
(Berry & Sakakibara, 2008; Feinberg & Gupta, 2004; Morck & Yeung, 1992; Tallman & 
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Li, 1996). Most of these studies, however, examine MNEs from developed countries, 
such as US (Morck & Yeung, 1992; Tallman & Li, 1996) and Japan (Berry & 
Sakakibara, 2008; Delios & Beamish, 1999).  
MNEs from emerging economies are developing rapidly in the last two decades. 
Large firms from emerging economies such as Brazil, Russia, India and China have 
become active players in global markets. Although the rise of MNEs from emerging 
economies has become an important phenomenon in the world economy, the scholarly 
literature has not paid much attention to it (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). Many studies in 
this area are either theoretical pieces (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Morck, Yeung & Zhao, 
2008) or investigate the role of country-level rather than firm-level factors in determining 
outward FDI from emerging economies (Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, Voss & Zheng, 
2007). Empirical studies have documented  that many MNEs from emerging economies 
invest abroad either to acquire strategic assets (Chen & Chen, 1998; Makino, Lau & Yeh, 
2002) or to exploit ownership advantages that are not the same as those in MNEs from 
developed countries (Lall, 1983). MNEs from emerging economies are different from 
MNEs in developed countries in many aspects such as the motivation and patterns of 
international expansion, thus calling for new theories to explain the rise of MNEs from 
emerging economies (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 2009). 
To better understand the internationalization of firms from emerging economies, 
Chapter 3 examines the role of government in the globalization process. I argue that 
government influences both the motivation and resources of firms when they go aboard. 
More specifically, I show that compared to partially privatized enterprises (PPEs) and 
fully privatized enterprises (FPEs), state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are less likely to go 
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abroad as a result of their risk-averse nature. They also differ in terms of the resources 
they rely on when they go abroad. SOEs rely on external resource from the government 
rather than internal resources; while PPEs reply on internal firm-specific ownership 
advantages rather than external government resources to invest abroad. In addition, 
because external resources are largely controlled by the government in China, a 
government policy that encourages firms to go abroad changes the availability of external 
resources, but not internal resources. As a result, SOEs are more willing to invest abroad 
after the policy while the decision of PPEs and FPEs remain unchanged. An empirical 
investigation of the FDI activities of Chinese-listed firms in high-tech industries between 
1991 and 2007 supports the arguments.  
1.4.3 Related Product Diversification and Firm Performance 
Product diversification, or diversification across business lines, is a common 
corporate strategy (Rumelt, 1974).  The extent of product diversification has important 
implications for both the competitiveness of a firm and its overall performance. 
Researchers have studied the relationship between diversification and performance 
widely and generally found an inverted U-shape relationship between diversification and 
performance in developed economies: performance improves as firms move from 
specialization to related diversification but deteriorates as firms move from related to 
unrelated diversification (Palich et al., 2000). Their main argument is that related 
diversification adds value because capabilities existing in the firm can be applied across 
several businesses while unrelated diversification imposes heavy organizational costs, 
offsetting the benefits of diversification. 
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In emerging economies, however, unrelated diversification may be beneficial. The 
existing literature offers essentially two explanations for the success of unrelated 
diversification: transaction costs and capabilities. The transaction cost approach views 
unrelated diversification as an efficient extension of firm boundaries to solve the problem 
of market imperfection (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Leff, 1978); the capability approach 
makes the argument that capability to leverage local and foreign contacts enables firms in 
emerging economies to enter unrelated businesses successfully (Guillen, 2000; Kock & 
Guillen, 2001) and this capability is rare, valuable, non-imitable and non-substitutable; 
and can be used repeated without losing value (Guillen, 2000). 
One notable gap in the literature on the relationship between product 
diversification and firm performance in emerging economies is that scholars largely focus 
on the benefits of unrelated diversification, neglecting to address the difficulties of 
related diversification. They assume that firms have the capability to benefit from related 
diversification. This assumption, I believe, does not always hold, especially in emerging 
economies where the development of such capability is constrained by the institutional 
environments.  
             As an attempt to fill in this gap, Chapter 4 focuses on the failure of related 
diversification in emerging economies through a capability perspective. This chapter 
investigates the relationship between related diversification and firm performance in the 
context of emerging economies. Although related diversification is believed to be 
beneficial to firm performance for various reasons such as resource exploitation, this 
chapter shows that seemingly related diversification, a type of diversification focusing on 
the relatedness of technologies but not of markets, will harm firm performance. 
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Moreover, even though a firm is able to identify a truly related business, the lack of 
implementation capability still makes it difficult for firms to benefit from related 
diversification. As a result, both seemingly related diversification and related 
diversification are negatively associated with firm performance in emerging economies. 
Additionally, the negative impact of related diversification on firm performance is 
moderated by firm experience and state ownership. The empirical tests on a population of 
Chinese firms listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange from 1993 to 2006 support the 
arguments. 
1.5 Intended Contributions 
The intended contribution of this dissertation is three-fold. First, this dissertation 
examines how institutional environments influence resources by constraining the 
development of internal resources and influencing the availability of external resources. 
Although previous studies on RBV, RDT and IT have applied these theories to explain 
firm scope, they remain largely isolated. More research is needed to integrate research in 
different theoretical perspectives2. Linking these theories together and examining their 
interactions remain a largely unexplored area. This dissertation helps us understand the 
impact of institutional environments on firm scope from another perspective: institutional 
environments can influence firm scope through their influence on firm resources. Chapter 
2 examines how internal resources and capabilities can mitigate the negative impact of 
external national distance on the internationalization process. Chapter 3 examines the 
motivation and the source of resources when firms go abroad. PPEs rely on internal 
resources and capabilities, as predicted by RBV while SOEs rely on external government 
                                                 
2
 For example, Hillman, Withers and Collins (2009) suggest that the integration of RDT with other theoretical 
perspectives such as RBV and IT provides a promising future for the development of RDT. 
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resources to conduct FDI. Government provides resources that firms can utilize when 
they go abroad. By providing these resources, government influences the availability of 
resources in external environments. Chapter 4 shows institutional environment constrains 
the development of resources and capabilities, especially the capabilities to benefit from 
related diversification. 
Second, this dissertation advances our understanding of both product diversification 
and internationalization in emerging economies. Emerging economies are characterized 
by various unique features, such as institutional voids, a large number of government 
corporations, and young private sectors (Peng & Delios, 2006). All of these 
characteristics render the applicability of theories and findings in the western context to 
emerging economies. Therefore, scholars interested in emerging economies should be 
cautious in applying existing theories and should try to develop new theories to explain 
firm strategy in emerging economies (Barney & Zhang, 2009; Whetten, 2009). This 
dissertation aims to develop theories and provide empirical evidence to better understand 
firm strategy in emerging economies. Chapter 4 shows that the relationship between 
related product diversification and firm performance is different in emerging economies. 
This chapter contributes to the literature by showing that related diversification is not 
always beneficial and firms may actually need to learn how to benefit from it. It is a good 
supplement to existing theories on the benefits of unrelated diversification (Guillen, 
2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).  Together, they provide a complete picture of the 
relationship between product diversification and firm performance for firms in emerging 
economies. Similarly, the findings of Chapter 3 also show the applicability of existing 
theories to emerging economies is limited. The internalization theory, a dominant theory 
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in explaining globalization, is only applicable to PPEs that seek to exploit their key 
resources in foreign markets. It is not applicable to SOEs which invest abroad to gain 
legitimacy. SOEs will rely on external government resources to go abroad rather than 
internal firm resources. 
This dissertation also contributes to the international business literature 
empirically by providing a set of multi-dimensional measures of cross-national distances. 
Instead of relying on the widely-used Hofstede approach and measures of cultural 
distance, chapter 2 uses institutional theories of national business, governance and 
innovation systems to ground the conceptual definitions, analysis, and choice of 
empirical dimensions and indicators. The new measures are made publicly available to all 
researchers, with the intent to help them use distance measures that match their research 
questions. Perhaps this new approach can help resolve some of the inconsistencies 
reported in the literature concerning the effects of national distance on various strategies 
such as foreign entry mode choice and human resource practices, given that each of these 
questions may possibly require the use of different dimensions and measures of distance. 
 
The remainder of the dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 develops a 
new set of measures for institutional distance, including eight dimensions. It also 
empirically tests the impact of distance on the choice of foreign entry decisions of U.S. 
and Chinese firms; and how these impacts are influenced by various factors such as firm 
resources and capabilities. Chapter 3 investigates how government influences the 
motivation and resources of Chinese firms when they go abroad. Chapter 4 explores the 
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relationship between related diversification and firm performance in the context of China. 
Chapter 5 summarizes the dissertation and discusses its contribution and implication. 
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Figure 1-2 Resources, Institutional Environments and Firm Scope3 
                                                 
3
 RBV stands for Resource-Based View, RDT stands for Resource Dependence Theory, and IT stands for Institutional Theory. 
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Figure 1-3 RBV, RDT and IT4 
  
  
                                                 
4
 RBV stands for Resource-Based View, RDT stands for Resource Dependence Theory, and IT stands for Institutional 
Theory. 
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Figure 1-4 Dissertation Overview 
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CHAPTER 2 AN INSTITUTIONAL APPROACH TO CROSS-NATIONAL 
DISTANCE5 
2.1 Introduction 
The field of international business has paid much attention to the impact of cross-
national distance on the decision to enter specific countries, the sequence of market entry, 
and the choice of entry mode, among others. These research questions lie at the core of 
the field of international business, and researchers have for decades used cross-national 
distance as a main explanatory variable (for a review of the literature, see Werner, 2002). 
These fundamental decisions have been explored by scholars ever since the founder of 
the field, Stephen Hymer (1960), noted that a key factor shaping the a firm’s 
internationalization was the so-called “liability of foreignness,” which increases with the 
distance between home and host countries. The eclectic paradigm (Dunning, 1993) also 
calls the attention to cross-national distance, and distinctively proposed to look at 
ownership, location, and internalization factors from a multi-dimensional perspective. In 
this view, countries may be “distant” from each other not only in the geographic sense, 
but also in other dimensions.  Economic, social, cultural or political differences make it 
harder for firms to operate across them. 
In spite of decades of research, the field has not yet provided a comprehensive 
analysis of the fact that countries differ from one another on a number of dimensions. 
Table 2-1 summarizes the definition, dimensions, and consequences of cross-national 
distance as articulated in the four most influential articles on cross-national distance. 
From a conceptual point of view, international business scholars have tended to define 
                                                 
5
 This chapter builds on a forthcoming JIBS paper coauthored with Heather Berry and Mauro Guillen. I add additional 
analyses using Chinese data.  
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distance in broad terms, but measured it rather narrowly. For instance, Johanson & 
Vahlne (1977:24) alluded to “differences in language, education, business practices, 
culture, and industrial development” as relevant dimensions. Similarly, Kogut & Singh 
(1988:413), referred generically to the “characteristics of a foreign market,” and 
proceeded to calculate dyadic distances between pairs of countries using Hofstede’s 
(1980) cultural constructs, namely, uncertainty avoidance, power distance, individualism, 
and masculinity. For their part, Barkema, Bell and Pennings (1996:153) mentioned 
“linguistic, institutional, cultural, and political factors,” but measured the construct in 
terms of cultural distance and cultural blocs of countries. Lastly, Hennart & Larimo 
(1998:517), who approached distance from a transaction-cost perspective, restricted their 
definition to “national cultural characteristics of the home and host countries,” measuring 
it using Hofstede’s data.   
As noted in the last column of Table 2-1, international business scholars have 
argued that cross-national differences of a psychic or cultural nature increase uncertainty 
by preventing information or knowledge to flow between countries, thus increasing the 
cost of doing business across borders, i.e. the transaction costs associated with 
international business. Though conceptually recognizing the multi-dimensional nature of 
distance, most international business scholars have undertaken empirical work on cross-
national distance effectively paying attention to one single dimension. And, as noted 
above, most researchers have used Hofstede’s (1980) data to empirically measure 
distance. 
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2-1 about here 
----------------------------------- 
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This paper proposes to conceptualize distance and its effects in terms of the 
differences between two objects.  I approach cross-national distance from an institutional 
perspective so as to capture the rich diversity of ways in which countries differ, thus 
following recent institutional theorizing in the field of international business (Jackson & 
Deeg, 2008; Pajunen, 2008). I define distance in dyadic terms: two countries are distant 
from each other to the extent that they are institutionally different along a number of 
dimensions. I justify the choice of a comprehensive set of eight dimensions of distance by 
reference to established and widely used institutional theories of cross-national business, 
governance, and innovation systems (Henisz & Williamson, 1999; la Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, 1998; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993; Whitley, 1992). Taken 
together, these theories propose eight dimensions of distance, namely, economic, 
financial, political, administrative, cultural, demographic, knowledge, and global 
connectedness.  I use these theories and the massive body of empirical work they have 
inspired to select empirical indicators for each of these eight dimensions. Although not 
based on institutional differences, I also propose to include sheer geographic distance as a 
relevant dimension, thus bringing the total of distance dimensions to nine. 
Defining and measuring cross-national distance along multiple dimensions is 
important because different types of distance can impact firm, managerial or individual 
decisions in different ways, depending on the dimension of distance under examination. 
For instance, while geographic distance may create higher barriers for managers 
contemplating entry, less economic distance may help to diminish the impact of 
geography because the demand for a firm’s products across countries with more similar 
buying habits may offset the higher difficulties associated with larger geographic 
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distance. While political distance may dissuade firms from setting up a distribution 
subsidiary, it may encourage setting up a manufacturing subsidiary that produces 
products for the host country. Armed with a multi-dimensional definition and empirical 
operationalization of distance, I argue that we can better understand when and why 
different types of distance have either a positive or negative impact on managerial 
decisions, country trade patterns, or even political relationships across countries.   
Given the multidimensional nature of distance, I propose to use the Mahalanobis 
method of calculating dyadic distances, which surmounts key limitations of previous 
research based on the Euclidean approach because it is scale-invariant and takes into 
consideration the variance-covariance matrix, a feature that facilitates approaching 
distance as a construct made of multiple, partially overlapping dimensions. The distance 
calculations are made freely available to managers and scholars in the hope that the 
multidimensional dataset can be used to test how different dimensions of distance affect 
decisions and outcomes at the individual, firm, and country levels of analysis.  To 
illustrate the potential application of the multidimensional approach, I examine several 
choices of foreign entry by U.S. and Chinese companies. In the US setting, I explore how 
the different distance dimensions are likely to influence the initial and sequential entry 
decisions of firms, the choice of manufacturing versus distribution subsidiaries, the 
choice between high and low income countries in which to invest, and the choices of high 
versus low R&D intensive firms.  Considering improved model fit, higher explained 
variance and the differential effects of the distance measures, the empirical illustrations 
demonstrate the importance of disaggregating the distance construct and the usefulness of 
the distance calculations. The tests using the Chinese sample further confirm the findings 
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in the U.S. sample and also show the different effects of distance dimensions in different 
settings. I conclude by suggesting several other research questions that may be amenable 
to a more multidimensional approach to cross-national distance. 
2.2 Existing Approaches to Cross-National Distance 
The most widely used approach to cross-national distance is based on Geert 
Hofstede’s four measures of culture, made originally available in his 1980 book, 
Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values (for a review 
of its impact, see Kirkman, Lowe and Gibson, 2006). Hofstede’s cultural distance has 
been used in various studies investigating different research questions, summarized in 
Table 2-2.  
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2-2 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
International business scholars found his approach appealing for two reasons. 
First, the emphasis on flows of information between the home and host countries lends 
itself to a conceptualization based on cultural and psychic differences, which raise the 
uncertainty and hence the costs of foreign expansion (Barkema et al., 1996; Hennart & 
Larimo, 1998; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Kogut & Singh, 1988). Second, Hofstede 
offered a set of cultural indicators for a large sample of countries. He collected the data 
through a questionnaire-based survey among managers of IBM subsidiaries around the 
world conducted between 1967 and 1973 (the firm is referred to as “Hermes” in the 
book). Hofstede performed a factor analysis of the survey responses and proposed power 
distance, uncertainty avoidance, individualism, and masculinity as the key distinguishing 
aspects of national culture. He then used a few selected questions in the survey to 
  52
measure each dimension. Originally, only forty countries were covered. In subsequent 
additions, the data were made available for a total of 53 countries, less than one third of 
the total number of countries in the world (Hofstede, 2001: 491-502).  
While many management scholars have embraced Hofstede’s cultural scores as 
the basis of measures of cross-national distance, criticisms of this approach abound, 
especially in the fields of international business (Guillén & Suárez, 2001; Shenkar, 2001) 
marketing (Ng, Lee & Soutar, 2007), and accounting (Baskerville, 2003). First, Hofstede 
reduced all cross-national differences to the dimension of culture, thus failing to capture 
the rich array of dimensions along which countries differ from one another (Ghemawat, 
2001). Recent scholarship has pointed out that several of Hofstede’s cultural variables 
have their roots in economic, language, religion, and legal factors (Tang & Koveos, 
2008). Second, Hofstede assumed that cross-national distances do not change over time. 
This assumption has been undermined by recent sociological research, which 
demonstrates that cultural distance, let alone economic or political distance, can change 
over time quite rapidly (Inglehart & Baker, 2000; Shenkar, 2001; Webber, 1969). Third, 
when researchers use Hofstede’s cultural measures to study the behavior of individual 
manager, they may infer an error in interpretation if they assume that individual members 
of a group have the average characteristics of the population at large.  This type of error 
is called an ecological fallacy and results when one deduces conclusions about 
individuals based on aggregate or population-level data.  Fourth and related to the third 
criticism, Hofstede assumed that the managers of a single corporation (i.e. IBM) are 
representative of the overall population in a given country (Lu, 2006; Smith, 1996). 
Moreover, it is possible that the cultural distance perceived by employees in a cross-
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cultural organization like IBM is smaller than the actual cultural distance between the 
two countries due to interactions between employees of the same company (Lu, 2006). 
Because of these shortcomings, Hofstede’s cultural distance scores are not widely used in 
other social sciences like sociology and anthropology (Baskerville, 2003), although they 
continue to be popular in international management research.   
Given these issues, it should not be surprising that the empirical findings based on 
Hofstede’s cultural scores can be ambiguous and contradictory. In Table 2-3, I 
summarize conflicting results that have been found by scholars in the international 
business, human resource and entrepreneurship literatures. For example, in the subfield of 
international strategy, researchers have reported different results regarding the effects of 
cultural distance on subsidiary performance or foreign entry mode. Padmanabhan and 
Cho (1996) found that larger cultural distance encourages full ownership, Brouthers and 
Brouthers (2001) concluded that larger cultural distance encourages joint ownership, and 
Erramilli (1996) found larger cultural distance to have no significant effect on majority 
versus minority ownership.  In the entrepreneurship literature, different dimensions of 
cultural distance have been found to be associated with entrepreneurial orientation. For 
example, Mueller and Thomas (2001) found that lower uncertainty avoidance increased 
entrepreneurial orientation while Mitchell, Smith, Seawright and Morse (2000) found that 
power distance and individualism entrepreneurial behavior.  And in human resource 
management, the influence of cultural distance on the similarity between the parent’s and 
the subsidiary’s HRM systems has also yielded different results depending on the study.  
For example, Gong (2003) found that larger cultural distance increases the proportion of 
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expats while Rosenzweig and Nohria (1994) examined how cultural distance can result in 
very different human resource management systems across parents and subsidiaries.   
----------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2-3 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
From both a macro and a micro perspective, studies using Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions have yielded not only conflicting results, but also evidence suggesting that 
additional dimensions of distance beyond cultural need to be incorporated if one is to 
understand how different aspects of distance affect decisions and outcomes at the 
individual, firm, and country levels. These studies show not only the limitations of using 
a distance variable that is based exclusively on a cultural dimension, but also the 
importance of articulating and exploring how different dimensions of distance can impact 
the research question under consideration.  While cultural distance can impact entry 
mode choice, so too can geographic, economic or knowledge dimensions of distance. If a 
firm is trying to use a joint venture to access knowledge, this needs to be incorporated 
into the model before one can gauge the impact of cultural distance as a separate 
construct. Similarly, the use of expatriate managers can be affected not only by the 
cultural distance between countries, but also the economic and knowledge distance across 
countries. Expats can play a different role in countries with different levels of economic 
development, and the cost of expatriation can also be much lower in some countries than 
others.  As I will explore in more detail below, the choice of country to enter is driven by 
a different dimension of cross-national distance depending on whether the foreign 
subsidiary is engaged in distribution or in manufacturing. Trade barriers and policies are 
likely to play very different roles depending on whether a firm is trying to sell products in 
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a local market that have been produced elsewhere or tap into lower costs of production to 
serve other markets. Similarly, the choices of firms with high and low R&D intensive 
products are likely to be impacted in different ways across countries with different 
demographic profiles or cultural values. Thus, the conceptual and empirical analysis will 
show that reducing cross-national differences to cultural distance is a generalization that 
obscures rather than illuminates. 
Over the last few years, scholars have developed measures of cultural distance 
that represent a conceptual and empirical improvement over Hofstede’s. One of them is 
Schwartz’s (1992, 1994) cultural values framework, which has the advantages of deriving 
the values from theory, offering a more comprehensive set of dimensions, being based on 
two matched samples of more diverse and representative populations (students and 
teachers), and having collected the data more recently, from 1988 to 1992 (Ng et al., 
2007). Some empirical studies have shown the validity of Schwartz’s cultural values. For 
example, Drogendijk & Slangen (2006) found that Schwartz’s framework is better than 
Hofstede’s distance when it comes to explaining foreign entry mode choice by 
multinational enterprises. 
Another alternative to Hofstede’s cultural distance is the Global Leadership and 
Organizational Behavior Effectiveness (GLOBE) study, conducted during the late 1990s 
by a research team comprised of more than one hundred scholars from all over the world. 
GLOBE focuses on nine constructs, namely, performance orientation, future orientation, 
gender egalitarianism, assertiveness, institutional collectivism, in-group collectivism, 
power distance, humane orientation, and uncertainty avoidance (House et al., 2004: 16). 
In this sense, GLOBE is more comprehensive and recent than Hofstede’s study, but it 
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suffers from the same problems of uni-dimensionality (i.e. only cultural aspects are 
considered), ecological fallacy, time-invariance, and representativeness mentioned above. 
Scholars studying leadership have used the GLOBE data to measure cultural distance. 
For example, Hytter (2007) adopted the GLOBE framework and data to study leader 
retention strategies in France and Sweden. Hofstede (2006) compared the similarities and 
differences between GLOBE and his approach. The dimensions in GLOBE are derived 
from Hofstede, though for conceptual reasons they were expanded to nine dimensions.  
Hofstede re-factor analyzed the country scores and found five meta-factors to emerge.  
The strongest was highly correlated with GNP per capita and the next with Hofstede’s 
power distance.  Three factors significantly correlated with Hofstede’s uncertainty 
avoidance, individualism and long-term orientation.  Hofstede’s conclusion from this 
analysis is that in spite of a very different approach, the GLOBE study still reflects the 
structure of his original model.   
Yet another recent line of research has focused on extending the concept of 
psychic distance.  Dow and Karunaratna (2006) and Brewer (2007) have argued that a 
broader set of psychic distance scales is needed to understand both entry mode choices 
and psychic distance between countries more generally. Dow and Karanuaratna (2006) 
propose that language, religion, development level, education and political systems need 
to be examined when considering firm entry mode choices. Brewer (2007) has also 
expanded the measurement of psychic distance and focused on trade, political and social 
ties across nations. I share these authors’ concerns about the way psychic distance has 
typically been measured. 
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Perhaps the most comprehensive attempt to broaden the study of cross-national 
distance is Ghemawat’s (2001) four-dimensional approach: cultural, administrative, 
geographic and economic distance (CAGE). Beyond the specific dimensions, this paper 
changed the way in which strategy and international business researchers see the issue of 
cross-national distance by focusing the attention on its multidimensional nature. Still, 
Ghemawat’s approach does not go far enough in recognizing the complexities of distance 
given that it does not take into consideration important dimensions I will discuss below, 
including variables related to finance, politics, demography, knowledge, and global 
connectedness. In addition, Ghemawat does not offer guidance as to the specific 
empirical indicators to be used to capture each of the four dimensions that he discusses.   
In sum, previous scholarship on cross-national distance has tended to be one-
dimensional and time-invariant in nature. It has also based its measures on data that are 
not entirely representative of the rich and diverse characteristics of countries. At most, 
less than one third of the total number of countries in the world is included. Moreover, 
the method of calculation used does not generally take into consideration differences in 
measurement scales or correlations between the underlying variables. As I argue below, 
this limited characterization of cross-national distance is not sufficient to capture the 
manifold ways in which countries differ from one another.   
2.3 A New Approach to Cross-National Distance 
  The key problem with previous research on cross-national distance and its 
impact is the lack of a theoretical framework that accommodates the different dimensions 
along which countries differ from one another. I provide such a framework by grounding 
the analysis and choice of distance dimensions and empirical indicators in institutional 
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theories of cross-national differences. Following recent institutional theorizing in the 
field of international business (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Pajunen, 2008), I base the 
approach on three conceptualizations of cross-national institutions that have attracted 
enormous attention and induced a large empirical literature. The first theoretical 
perspective on cross-national distance was pioneered by management scholar Richard 
Whitley (1992) and is focused on the concept of “national business systems” (Whitley, 
1992). The second was formulated by management scholar Witold Henisz and economist 
Oliver Williamson (1999), and by economists Rafael La Porta, Florencio López-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (1998). It emphasizes the implications of 
differences in national systems of governance. The third was proposed by economist 
Richard Nelson and economic historian Nathan Rosenberg (1993). Each of these 
conceptualizations of cross-national institutional differences has encouraged hundreds of 
empirical studies. Let us analyze theoretical tradition to cross-national institutions in turn, 
identifying the different dimension of distance discussed in them. 
National business systems are “particular arrangements of hierarchy-market 
relations becoming institutionalized and relatively successful in particular contexts” 
(Whitley, 1992:10). Countries differ to varying degrees in terms of the characteristics of 
their business systems, specifically their economic, financial, and administrative 
practices. Whitley (1992: 231) argued that such differences originate in demographic, 
geographic, cultural, and political institutions, which make some countries more 
different, or distant, than others from a given focal country, a characteristic that affects 
managerial decisions. 
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A second important thrust in the literature on cross-national institutions deals with 
governance. National governance systems refer to the “set of incentives, safeguards, and 
dispute-resolution processes used to order the activities of various corporate 
stakeholders” such as owners (i.e. shareholders), managers, workers, creditors, suppliers 
and customers (Kester, 1996:109). They originate in administrative (including legal) and 
political institutions that historically make certain stakeholders more powerful in certain 
countries than others (Glendon, Gordon & Osakwe, 1994; Henisz & Williamson, 1999; 
Henisz, 2000; la Porta et al., 1998). While this theoretical tradition emphasizes a smaller 
set of institutional dimensions than the theory of business systems, the underlying logic is 
also one of institutional variation that produces longer distances between countries. 
Governance dimensions are also relevant to managerial decisions because firms need to 
establish relationships with stakeholders in order to operate in a given country. 
Finally, national innovation systems refer to configurations of institutions that foster 
the development of technology and innovation (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993). A central 
tenet documented by this literature is that countries differ in their ability to produce 
knowledge and in the extent to which they can leverage that knowledge by being 
connected to other countries (Furman, Porter & Stern, 2002; Porter, 1990). Once again, 
while the theory of national innovation systems focuses the attention on another set of 
dimensions of cross-national variation, the argument is that such differences generate 
varying distances between pairs of countries. 
Following these institutional theories of national business, governance, and 
innovation systems, I argue that distance between countries is eminently multi-
dimensional, including the eight dimensions discussed by institutional approaches: 
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economic (Whitley, 1992), financial (la Porta et al., 1998; Whitley, 1992), political 
(Henisz, 2000; Whitley, 1992), administrative (Henisz & Williamson, 1999; Henisz, 
2000; la Porta et al., 1998; Whitley, 1992), cultural (Hofstede, 1980; Inglehart, 2004; 
Whitley, 1992), demographic (Whitley, 1992), knowledge (Furman et al., 2002; Nelson 
& Rosenberg, 1993), and connectedness (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993).  These eight 
dimensions of distance represent specific ways in which countries differ from one 
another.  In addition to them, I also consider sheer geographic distance as a ninth 
dimension.        
--------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Tables 2-4, 2-5 and 2-6 about here 
---------------------------------------------------- 
 
Tables 2-4, 2-5 and 2-6 provide summary information on each of the nine 
dimensions, including definitions, theoretical sources, empirical examples from the 
international business literature, data sources, and country and time coverage. I start by 
considering economic distance (Whitley, 1992). The international business literature has 
tended to focus on three specific indicators of economic differences across countries (for 
a review, see Caves, 1996). Countries differ in terms of their income level (GDP per 
capita), prevailing inflation rates, and intensity of trade with the rest of the world (exports 
plus imports as a proportion of GDP). These indicators are important because they are 
correlated with consumer purchasing power and preferences, macroeconomic stability, 
and the openness of the economy to external influences. These factors have been found to 
influence, for instance, foreign market entry mode, firm survival and performance, 
among other variables (for a review of the evidence, see Caves, 1996). Numerous studies 
in international business have examined the impact of economic distance on the choice of 
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foreign market and of entry mode (Iyer, 1997; Yeung, 1997; Zaheer & Zaheer, 1997). 
Researchers have also developed ad hoc measures of economic distance, like Campa and 
Guillén’s (1999) competitor development index, based on the income per capita of the 
country in which the focal firm’s most important competitors are located. 
The institutional literature on cross-national differences also emphasizes the 
financial dimension. Countries at varying levels of economic development have evolved 
over time quite different financial systems, with manifold implications for the way in 
which companies and their competitors fund their operations (la Porta et al., 1998; 
Whitley, 1992). Scholars of financial differences across countries have mainly considered 
indicators related to the equity and credit markets. I included in the analysis the market 
capitalization of listed companies (as a percent of GDP), the number of listed companies, 
and the amount of private credit available (as a percent of GDP). These indicators have 
been proposed and used by the literature on cross-national financial systems (Berglof, 
1988; la Porta et al., 1998; Steinherr & Huveneers, 1994). Researchers in the field of 
international businesses have used this approach to examine corporate governance, 
foreign investment, and corporate acquisitions (Capron & Guillen, 2009; Rueda-Sabater, 
2000). 
In addition to different levels of economic and financial market development, the 
institutional literature has also underscored that countries differ in terms of the nature of 
their political systems (Henisz & Williamson, 1999; Henisz, 2000; Whitley, 1992). 
Scholars have looked at political differences among countries mostly in dichotomous 
terms, e.g. emphasizing the differences between democratic and autocratic regimes. My 
approach follows the extant literature in characterizing countries along continuous 
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political dimensions such as institutional checks and balances (Demirbag, Glaister & 
Tatoglu, 2007; Dow & Karunaratna, 2006; Henisz, 2000), democratic character, the size 
of the state relative to the economy, and external trade associations (Brewer, 2007; 
Hirschberg, Sheldon & Dayton, 1994). These variables have been found to correlate with 
the choice of foreign markets to enter, the choice of entry mode, and foreign direct 
investment flows (Delios & Henisz, 2000, 2003; Garcia-Canal & Guillen, 2008; 
Gastanaga, Nugent & Pashamova, 1998; Henisz & Delios, 2001). 
The next key dimension emphasized in the institutional literature, administrative 
distance, refers to differences in bureaucratic patterns owing to colonial ties, language, 
religion, and the legal system (Ghemawat, 2001; Henisz, 2000; la Porta et al., 1998; 
Whitley, 1992). Researchers have measured administrative distance by determining if 
countries share a common language (Wolf & Weinschrott, 1973) or a common legal 
system (la Porta et al., 1998), and whether they have or have had a colonial relationship 
(Brocker & Rohweder, 1990). Research on linguistic distance, defined as how ‘distant’ 
from English a particular language is, in the sense of how difficult it is for an English 
speaker to learn it (Hutchinson, 2005), has examined the ability of an immigrant to 
realize the potential benefits from networking and to effectively use knowledge of her 
home country tastes and markets to promote trade and commerce between their host 
country and their country of origin (Chiswick & Miller, 1998). I included colonizer-
colonized links as well as common language, legal and religious institutions as part of 
this measure. While one could argue that administrative distance is related to both 
cultural and political distance, I believe that it is distinct because it goes beyond national 
political systems to include both formal and informal institutional arrangements that 
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transcend the purely political nature of the nation-state. Research has found that these 
measures correlate with the occurrence of cross-border mergers and acquisitions, and 
with the choice of foreign markets to enter (Guler & Guillen, 2010; Lubatkin, Calori, 
Very & Veiga, 1998).  
The next dimension noted in Table 2-4 is cultural distance. As noted above, 
Hofstede (1980) and many other researchers have long demonstrated the importance of 
differences in cultural values and norms across countries, and their impact on foreign 
market entry, entry mode choice, and other important research questions (Werner, 2002). 
The institutional theory of business systems also highlights culture as a relevant 
dimension (Whitley, 1992), as do strategy scholars (Ghemawat, 2001). The international 
business literature includes a number of influential studies of the impact of cultural 
distance on the foreign expansion of the firm (Barkema et al., 1996; Hennart & Larimo, 
1998; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977; Kogut & Singh, 1988). Recent studies have considered 
additional cultural aspects across countries (Brewer, 2007; Dow & Karunaratna, 2006; 
House et al., 2004; Schwartz, 1992, 1994). To create the measure of cultural distance I 
used public opinion data from four waves of the World Values Survey (WVS) (Inglehart, 
2004). Given the popularity of Hofstede’s dimensions of cultural distance, I constructed 
the measures to mimic Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance, power distance, individualism, 
and masculinity (see Appendix 1). Scholars using the WVS have found that cultural 
values evolve rather quickly over time (Inglehart & Baker, 2000). The WVS allows us to 
capture such changes because it is conducted around the world every three or four years. I 
interpolated the data for years in between waves of the survey.    
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Institutional theory identifies demography as a key dimension of cross-national 
difference as well (Whitley, 1992). Countries differ in terms of the size, growth, age 
structure, and qualities of their populations. These dimensions have direct implications 
for market attractiveness and growth potential. I focused the analysis on differences in 
life expectancy rates, birth rates, and the age structure of the population, which attest to 
fundamental characteristics of the population of countries that may affect consumer 
behavior and other market-related processes of interest to firms. I interpolate the 
demographic distance because birth and life expectancy rates are available for most 
countries only every few years, especially when a population census is conducted (UN, 
2006). Researchers in the international business area have used demographic variables to 
study patterns of international corporate expansion and share prices (Caves, 1996; 
Huynh, Mallik & Hettihewa, 2006). 
 The institutional literature also proposes that countries differ in terms of their 
capacity to create knowledge and innovate, with important implications for their role in 
the global economy (Furman et al., 2002; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993).  Proximity to 
knowledge has been argued to influence the location choice of multinational firms 
(Anand & Kogut, 1997; Berry, 2006; Guler & Guillen, 2010; Nachum, Zaheer & Gross, 
2008; Shaver & Flyer, 2000) because of the potential for spillovers. Talent, innovation 
and creativity are not distributed evenly across locations (Florida, 2002) and this affects 
the distance between countries. Following the literature on national innovation systems, I 
measured knowledge distance using the number of patents and of scientific articles per 
capita (Furman et al., 2002; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993).  
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 The last dimension of cross-national distance identified in the institutional 
literature focuses on the connectedness of a country with the rest of the world. Global 
connectedness captures the ability of resident individuals and companies to interact with 
other parts of the world, obtain information, and diffuse their own activities (Oxley & 
Yeung, 2001). Following the literature in this area (for a review, see Guillén & Suárez, 
2005), I captured this dimension using measures of international tourism expenditures as 
a percent of GDP, international tourism receipts as a percent of GDP, and Internet users 
as a percent of the population. 
In addition to the eight dimensions of distance based on institutional differences 
across countries, I also included in the dataset and analyses geographic distance because 
it has long been recognized as having an impact on trade, foreign investment, and other 
types of economic activity taking place between countries (Anderson, 1979; Deadorff, 
1998). Geographic distance increases the costs of transportation and communication. 
Scholars that use gravity models in the international business and international trade 
literatures have long recognized the important role of geographic distance (Fratianni & 
Oh, 2009; Hamilton & Winters, 1992; Wolf & Weinschrott, 1973). Different methods 
have been used to examine geographic distance between pairs of countries. For example, 
Chen (2004) calculated geographic distance according to the latitudes and longitudes of 
the main city in each region or country, and found that geographic distance decreased 
international trade between pairs of countries. Krishna (2003) used the direct line 
distance to measure geographic distance. I calculate geographic distance using the great 
circle method.6 Gravity models in the international economics literature have considered 
                                                 
6
 Because the great circle distance is already a dyadic distance, I do not convert it into Mahalanobis distance. 
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how geographical distance between two countries impacts bilateral trade flows. In these 
models, trade between two countries is directly related to size (i.e. GDP) and inversely 
related to geographic distance (Anderson, 1979; Deadorff, 1998).    
An important feature of the approach is that I compute distance separately for 
each dimension based on the empirical indicators mentioned above, thus allowing 
researchers to utilize the one that theoretically fits their research question best. For 
example, although Kogut and Singh (1988) considered how Hofstede’s cultural distance 
measures may impact a firm’s choice among joint ventures, acquisitions and greenfield 
entry modes, I believe that there are several other dimensions of distance that can affect 
those choices (see Lopez-Duarte and García-Canal, 2002). For joint venture decisions in 
particular, the administrative distance provides information about common language and 
legal systems. In more “distant” countries across the administrative measure, firms may 
be less willing to enter into joint ventures. Furthermore, economic distance may impact 
the decision of firms to enter particular countries before an entry mode decision becomes 
relevant. By only including culture, it is likely that some of the variance that may come 
from other omitted distance dimensions is included in the measure of cultural distance. 
Similarly, the longevity of foreign ventures could be influenced not only by cultural 
distance (Barkema et al., 1996), but also by economic and geographic distance between 
the firm’s home country and the host environment of the foreign venture. By including 
only one dimension of distance in the analysis, it is difficult to determine whether the 
impact of cultural distance would be significant above and beyond other relevant aspects 
of distance. While I agree that cultural distance is an important measure to consider when 
examining multiple research issues, it is likely that culture is one of many distance 
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dimensions that influence managerial decisions regarding entry, entry mode choice, 
performance, consumer choice, and knowledge transfer, for example.  
2.4 Calculation Method 
There is no agreement in the literature as to what is the best way to measure the 
distance between two points or objects. There are, however, five desirable properties that 
distance measures ought to exhibit, including symmetry, nonnegativity, identification, 
definiteness, and triangle inequality (see Table 2-7). Perhaps the most widely used 
measure is the Euclidean method, which is defined as the geometrically shortest possible 
distance between two points. The traditional Euclidean distance measure meets all five of 
the desirable characteristics listed above (see Appendix 2). Another commonly used 
measure is the Euclidean squared distance, which meets all of the criteria except triangle 
inequality. A measure that displays all five properties is referred to as a metric.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2-7 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
A key problem with the Euclidean method for calculating distance is that, while it 
is a metric, it does not take into consideration the correlation between the variable 
indicators used to computing it. When two or more variables are highly correlated with 
each other, they are capturing the same characteristic. Therefore, a distance measure that 
ignores correlation would be giving more importance or weight to the characteristic 
measured by the correlated variables. A second problem with Euclidean distance is that it 
does not take into account the variance of the variables.  A third, related, shortcoming is 
that it is sensitive to the scale of measurement. 
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An alternative method, the one I favor in this paper given the multi-dimensional 
definition, is the Mahalanobis distance, originally formulated in 1936 (see Appendix 2). 
Scholars in chemistry (De Maesschalck, Jouan-Rimbaud & Massart, 2000), climatology 
(Mimmack, Mason & Galpin, 2001), and other fields use it when it comes to solving 
problems related to clustering, multivariate calibration, pattern recognition, outlier 
detection, and process control (Cohen, 1969; Rouseeeuw & Leroy, 2003; Seber, 1984). 
The Mahalanobis distance meets the five desirable criteria listed above, and it also 
surmounts the three key problems associated with the Euclidean distance because it takes 
into account the information contained in the variance-covariance matrix and is scale-
invariant. Scholars familiar with principal-component analysis would realize that 
Mahalanobis distance is equivalent to the Euclidean distance calculated with the 
standardized values of the principal components (De Maesschalck et al., 2000). The main 
disadvantages of the Mahalanobis method when compared to the Euclidean is that none 
of the variables can be perfectly collinear, and that there have to be more points than 
variables in the data so that one can calculate the inverse of the variance-covariance 
matrix (see Table 2-7).  
When measuring distances between pairs of countries, the Mahalanobis distance 
is a better alternative than the Euclidean method, for several reasons. First, the variables 
that characterize countries tend to be very highly correlated with one another. For 
instance, the various dimensions of culture (e.g. power distance, individualism, and so 
on) or economic development (e.g. GDP per capita, inflation, etc.) are highly correlated 
with each other. Second, the variance of the variables differs massively both cross-
sectionally and over time. For example, while there has been very little cross-national 
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convergence in terms of GDP per capita over the last few decades (Pritchett, 1997), infant 
mortality rates have dropped quite rapidly across the world (UN, 2006). And third, 
variables that characterize countries are typically measured on different scales. For 
instance, GDP per capita and inflation are each measured using different units. The 
Euclidean approach does not allow for multiple scales. Because I propose multi-
dimensional distance measures, the higher correlations, the unequal variances and the 
varying scales across the components for each of the distance dimensions renders the 
Mahalanobis approach superior to the Euclidean one.      
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2-8 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
Table 2-8 shows the correlations between pairs of the nine dimensions of 
distance, each calculated with the greatest number of observations available. The 
coefficients are generally low, indicating that distances between pairs of countries can be 
very different depending on the dimension chosen. The correlation between the Euclidean 
distance measure based on Hofstede’s scores and the culture distance measure based on 
the world values surveys is quite low. This correlation may be affected by the fact that 
the new measure varies over time while the one based on Hofstede’s scores is the same 
for each year in the sample. Moreover, the source of the data, the World Values Survey, 
is representative of the adult population of the country, while the sample used by 
Hofstede, based on the employees of one large multinational, was not. As shown in the 
empirical illustration below, the correlation between the cultural distance variable and 
Hofstede’s measures is much higher when I restrict the time period. 
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In sum, the theoretical and methodological approach to cross-cultural distance 
offers many improvements over previous approaches. First, it is theoretically grounded 
on very influential conceptualizations of cross-national differences and distance (Henisz, 
2000; la Porta et al., 1998; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993; Whitley, 1992) and builds on 
recent institutional theorizing in international business (Jackson & Deeg, 2008; Pajunen, 
2008). Second, it takes into consideration each of the dimensions proposed in the 
institutional literature as being relevant. Third, it covers more than twice as many 
countries as in previously available datasets. Fourth, it offers the indicators for each of 
the dimensions of distance over time. And fifth, it is caulculated using the Mahalanobis 
method, which takes into consideration the variance-covariance matrix and is scale-
invariant. 
2.5 Empirical Illustrations 
To illustrate the value of the multi-dimensional approach to cross-national 
distance, I conduct empirical illustrations in two different settings. First, I examine the 
choice of foreign market entry by U.S. companies in four different contexts. The purpose 
of this illustration is to show how different dimensions of distances have different 
impacts under different contexts. Second, I examine the impact of distance measures in 
another empirical setting: China, to confirm the findings in the U.S. sample and to show 
that different distance dimensions have different impacts for firms from different 
countries.  
2.5.1 US firms 
 I examine four different research questions using the U.S. sample. The first 
illustrative research question is to assess the extent to which prior international 
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experience may lessen the impact of distance between pairs of countries on subsequent 
entry decisions. I consider foreign entry by firms with and without prior experience in a 
host country. In the second example, I consider how distance dimensions differentially 
affect firm choices to set up manufacturing and distribution subsidiaries.  In the third 
example, I consider how the new distance dimensions impact the choice to enter high or 
low income host countries. And finally, in the fourth example, I consider how distance 
dimensions affect the decisions of firms pursuing different product market strategies.  As 
stated above, I would expect the distance measures to exert different effects on firm 
decisions depending on the research question under examination. I offer these four 
different foreign expansion choices by firms to illustrate how the disaggregated distance 
dimensions differentially impact these four foreign expansion choices by firms. 
Across the empirical examples, I use the same random sample of 871 U.S. 
publicly-traded manufacturing firms from 1993 to 2005. This sample is representative of 
all firms that report data to Compustat in terms of mean sales and assets. The starting 
point for the time period was determined by the availability of electronic data from the 
Directory of Corporate Affiliates (the source for foreign subsidiary entry information). I 
searched the Directory of Corporate Affiliates for all matching information for the sample 
of firms. Of the total 871 firms, 412 were found to have foreign subsidiaries.   
The unit of analysis is the firm-country-year. I considered firms to be at risk of 
entering a country if any other U.S. firm in the sample had invested in that country by the 
end of 2005. The 412 firms invested in 128 foreign countries. After matching the U.S. 
panel of firms with the distance measures described above, I ended up with a sample size 
of 265,691 firm-country-year observations. It is important to note that the final sample 
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size is constrained by the number of countries included in the World Values Survey, the 
source of data for the cultural distance measure. This final set reflects risk of entry into 
41 countries.   
Across the models, the dependent variable, foreign market entry, is dichotomous. 
The predictor variables of interest include the economic, financial, political, 
administrative, cultural, demographic, knowledge, and global connectedness distance 
dimensions described above. For the purposes of illustration, I included in the regression 
models as many distance dimensions as possible while ensuring that the correlations 
across these measures would not cause multicolinearity problems. In the sample for 
analysis, economic distance is correlated with financial and demographic distance and 
political distance is correlated with geographic distance (see Tables 2-8 and 2-9). 
Therefore, I excluded the economic and political distances from the final models.  
 I also included several firm-level control variables in each regression: firm size, 
measured as the total sales of the parent firm; and R&D expenditures over assets. I 
measured firm host country experience with the cumulative number of investments made 
by the parent firm in a particular country during previous years. All control variables are 
lagged by one year. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2-9 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
I also included year dummies and industry dummies to control for potential year 
and industry heterogeneity. I estimated the models using logistic regression with robust 
standard errors.  I clustered by parent firm in all models reported in Table 2-10 below.  
Table 2-9 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations for all of the distance and 
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control variables. I excluded global connectedness from the analysis because its limited 
availability over time reduces the sample size by about one third.    
Table 2-10 presents the regression results. Model 1 is the baseline model that 
includes only parent firm controls, industry dummies and year dummies. Model 2 
includes parent firm controls and the Hofstede Euclidean distance measure, which has a 
negative and significant impact on firm entry decisions, consistent with Kogut and 
Singh’s (1988) classic findings. This finding suggests that U.S. firms are less likely to 
invest in countries that are more culturally distant from their home country. In Model 3 I 
replace Hofstede’s Euclidean distance with the Hofstede Mahalanobis distance measure, 
which behaves in a similar way. In Model 4, I use the time-varying cultural distance 
measure based on the WVS data, which also negatively and significantly influences firm 
entry decisions. In Model 5, I include several of the distance measures at once. As can be 
seen in this column, each of the distance variables negatively and significantly influences 
firm entry decisions when considering all entries by all firms.    
------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 2-10 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
In Models 6 through 21 of Table 2-10, I show how both Hofstede’s cultural 
distance measure and the cross- national distance dimensions impact the choice of foreign 
market entry by U.S. companies in four different contexts.   Through these results, I 
explore how the inclusion of a broader set of distance dimensions can increase our 
understanding of the influence of cross-national distance on firm foreign entry decisions.  
Models 6 through 9 present evidence pertaining to the first illustrative research question. 
I predicted that the distance dimensions may have less impact on subsequent foreign 
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entry by firms. First, I show how Hofstede’s cultural distance impacts firms with and 
without host country experience.  In Models 6 and 8, we can see that Hofstede 
significantly negatively influences firm foreign entry decisions for firms with and without 
experiences in host country markets.  In contrast, when we consider the disaggregated 
measures of cross-national distance (in Models 7 and 9), we can see different impacts 
across the disaggregated dimensions of distance.  For firms with prior host country 
experience, the cultural, demographic, knowledge and geographic distance dimensions do 
not significantly affect subsequent entry decisions, while these dimensions of distance are 
significant in the case of firms without such experience. To assess the validity and 
usefulness of the new approach, I consider three comparisons.  First, I used Wald tests to 
examine for significantly different across the coefficients for the subgroups.   The 
coefficients for financial distance (chi-squared=12.31, p<.01), knowledge distance (chi-
squared=9.45, p<.01), administrative distance (chi-squared=3.93, p<.05) and geographic 
distance (chi-squared-6.02, p<.05) are significantly different across model 7 and model 9.  
Then, given concerns about comparing coefficients directly in non-linear logit models 
(Allison, 1999; Hoetker, 2007), I consider improvements in fit across the models, 
considering both the improvement in r-square values and log-liklihood improvements 
across the models.   In models that incorporate Hofstede’s cultural distance  versus the 
new dimensions of distance for firms without host country experience  (Models 8 and 9 
respectively), there is an improvement in r-square from .28 to .32.  In addition, there is a 
significant improvement in the log-liklihood ratio from Model 8 to Model 9.  These three 
comparisons suggest that as firms accumulate experience in host countries, the new 
measures of distance between the home and host countries have varying degrees of 
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constraining influences on managerial decision making.  Because managers can learn 
about different dimensions of cross-national distance as they operate in host countries, 
subsequent expansion into that country is influenced by a different set of factors than the 
initial entry choice.  Taken together, these results and comparisons across the models in 
Table 2-10 suggest that when I incorporate the multi-dimensional measures of cross-
national distance, I can consider how several different aspects of distance influence 
managerial decisions to enter foreign countries.  
In Models 10 through 13 of Table 2-10, I show the results for the second 
illustrative example.  Here, I consider how the distance dimensions can differentially 
impact the choice of manufacturing versus distribution subsidiaries.  In Models 10 and 
12, we can see that Hofstede’s cultural distance measure significantly negatively 
influences firm foreign entry decisions for both manufacturing and distribution 
subsidiaries.  In contrast, when we consider the disaggregated measures of cross-national 
distance, we again can see differential impacts across our disaggregated dimensions of 
distance on distribution and manufacturing subsidiaries.  In Models 11 and 13, the 
demographic and political distance measures behave differently for manufacturing versus 
distribution choices by firms.  Political distance has the opposite effect across the 
manufacturing and distribution choices by firms while demographic distance is only 
significant for distribution subsidiary choices. Further, though they have the same sign 
and significance, the cultural and geographic distance dimensions have a significantly 
larger impact in one model than the other (cultural distance has a larger negative impact 
on distribution than manufacturing subsidiaries while geographic distance has a larger 
negative impact on manufacturing than distribution subsidiaries).  There is no significant 
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difference across the Hofstede cultural distance measure in Models 10 and 12.  Using 
Wald tests, the coefficients demographic distance (chi-squared=4.19, p<.05), political 
distance (chi-squared=3.86, p<.05) and geographic distance (chi-squared=4.52, p<.05) 
are statistically significantly different across the manufacturing and distribution 
subgroups in Models 11 and 13.  Comparing the r-square values across these models 
shows an increase from .28 to .32 in the manufacturing decisions of firms considering 
only Hofstede’s measure (Model 10) versus our multi-dimensional distance measures 
(Model 12) and an increase from .28 to .31 in the distribution subsidiary decisions of 
firms considering only Hofstede’s measure (Model 11) versus our multi-dimensional 
distance measures (Model 13).  In addition, there is a significant improvement in the log-
likehood from model 10 to model 12 and from model 11 to model 13.  Overall, these 
results show how the new distance dimensions can differentially impact firm choices for 
producing when compared to selling firm products.  For example, the results suggest that 
the greater the political distance between the host and home country of a firm, the less 
likely a firm is to set up a manufacturing subsidiary and the more likely a firm is to set up 
a distribution subsidiary.  By only including Hofstede’s measure of cultural distance (in 
Models 10 and 12), we cannot capture how managers respond to several difference 
dimensions of distance and the more nuanced distance results revealed in Models 11 and 
13.    
 In Models 14 through 17 in Table 2-10, I consider how distance impacts the 
choice of high and low income country locations by firms.  In Models 14 and 16, 
Hofstede’s cultural distance measure significantly negatively influences firm entry 
decision for both high and low income countries.  In contrast, the disaggregated measures 
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of cross-national distance differentially impact firm entry decisions across high and low 
income countries.  Models 15 and 17 show that cultural, administrative and demographic 
distances positively and significantly influence firm decisions to enter low income 
countries while these same distance dimensions negatively influences firm decisions to 
enter high income countries.  Wald tests show that the coefficients for cultural distance 
(chi-squared=4.01, p<.05) and administrative distance (chi-squared=5.07, p<.01) are 
significantly different from each other. Comparing the r-square values across these 
models shows an increase from .33 to .39 in the low income country choices of firms 
considering only Hofstede’s measure (Model 14) versus the multi-dimensional distance 
measures (Model 15) and an increase from .31 to .35 in the high income country choices 
of firms considering only Hofstede’s measure (Model 16) versus the multi-dimensional 
distance measures (Model 17).  In addition, there is a significant improvement in the log-
liklihood of model 15 over model 14 and of model 17 over Model 16.   
 Finally, in the fourth example, I consider how distance dimensions affect the 
decisions of firms pursuing different product market strategies.  In Models 18 through 21, 
I distinguish between firms with high and low R&D intensities.  In Models 18 and 20, 
Hofstede’s cultural distance measure continues to negatively and significantly influence 
both high and low R&D intensive firm decisions to enter foreign markets.  However, 
when I include the multi-dimension distance measures in models 19 and 21, we see that 
demographic distance is not significant for low R&D intensive firms though it is for high 
R&D intensive firms.  Wald tests reveal that the coefficients for demographic distance 
are significantly different (chi-squared=7.02, p<.01).  Though some of the other distance 
coefficients are negative and significant in both Models 19 and 21, Wald tests reveal 
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significant differences across these negative and significant dimensions.  For example, 
though the WVS cultural distance measure is negative and significant across both 
subsamples, there is a significant difference across the coefficients for this dimension 
(chi-squared=8.10, p<.01).  Comparing the r-square values across these models shows an 
increase from .25 to .30 for firms with low R&D intensity considering only Hofstede’s 
measure (model 18) versus the multi-dimensional distance measures (Model 19) and an 
increase from .43 to .47 for firms with high R&D intensity considering only Hofstede’s 
measure (Model 20) versus the multi-dimensional distance measures (Model 21).  In 
addition, there is a significant improvement in the log-liklihood of Model 19 over Model 
18 and Model 21 over Model 20. While both the Hofstede distance dimension and the 
WVS cultural distance measures suggest that cultural distance has a significant negative 
impact on the foreign expansion decisions of firms with high and low R&D intensive 
products, the distance dimension results show that demographic distance negatively 
influences high R&D intensive firm decisions to enter foreign countries though it does 
not significantly influence low R&D intensive firm decisions. 
 One could argue that I need to concern about unobserved host country affects in 
the empirical analysis.  However, I believe that inserting country dummies forces the 
distance measures to make a contribution to explanatory power in terms of longitudinal 
changes as opposed to cross -sectional levels.  This is not what I am trying to show in the 
empirical example.  If I used country dummies, that would effectively bundle all cross-
sectional variation, thus undermining the goal of the paper, which is precisely to 
accomplish the opposite, i.e. unpack the dimensions of distance, both cross-sectionally 
and longitudinally.  
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These four empirical illustrations show statistically significant differences across 
several of the distance dimensions.  Some of the distance dimensions positively and 
significantly impact firm foreign entry choices while others negatively and significantly 
influence these choices.  By exploring different levels of firm foreign experience, 
business functions, location choices and product market strategies, the empirical 
illustrations show that the distance dimensions matter in different ways to firms making 
different firm expansion choices.  These results demonstrate the importance of 
disaggregating the distance construct into its different dimensions because they show 
statistically significant differences across the coefficients for the WVS cultural distance, 
demographic distance, knowledge distance, administrative distance, financial distance, 
geographic distance and political distance dimensions.  In addition, models with the 
distance dimensions represent an improvement over models that incorporate Hofstede’s 
distance measures considering the explained variance and in improvements in model fit.  
Instead of exploring whether distance matters to firm foreign expansion decisions by 
using an aggregate measure of distance, the results that use multi-dimensional measures 
of cross-national distance, consider how and why disaggregated dimensions of distance 
that derive from different country business, governance and innovation systems can 
differentially impact firm foreign expansion decisions.    
2.5.2 Chinese firms 
I then explore the effects of national distances on foreign entry in a sample of 
Chinese firms. The sample consists of Chinese listed firms in high-tech industries. High-
tech industries include communications and related equipment manufacturing, computer 
and related equipment manufacturing, computer application service, computer software 
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development and consultation, consumer electronics manufacturing, electrical machinery 
and equipment manufacturing, and electronic components and appliances. 
I identified high-tech firms according to the industry description in their annual 
reports. Then, I went through the annual reports to identify the foreign subsidiaries. 
Listed firms usually disclose subsidiary information (including destination country, the 
amount of capital invested, the percentage of ownership, and primary business activities 
of subsidiaries) in the appendix. After gathering this information, I next determined the 
establishment year of the subsidiaries. If this information was not disclosed in the annual 
report, I consulted the company’s website and also searched the Internet to determine the 
exact year of establishment. I collected other financial data from CSMAR, a database that 
is part of Wharton Research Data Services. 
In all, there are 259 firms investing in 49 countries from 1990 to 2008. Across the 
models, the dependent variable, foreign market entry, is dichotomous. The predictor 
variables of interest include the economic, financial, political, administrative, cultural, 
demographic, and demographic distance. Similar to the US illustration, I included in the 
regression models as many distance dimensions as possible while ensuring that the 
correlations across these measures would not cause multicolinearity problems. I excluded 
the global connectedness distance and knowledge distance from the final models due to 
lack of observations.  
I also included several firm-level control variables in each regression: firm size, 
measured as the log of total assets of the parent firm; and firm foreign country experience 
with the cumulative number of investments made by the parent firm in any foreign 
countries during previous years. I also included year dummies to control for potential 
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year heterogeneity. I estimated the models using logistic regression with robust standard 
errors.  Table 2-11 summarizes the mean, standard deviation, and correlations of 
variables in the regressions for Chinese firms. 
---------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2-11 & 2-12 about here 
---------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 2-12 presents the regression results. I clustered by parent firm in all models. 
Model 1 is the baseline model that includes only parent firm controls and year dummies. 
Model 2 includes parent firm controls and the Hofstede Euclidean distance measure, 
which is not significant. In Model 3 I replace Hofstede’s Euclidean distance with the 
Hofstede Mahalanobis distance measure. Hofstede Mahalanobis distance is negatively 
significant, suggesting that Chinese firms, like their US counterparts, are less likely to 
invest in countries that are more culturally distant from their home country.  The 
significance of Mahalanobis measure but not Euclidean measure suggests that 
Mahalanobis may be a better way for distance calculation. In Model 4, I use the time-
varying cultural distance measure based on the WVS data, which is not significant. In 
Model 5, I include several of the distance measures at once. The r square value increases 
from 0.28 in model 3 to 0.35 in model 5, the model fit improves using the multi-
dimensional distance measures. As can be seen in this column, some of the distances are 
negatively significant while others are positively significant.   Geographic, cultural and 
administrative is negatively significant. These results are the same as those for US firms. 
Chinese firms are less likely to invest in countries that are remote, culturally and 
administratively distant. However, unlike US firms, Chinese firms are willing to invest in 
economically and politically remote countries, as shown by the positive sign of economic 
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and political distance. The reason for the positively economic distance is that Chinese 
firms may either invest in technological advanced countries such as US or Japan to 
acquire the technology or invest in lower income countries such as Vietnam and the 
Philippians to reduce production costs (Luo & Tung, 2007). Both types of countries are 
economically remote from China. The political system in China is different from most of 
the countries in the world (Abrami & Zhang, 2007); therefore, the sign of political 
distance is positive. Financial and demographic distance is not significant, suggesting that 
for Chinese firms, financial and demographic factors are not their primary concerns when 
they choose a country to invest in. 
From model 6 to model 9 in Table 2-12, I split the sample according to whether 
the firm invests in a high-income or low-income country. This is one of the four 
comparisons I made using the U.S. sample. For the Chinese sample, I do not have enough 
data to conduct the other three comparisons. Model 6 and 7 are the results for low-income 
countries and model 8 and 9 are the results for high-income countries. We can see an 
improvement in model fit by using the multi-dimensional distance measures. The r-
square value increase from 0.68 to 0.75 in model 6 and 7; and increases from 0.18 to 0.27 
in model 8 and 9. Moreover, similar to the results using U.S. sample, the distance 
dimensions behave differently in high-income and low-income countries. The Chi-square 
test for differences in coefficients show that cultural, administrative, political, 
demographic, economic and geographic distance are significantly different (P-value <.01) 
in model 7 and model 9. Overall, the impacts of distance are smaller when firms invest in 
high-income countries than in low-income countries – consistent with the U.S. sample.  
While administrative, demographic, and geographic distances are negatively significant 
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in model 7, they are not significant in model 9. The difference between U.S. and China 
sample is that while political distance is positively significant in low-income countries, it 
is not significant in high-income countries; and while economic distance is not significant 
in low-income countries, it is positively significant in high-income countries. These 
results show that when Chinese firms invest in low-income countries, they can invest in 
politically distant countries because these areas may have been overlooked by developed 
countries, such as Africa (Laschinger, 2005). Chinese firms may invest to take 
advantages of this opportunity. In terms of economic distance, Chinese firms may choose 
to invest in economically advanced countries to sell their products at a low price or to 
acquire the advanced technology in these countries (Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Deng, 
2007). These benefits are generally not available in low income countries. Thus, 
economic distance is positively significant in high-income countries but not significant in 
low-income countries. 
Overall, the empirical illustration using Chinese firms further provide evidence of 
the superiority of the multi-dimensional approach, evident in the increased pseudo R-
square and Chi-square value. More importantly, it shows that the same distance 
dimensions have different effects on the probability of foreign entry for Chinese and U.S. 
firms. It highlights the importance to investigate firm strategies in emerging economies. 
2.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
In this paper I proposed a new approach to conceptualizing, measuring, and 
examining the influence of cross-national distance. Instead of relying on the widely-used 
Hofstede approach and measures of cultural distance, I used institutional theories of 
national business, governance and innovation systems to ground the conceptual 
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definitions, analysis, and choice of empirical dimensions and indicators. Based on these 
theories and on recent institutional theorizing in international business (Jackson & Deeg, 
2008; Pajunen, 2008), I identified eight dimensions of distance: economic, financial, 
political, administrative, cultural, demographic, knowledge, and connectedness. 
Moreover, I developed empirical indicators for each distance dimension based on the 
literature. Instead of using the Euclidean method to calculate dyadic distances between 
pairs of countries, I used the Mahalanobis approach to handle the relatively high 
correlations between the indicator variables in all cross-national research, and the 
different scales on which they are measured. Finally, I calculated all measures over time 
and for twice as many countries as previous research.  
In order to assess the empirical validity and usefulness of the new approach, I 
offered two empirical illustrations. In the first illustration, I used the sample of US firms. 
I conducted four separate empirical tests, including the initial and sequential entry 
decisions of firms, the choice of manufacturing versus distribution subsidiaries, the 
choice between high and low income host countries, and the choices of high and low 
R&D intensive firms as they expand into foreign countries. Through these examples that 
consider several different foreign entry choices by U.S. companies, I illustrated how the 
inclusion of a broader set of distance dimensions increases our understanding of the 
influence of cross-national distance on firm foreign entry decisions. When I considered 
cultural distance alone (based either on the time-varying measure using the World Values 
Surveys data or Hofstede’s cultural distance measures), I found that cultural distance 
significantly dissuades firms from investing in foreign countries.  However, when I 
considered culture as one of many distance dimensions that can influence different types 
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of foreign investment decisions by firms, I found both culture and the other distance 
dimensions to have differential effects.  These results show not only the limitations of 
using a distance variable that is based exclusively on a cultural dimension, but also the 
importance of considering multiple dimensions of distance when analyzing the influence 
of cross-national distance across a range of research questions. I have shown opposite 
effects for the culture, political, administrative, demographic and geographic distance 
dimensions across the four empirical examples. These results illustrate how distance can 
differentially impact firm foreign investment decisions. In the second empirical 
illustration, I use the sample of Chinese firms. This illustration further confirms the 
validity of the multi-dimensional approach. Moreover, it shows the importance of 
investigating firm strategy in emerging economies, because the same distance dimensions 
have different impacts on firms from China and firms from U.S. These strategic 
differences warrant further investigation. 
While prior research has shown that distance matters, the example shows how 
different distance dimensions can be used to examine how, why and when cross-national 
distances influence managerial decisions. Our illustration of this more nuanced approach 
to considering distance can allow researchers to consider how several different aspects of 
cross-national distance influence managerial decisions. I believe that there is an important 
contribution in the new approach and that using different dimensions of distance adds 
value and detail.      
The multidimensional approach and data offered in this paper will hopefully spur 
more fine-grained studies of the impact of distance on various managerial, organizational, 
and business variables. Moreover, I hope that the multidimensional approach will help 
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researchers use distance measures that match their research questions. For instance, 
students of venture capital may prefer to use administrative and financial distance when it 
comes to understanding cross-national patterns of investment in ventures, while questions 
regarding human research management or consumer choice may be more readily 
answered using economic, cultural and demographic distance measures. Perhaps the 
approach can help resolve some of the inconsistencies reported in the literature 
concerning the effects of distance on foreign entry mode choice, firm performance, and 
human resource practices, given that each of these questions may possibly require the use 
of different dimensions and measures of distance. 
 
After showing the direct effects of institutional distance on international 
diversification and the differences of strategic behaviors of firms from U.S. and China, 
the next two chapters will investigate how the unique characteristics of emerging 
economies influence resources and thus firm scope. 
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2.7 Tables 
Table 2-1Distance Definitions and Consequences 
Article Definition of Distance 
Empirical Dimensions of 
Distance Used Consequences of Distance 
Johanson & Vahlne 
(1977) 
"The psychic distance is defined as the sum of 
factors preventing the flow of information from 
and to the market. Examples are differences in 
language, education, business practices, culture, 
and industrial development."  (p. 24) 
Uncertainty avoidance (in  
terms of market knowledge)  
Uncertainty: Firms should 
gradually increase their 
commitments to a foreign 
country as experience 
accumulates. 
Kogut & Singh 
(1988) 
"By psychic distance, it is meant the degree to 
which a firm is uncertain of the characteristics of 
a foreign market." (p. 413) 
 
Cultural distance (uncertainty 
avoidance, power distance, 
individualism, masculinity) 
Costs and uncertainty: Firms 
must choose among entry 
modes to improve their 
chances of success 
Barkema, Bell & 
Pennings (1996) 
"Psychic distance is defined in terms of factors 
preventing the flow of information between the 
firm and target nations, including linguistic, 
institutional, cultural, and political factors." (p. 
153) 
Cultural distance  and cultural 
blocs 
Uncertainty: Adjustment 
process, and difficulty of 
learning determine the 
longevity of foreign ventures 
Hennart & Larimo 
(1998) 
Culture distance is "defined as the difference 
between the national cultural characteristics of 
the home and of the host countries." (p. 517) 
Cultural distance 
Higher transaction costs 
related to the acquisition of 
knowledge about the foreign 
market 
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Table 2-2 Summary of Studies using Hofstede’s Cultural Distance 
Authors Journal Dependent Variable Citation 
Numbers 
1. Dependent variable=Entry Mode 
Kogut & Singh (1988) Journal of International Business Studies Joint venture vs. Greenfield vs. Acquisition 426 
Erramilli (1996) Journal of International Business Studies Majority vs. Joint vs. Minority Ownership 36 
Barkema & Vermeulen (1997) Journal of International Business Studies Entry mode; Survival 57 
Hennart & Larimo (1998) Journal of International Business Studies Full vs. Shared Ownership 37 
Brouthers & Brouthers (2001) Journal of International Business Studies Full vs. Shared Ownership 36 
2. Dependent variable= JV Performance 
Barkema, Bell & Pennings (1996) Strategic Management Journal Longevity of foreign venture 150 
Newman & Nollen (1996) Journal of International Business Studies Work unit financial performance 74 
Weber & Shenkar  (1996) Management Science Effective integration between merger partners 30 
Gomez-Mejia & Palich (1997) Journal of International Business Studies Performance 35 
Park & Ungson (1997) Academy of Management Journal Dissolution rate 97 
Morosini, Shane & Singh (1998) Journal of International Business Studies Post-merger performance 53 
3. Dependent variable= Human Resource Management 
Shenkar & Zeira (1992) Journal of International Business Studies CEO role conflict and role ambiguity 46 
Rosenzweig & Nohria (1994) Journal of International Business Studies Degree of HRM similarity 86 
Geletkanycz (1997) Strategic Management Journal Top management executives’ commitment to 
the status quo 
31 
Luo (2001) Administrative Science Quarterly Personal attachment between boundary spanners 
in joint ventures 
86 
4. Dependent variable= Others (Entrepreneurship; knowledge transfer; marketing) 
Shane (1992) Journal of Business Venturing Per capita number of trademarks 39 
Steenkamp, Hofstede & Wedel 
(1999) 
Journal of Marketing Consumer innovativeness 101 
Simonin (1999) Strategic Management Journal Ambiguity of knowledge transfer 113 
Steensma, Marino, Weaver & 
Dickson (2000) 
Academy of Management Journal Use of technology alliances 31 
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Table 2-3Conflicting Findings using Hofstede’s Cultural Distance in Different Research Areas 
Authors Journal Dependent 
Variable 
Industry Home/Host Country Findings 
1a. International  Business –Entry Mode 
Weber & 
Shenkar   
(1996) 
Management 
Science 
M&As Various Various/US acquisition National culture impacts post-
merger integration in 
international M&As 
Padmanabhan 
& Cho (1996) 
Management 
International Review 
Full vs. Shared 
Ownership 
Manufacturing Japan/45 countries Larger cultural distance 
encourages full ownership 
Brouthers & 
Brouthers 
(2001) 
Journal of 
International 
Business Studies 
Full vs. Shared 
Ownership 
Manufacturing Britain, Germany, 
Netherland, US/ 
Hungary, Poland, The 
Czech Republic, Russia, 
and Rumania 
Larger cultural distance 
encourages shared ownership 
Erramilli 
(1996) 
Journal of 
International 
Business Studies 
Majority vs. Joint 
vs. Minority 
Ownership 
Advertising Europe, US/Europe Cultural distance has no 
effects 
Kogut & 
Singh (1988) 
Journal of 
International 
Business Studies 
Joint venture vs. 
Greenfield vs. 
Acquisition 
Various Various/US Larger cultural distance 
encourages JV or greenfield 
over acquisition 
1b. International  Business –Performance 
Barkema, Bell 
& Pennings 
(1996) 
Strategic 
Management Journal 
Longevity of 
foreign venture 
Non-financial 
firms 
The Netherland/Various Larger cultural distance 
produces shorter longevity of 
JVs 
Park & 
Ungson 
(1997) 
Academy of 
Management Journal 
Dissolution rate Electronic firms JVs with US partners Larger cultural distance 
produces a lower  dissolution 
rate of JVs 
Glaister & 
Buckley 
(1999)  
Management 
International Review 
Subjective 
satisfaction and 
performance 
Manufacturing 
and tertiary 
sector 
JVs with UK partners Cultural distance has no effect 
on IJV performance 
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Table 2.3 (continued) 
 
Authors Journal Dependent 
Variable 
Industry Home/Host Country Findings 
2. Human Resource Management –Similarity Between Parent and Subsidiary HRM System 
Gong (2003) Academy of 
Management Journal 
proportion of 
expatriate parent 
country nationals in 
a subsidiary's 
workforce 
Various Japan/Various Larger cultural distance 
increases the proportion of 
parent country nationals 
Rosenzweig & 
Nohria (1994) 
Journal of 
International 
Business Studies 
Degree of HRM 
similarity 
Various Various/US Larger cultural distance 
reduces the  similarity of 
HRM system 
3. Entrepreneurship – Characteristics 
Mueller & 
Thomas 
(2000) 
Journal of Business 
Venturing 
Internal control and 
entrepreneurial 
orientation 
University 
students 
9 countries Higher individualism increases 
internal control;  Higher 
individualism, low uncertainty 
avoidance increase 
entrepreneurial orientation 
Mitchell, 
Smith, 
Seawright & 
Morse (2000) 
Academy of 
Management Journal 
Willingness and 
ability script; 
venture creation 
decision 
Entrepreneurs 
and non-
entrepreneurs 
7 countries Higher individualism, high 
power distance increases 
willingness and ability script; 
and venture creation 
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Table 2-4Dimensions of Cross-National Distance 
Dimension of 
Distance 
Definition Theoretical Sources 
in the Institutional 
Literature 
Examples of 
Empirical Studies in 
the International 
Business Literature 
Economic Differences in 
economic 
development and 
macroeconomic 
characteristics 
Whitley, 1992; 
Caves, 1996 
Iyer, 1997; Campa & 
Guillén, 1999; Yeung, 
1997; Zaheer & Zaheer, 
1997 
Financial Differences in 
financial sector 
development 
Whitley, 1992; La 
Porta et al., 1998 
Rueda-Sabater, 2000; 
Capron & Guillén, 
2009 
Political Differences in 
political stability, 
democracy, and trade 
bloc membership 
Whitley, 1992; 
Henisz, 2000; 
Henisz & 
Williamson, 1999; 
Gastanaga et al., 1998; 
Delios & Henisz, 2000, 
2003; Henisz & Delios, 
2001; García-Canal and 
Guillén, 2008 
Administrative Differences in colonial 
ties, language, 
religion, and legal 
system 
Whitley, 1992; 
Henisz, 2000; 
Ghemawat, 2001; La 
Porta et al., 1998 
Lubatkin et al., 1998; 
Guler & Guillén, 2009 
Cultural Differences in 
attitudes toward 
authority, trust, 
individuality, and 
importance of work 
and family 
Whitley, 1992; 
Hofstede, 1980; 
Inglehart, 2004 
Johanson & Vahlne, 
1977; Kogut & Singh, 
1988; Barkema et al., 
1996; Hennart & 
Larimo, 1998 
Demographic Differences in 
demographic 
characteristics 
Whitley, 1992 Huynh et al., 2006 
Knowledge Differences in patents 
and scientific 
production 
Nelson & 
Rosenberg, 1993; 
Furman et al., 2002 
Anand & Kogut, 1997; 
Shaver & Flyer, 2000; 
Berry, 2006; Nachum, 
Zaheer & Gross, 2008; 
Guler & Guillén, 2009 
Connectedness Differences in tourism 
and Internet use 
Nelson & 
Rosenberg, 1993; 
Guillén & Suárez,   
2005 
Oxley & Yeung, 2001 
Geographic Great circle distance 
between geographic 
center of countries 
Anderson, 1979; 
Deadorff, 1998 
Wolf & Weinschrott, 
1973; Hamilton & 
Winters, 1992; Frattiani 
& Oh, 2009 
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Table 2-5 Indicator Component Variables Used in the Calculation of Distance 
Dimensions 
Dimension:    Component Variables:     
       
1.  Economic Distance  
 Income     GDP per capita, 2000 USD     
 Inflation   GDP deflator (% GDP)     
 Exports     Exports of goods and services (% GDP)  
 Imports    Imports of goods and services (% GDP)  
2.  Financial Distance           
 Private Credit   Domestic credit to private sector (% GDP)   
Stock Market Cap  Market capitalization of listed companies (% GDP)  
Listed Companies  Number of listed companies (per one million population) 
3.  Political Distance  
 Policy Making Uncertainty Political stability measured by considering independent   
institutional actors with veto power   
 Democratic character  Democracy Score       
 Size of the state   Government consumption (% GDP)   
 WTO member   Membership in WTO (GATT before 1993)  
 Regional Trade Agreement Dyadic membership in the same trade bloc  
4.  Administrative Distance         
 Colonizer-colonized link  Whether dyad shares a colonial tie     
Common language   % population that speak the same language in the dyad  
 Common religion   % population that share the same religion in the dyad 
 Legal system    Whether dyad shares the same legal system  
5.  Cultural Distance            
 Power distance   WVS question on obedience and respect    
     for authority      
 Uncertainty avoidance  WVS questions on trusting people and  
job security   
 Individualism   WVS questions on independence and the  
role of government in providing for its citizens 
 Masculinity   WVS questions on the importance of  
     family and work     
6.  Demographic Distance          
 Life expectancy   Life expectancy at birth, total (years)  
 Birth rate   Birth rate, crude (per 1,000 people) 
Population under 14  Population ages 0-14 (% of total) 
 Population under 65  Population ages 65 and above (% of total)   
7.  Knowledge Distance           
 Patents    Number of patents per one million population   
 Scientific Articles  Number of scientific articles per one million population  
8. Global Connectedness Distance         
 International Tourism Expend International tourism, expenditures (% GDP)   
 International Tourism Receipts International tourism, receipts (% GDP)  
 Internet use   Internet users per 1,000 people   
9.  Geographic Distance 
 Great circle distance    Great circle distance between two countries according to  
     the coordinates of the geographic center of the countries 
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Table 2-6 Distance Dimensions, Sources, Year Availability, and Country Coverage 
Dimension:    Source           Years Available # of Countries (2004) 
1.  Economic Distance 
 Income    WDI  1960-2005 179 
 Inflation   WDI  1960-2005 157 
 Exports    WDI  1960-2005 165 
 Imports    WDI  1960-2005 165 
2.  Financial Distance 
 Private credit   WDI                   1960-2005 122 
Stock market Cap   WDI  1988-2005 122 
Listed companies  WDI  1988-2005 122 
3.  Political Distance     
 Policymaking uncertainty POLCONV 1960-2005 155 
 Democracy score  Freedom House 1960-2003 151 
 Size of the state   WDI   1960-2005 155 
 World trade agreements  WTO  1960-2005 133   
  
 Regional trade agreements WTO  1960-2005 133 
4. Administrative Distance 
 Colonizer-colonized Link CIA Factbook constant 198 
 Common language  CIA Factbook constant 198 
 Common religion  CIA Factbook constant 198 
 Legal system   La Porta et al.  constant 198 
5. Cultural Distance  
 Power distance   WVS  1980-2004 68 
 Uncertainty avoidance  WVS  1980-2004 66 
 Individualism   WVS  1980-2004 69 
 Masculinity   WVS  1980-2004 69 
6. Demographic Distance 
 Life expectancy   WDI  1960-2004 202 
 Birth rate   WDI  1960-2004 202 
 Population under 14  WDI  1960-2005 203 
Population under 65  WDI  1960-2005 203 
7. Knowledge Distance  
 Patents    USPTO  1977-2005 166 
 Scientific articles  WDI & ISI 1960-2003 110 
8. Global Connectedness Distance 
 International tourism Expend WDI  1995-2004 119 
 International tourism Receipts WDI  1995-2004 115 
Internet users   WDI  1995-2004 209 
9.  Geographic Distance 
 Great circle distance  CIA Factbook   constant 196 
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Table 2-7 Properties of Different Methods for Calculating Dyadic Distance 
Property Explanation Euclidean Euclidean 
Squared 
Mahalanobis 
1. Symmetry dij = dji for all i and 
j 
Yes Yes Yes 
2. 
Nonnegativity 
dij ≥ 0 for all i and j Yes Yes Yes 
3. 
Identification 
dii = 0 for all i Yes Yes Yes 
4. Definiteness dii = 0 only if xi = xj Yes Yes Yes 
5. Triangle 
inequality 
dij ≤ dik + djk for all 
i, j and k 
Yes No Yes 
6. Sensitive to 
correlation 
Variables are not 
assumed to be 
orthogonal to each 
other. 
No No Yes 
7. Sensitive to 
variance 
Variables are not 
assumed to have 
equal variance. 
No No Yes 
8. Scale 
invariant 
Measure is not 
sensitive to the 
scale of the 
variables. 
No No Yes 
9. Ability to 
handle over-
determination 
The number of 
points can be 
smaller than the 
number of 
variables. 
Yes Yes No 
 
Sources: Mimmack et al. (2001); Seber (1984). 
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Table 2-8 Correlation Matrix for Distance Dimensions7 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Hofstede Euclidean 
Distance 
1          
 (85792)          
2 Hofstede 
Mahalanobis 
Distance 
0.87 1         
 (85792) (85792)         
3 Economic Distance 0.07 0.02 1        
 (66378) (66378) (460000)        
4 Financial Distance 0.07 0.07 0.22 1       
 (25404) (25404) (78914) (83238)       
5 Political Distance -0.04 -0.08 -0.02 -0.05 1      
 (55094) (55094) (240000) (47811) (250000)      
6 Administrative 
Distance 
0.19 0.17 0.08 0.21 -0.01 1     
 (77903) (77903) (330000) (56027) (230000) (630000)     
7 WVS Cultural 
Distance 
-0.05 -0.07 -0.08 0.17 -0.21 0.07 1    
 (30894) (30894) (35006) (13832) (25165) (49101) (54845)    
8 Demographic 
Distance 
0.22 0.2 0.13 0.02 0.16 0.04 -0.03 1   
 (85792) (85792) (460000) (83238) (250000) (630000) (54845) (870000)   
9 Knowledge 
Distance 
0.18 0.11 0.17 0.2 0.06 0.18 0.09 0.09 1  
 (32899) (32899) (100000) (43688) (80490) (110000) (20484) (130000) (130000)  
1
0 
Global 
Connectedness 
Distance 
0.15 0.08 0.23 0.13 0.13 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.11 1 
 (12158) (12158) (68621) (41058) (40366) (52397) (8861) (73629) (28100) (73629) 
1
1 
Geographic 
Distance 
0.07 0.02 0.03 -0.02 0.1 -0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.02 0.01 
  (85792) (85792) (360000) (62202) (250000) (620000) (52649) (700000) (120000) (58472) 
                                                 
7
 Number of observations is in parentheses. Unless otherwise noted, all distances calculated using the Mahalanobis method; Correlations greater than 0.006 are 
significant at p < .05. 
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Table 2-9 US Sample Descriptive Statistics and Correlations (N=252,040, without Global Connectedness Distance)8 
 
  Variabl
e 
 Mean Std. 
Dev. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1 Entry 0.06  0.23  1.00              
2 Hofstede Euclidean 
Distance 
2.71  0.94  -0.16  1.00             
3 Hofstede Distance 7.15  3.78  -0.13  0.85  1.00            
4 Economic Distance 14.86  9.87  -0.13  0.38  0.13  1.00           
5 Financial Distance 6.94  5.23  -0.11  0.33  0.18  0.52  1.00          
6 Political Distance 175.83  84.64  -0.06  0.18  0.10  0.33  0.39  1.00         
7 Administrative 
Distance 
134.50  64.78  -0.06  -0.01  0.10  -0.19  -0.02  0.10  1.00        
8 WVS Cultural 
Distance 
2.49  1.52  -0.07  0.44  0.34  0.26  0.20  0.17  0.11  1.00       
9 Demographic 
Distance 
3.82  2.98  -0.07  0.52  0.29  0.51  0.24  0.31  -0.17  0.34  1.00      
10 Knowledge 
Distance 
67.96  40.47  -0.02  0.00  -0.06  0.35  0.34  0.40  -0.03  -0.05  0.03  1.00     
11 Geographic 
Distance 
8.23  2.49  -0.10  0.22  0.15  0.23  0.17  0.42  0.15  0.23  0.35  -0.02  1.00    
12 Log of Sales 4.48  2.49  0.31  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.03  0.00  1.00   
13 R & D Intensity 0.14  0.42  -0.05  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  -0.28  1.00  
14 Firm Host Country 
Experience 
0.03  0.31  0.14  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.02  0.02  0.01  0.00  0.00  0.02  0.00  0.15  -0.02  
                                                 
8
 Correlations greater than 0.005 are significant at p < .05. Unless otherwise noted, all distances calculated using the Mahalanobis method. 
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Table 2-10 Logistic Regressions Estimating the Effects of Distance on Foreign Market 
Entry by U.S. Manufacturing Firms, 1993-20059 
 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 
Hofstede 
Euclidean 
Distance 
 -0.87*** 
(0.03) 
   
Hofstede 
Mahalanobis 
Distance 
  -0.21*** 
(0.01) 
  
WVS Cultural 
Distanceb 
   -0.33*** 
(0.02) 
-0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Financial 
Distance 
    -0.17*** 
(0.01) 
Administrative 
Distance 
    -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Demographic 
Distance 
    -0.03** 
(0.01) 
Knowledge 
Distance 
    -0.02*** 
(0.00) 
Geographic 
Distance 
    -0.14*** 
(0.01) 
 
     
Log of Sales 0.71*** 
(0.03) 
0.77*** 
(0.04) 
0.75*** 
(0.04) 
0.72*** 
(0.04) 
0.79*** 
(0.04) 
R & D Intensity 
-0.56 
(0.65)  
-0.41 
(0.69)  
-0.44 
(0.67)  
-0.52 
(0.66) 
-0.36 
(0.70) 
Firm 
Experience 
0.19*** 
(0.05) 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.21*** 
(0.06) 
0.26*** 
(0.06) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
     
Number of 
observations 
252040  252040 252040 252040 252040 
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.33 0.31 0.28 0.36 
Chi-Square 1103.90**
* 
2323.11*** 1936.67*** 1494.53*** 2478.38*** 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
Compare model 
 
Additional d.o.f. 
 
Difference 
LogL 
 
-41979.00 -37971.88 -39099.56 -40866.35 -36571.14 
 
(3) and (5) 
 
5 
 
5056.82*** 
 
                                                 
9
 Robust standard errors shown in parentheses. Unless otherwise noted, all distances calculated using the 
Mahalanobis method.  * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001. 
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Table 2-10 (Con’t)  
Variables 
6 
(with 
experie
nce) 
7 
(with 
experie
nce) 
8 
(withou
t 
experie
nce) 
9 
(withou
t 
experie
nce) 
10 
(Manuf
acturin
g) 
11 
(Manuf
acturin
g) 
12 
(Distrib
ution) 
13 
(Distrib
ution) 
Hofstede 
Euclidean 
Distance 
        
Hofstede 
Mahalanobis 
Distance 
-0.05*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.19*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.19*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.17*** 
(0.01) 
 
Financial 
Distance 
 0.02 
(0.04) 
 -0.06* 
(0.03) 
 -0.15*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.15*** 
(0.01) 
Political 
Distance 
  
 
  
 
 -0.00* 
(0.00) 
 0.00*** 
(0.00) 
Administrati
ve Distance 
 -0.00** 
(0.00) 
 -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
WVS 
Cultural 
Distanceb 
 0.00 
(0.03) 
 -0.04* 
(0.02) 
 -0.04* 
(0.02) 
 -0.11*** 
(0.02) 
Demographi
c Distance 
 -0.00 
(0.00) 
 -0.02*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.00 
(0.01) 
 -0.06*** 
(0.01) 
Knowledge 
Distance 
 -0.02 
(0.00) 
 -0.14*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.02*** 
(0.00) 
Geographic 
Distance 
     -0.11*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.09*** 
(0.01) 
Log of Sales 0.24*** 
(0.06) 
0.24*** 
(0.06) 
0.73*** 
(0.05) 
0.78*** 
(0.05) 
0.61*** 
(0.04) 
0.63*** 
(0.04) 
0.71*** 
(0.04) 
0.74*** 
(0.04) 
R & D 
Intensity 
2.46 
(1.96)  
2.51 
(1.93) 
0.09 
(0.44)  
0.15 
(0.19) 
-4.99*** 
(1.32) 
-5.04*** 
(1.37)  
0.22*** 
(0.05)  
0.23*** 
(0.05)  
Firm 
Experience 
Dropped Dropped Dropped Dropped 0.12*** 
(0.04) 
0.14*** 
(0.04) 
0.15*** 
(0.05) 
0.17*** 
(0.05) 
Year 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observations 
13062  13062 238978 238978 240162 240162 240162 240162 
Pseudo R2 0.08 0.09 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.32 0.28 0.31 
Chi-Square 218.75**
* 
232.50**
* 
1253.59*
** 
1379.06*
** 
1122.43*
** 
1425.41*
** 
1324.18*
** 
1931.25*
** 
Log pseudo-
likelihood 
 
Compare 
model 
 
Additional 
d.o.f. 
Difference 
LogL 
 
-5373.21 -5360.11 
 
 
(6) and 
(7) 
 
5 
 
26.2*** 
-
14720.82 
-
13988.24 
 
(8) and 
(9) 
 
5 
 
1465.16*
** 
-
21728.72 
-
20692.31 
 
(10) and 
(11) 
 
6 
 
2072.82*
** 
-
26010.65 
-
24824.91 
 
(12) and 
(13) 
 
6 
 
2371.45*
** 
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Table 2.10 (Con’t)  
Variables 
14 
(Low 
income 
countrie
s) 
15 
(Low 
income 
countrie
s) 
16 
(High 
income 
countrie
s) 
17  
(High 
income 
countrie
s) 
18 
(Low 
R&D 
intensit
y firms) 
19 
(Low 
R&D 
intensit
y firms) 
20 
(High 
R&D 
intensit
y firms) 
 21 
(High 
R&D 
intensit
y firms) 
Hofstede 
Euclidean 
Distance 
        
Hofstede 
Mahalanobi
s Distance 
-0.18*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.16*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.21*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.19*** 
(0.02) 
 
Financial 
Distance 
 -0.15*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.14*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.17*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.18*** 
(0.02) 
Political 
Distance 
 -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
    
Administrat
ive 
Distance 
 0.01*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.01*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.00*** 
(0.00) 
WVS 
Cultural 
Distanceb 
 0.19*** 
(0.04) 
 -0.15*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.05* 
(0.02) 
 -0.15*** 
(0.04) 
Demograph
ic Distance 
 0.08** 
(0.03) 
 -0.00 
(0.01) 
 -0.02 
(0.01) 
 -0.07*** 
(0.02) 
Knowledge 
Distance 
 -0.17*** 
(0.03) 
 -0.02*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.02*** 
(0.00) 
 -0.02*** 
(0.00) 
Geographic 
Distance 
 -0.28*** 
(0.02) 
 0.02 
(0.02) 
 -0.17*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.05* 
(0.02) 
Log of 
Sales 
0.84*** 
(0.06) 
0.90*** 
(0.07) 
0.76*** 
(0.04) 
0.80*** 
(0.04) 
0.68*** 
(0.04) 
0.72*** 
(0.05) 
0.91*** 
(0.05) 
0.98*** 
(0.05) 
R & D 
Intensity 
-2.10 
(1.59) 
-1.96 
(1.71) 
-0.18 
(0.63) 
-0.08 
 
(0.63) 
Dropped  Dropped  Dropped Dropped 
Firm 
Experience 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.26*** 
(0.07) 
0.26*** 
(0.07) 
0.31*** 
(0.07) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.22*** 
(0.06) 
0.26** 
(0.10) 
0.36** 
(0.13) 
Year 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry 
Dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
observation
s 
89253 89253 150909 150909 136541 136541  115268 115268 
Pseudo R2 0.33 0.39 0.31 0.35 0.25 0.30 0.43 0.47 
Chi-Square 1136.50*
** 
1269.92*
** 
1497.26*
** 
2099.58. 1291.72*
** 
1908.03*
** 
953.56**
* 
1154.29*
** 
Log 
pseudo-
likelihood 
 
Compare 
model 
 
Additional 
d.o.f. 
 
Difference 
LogL 
 
-7939.58 -7141.40 
 
 
 
(14) and 
(15) 
 
6 
 
1584.35*
** 
-
29313.63 
-
27543.33 
 
 
(16) and 
(17) 
 
6 
 
3540.59*
** 
-
28675.99 
-
26755.76 
 
 
(18) and 
(19) 
 
5 
 
3845.31*
** 
-
10019.41 
-9282.88 
 
 
 
(20) and 
(21) 
 
5 
 
1473.06*
** 
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Table 2-11China Sample Descriptive Statistics and Correlations10 
    Me
an 
Std. 
Dev
. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Entry 0.00  0.03  1.00            
2 Hofstede 
Euclidean 
Distance 
3.22  0.74  -0.01  1.00           
3 Hofstede 
Distance 
11.1
8  3.98  
-
0.01  0.91  1.00          
4 Economic 
Distance 8.57  8.02  0.02  0.50  0.38  1.00         
5 Financial 
Distance 4.29  3.19  0.00  
-
0.20  
-
0.17  
-
0.01  1.00        
6 Political 
Distance 
88.3
0  
62.6
8  0.03  
-
0.39  
-
0.35  
-
0.07  0.27  1.00       
7 Administra
tive 
Distance 
142.
87  
57.3
9  
-
0.01  0.35  0.32  0.40  0.01  
-
0.25  1.00      
8 WVS 
Cultural 
Distance 
3.92  2.38  0.02  -0.13  
-
0.15  
-
0.13  0.16  0.35  
-
0.11  1.00     
9 Demograp
hic 
Distance 
12.2
3  8.19  0.00  0.61  0.54  0.45  
-
0.29  
-
0.36  0.19  
-
0.02  1.00    
1
0 
Geographic 
Distance 
695
1.07  
272
4.91  0.01  0.16  0.01  0.08  
-
0.12  0.18  
-
0.48  0.21  0.20  1.00   
1
1 
Log of 
Assets 
20.8
8  1.01  0.06  
-
0.01  0.00  0.00  0.01  0.07  0.00  0.11  0.02  0.00  1.00  
1
2 
Firm Host 
Country 
Experience 
0.14  0.89  0.16  0.00  0.00  -0.01  0.01  0.05  0.00  0.09  0.01  0.00  0.26  
 
                                                 
10
 Correlations greater than 0.008 are significant at p < .05. Unless otherwise noted, all distances calculated 
using the Mahalanobis method. 
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Table 2-12 Logistic Regressions Estimating the Effects of Distance on Foreign Market 
Entry by Chinese High-tech Firms, 1990-200811 
Variables 1  2 3 4 5 
Hofstede Euclidean 
Distance 
 -0.27 
(0.19) 
   
Hofstede Mahalanobis 
Distance 
  -0.07** 
(0.02) 
  
WVS Cultural 
Distanceb 
   -0.01 
(0.05) 
-0.22* 
(0.09) 
Financial Distance 
    -0.22 
(0.15) 
Administrative 
Distance 
    -0.01* 
(0.00) 
Political Distance 
    0.01** 
(0.00) 
Demographic Distance 
    -0.03 
(0.05) 
Economic Distance 
    0.11* 
(0.05) 
Geographic Distance 
    -0.33* 
(0.17) 
 
     
Log of Assets 1.54** 
(0.50) 
1.54** 
(0.50) 
1.54** 
(0.50) 
1.54** 
(0.50) 
1.55** 
(0.51) 
Firm Experience 0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.19*** 
(0.06) 
0.20*** 
(0.06) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
     
Number of 
observations 
21243 21243 21243 21243 21243 
Pseudo R2 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.28 0.35 
Chi-Square 191.45*** 190.34*** 332.73*** 191.94*** 40975.43*
** 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
 
Compare model 
Additional d.o.f. 
Difference LogL 
-139.88 -139.35 -138.77 -139.87 -125.94 
 
(3) and (5) 
6 
13.93* 
 
  
                                                 
11
 Robust standard errors shown in parentheses.Unless otherwise noted, all distances calculated using the 
Mahalanobis method.  * p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001. 
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Table 2-12 (Continued) 
Variables 
6  
(Low income 
countries) 
 7  
(Low income 
countries) 
8  
(High income 
countries) 
9  
(High income 
countries) 
Hofstede Euclidean Distance 
  
 
  
Hofstede Mahalanobis Distance 
-0.08 
(0.06) 
 -0.08* 
(0.04) 
 
WVS Cultural Distanceb 
 -0.14*** 
(0.03) 
 -0.34** 
(0.13) 
Financial Distance 
 0.31 
(0.38) 
 -0.36* 
(0.18) 
Administrative Distance 
 -0.09*** 
(0.02) 
 -0.01 
(0.01) 
Political Distance 
 0.03*** 
(0.01) 
 -0.01 
(0.01) 
Demographic Distance 
 -0.89*** 
(0.16) 
 -0.09 
(0.09) 
Economic Distance 
 -1.84 
(1.39) 
 0.19* 
(0.09) 
Geographic Distance 
 -0.61*** 
(0.13) 
 -0.09 
(0.28) 
 
    
Log of Assets 6.60** 
(2.25) 
7.31** 
(2.67) 
1.05** 
(0.35) 
1.06** 
(0.35) 
Firm Experience 0.24*** 
(0.07) 
0.26*** 
(0.07) 
0.20*** 
(0.05) 
0.21*** 
(0.06) 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
    
Number of observations 2620 2620 13463 13463 
Pseudo R2 0.68 0.75 0.18 0.27 
Chi-Square 1101.01*** 1190.53*** 168.94*** 12109.55*** 
Log pseudo-likelihood 
 
 
-17.27 -13.32 -107.30 -95.36 
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CHAPTER 3 GOVERNMENT CORPORATIONS AND GLOBALIZATION: 
EVIDENCE FROM CHINA 
3.1 Introduction 
Multinational enterprises (MNEs) from emerging economies have grown rapidly 
during the past two decades. Large firms from emerging economies such as Brazil, 
Russia, India, and China have become active players in the global market. They not only 
sell products worldwide, but also set up subsidiaries or acquire companies to conduct 
foreign direct investment (FDI). By 2008, the annual FDI outflows from emerging 
economies amounted to $351 billion (19% of the world’s total outward FDI). In 2008, 
seven companies from emerging economies ranked among the world’s top 100 
transnational corporations, compared to none in 1993 (UNCTAD, 2009). Cemex S.A. 
from Mexico, Lenovo from China, and Tata Steel Ltd. from India are among the largest 
MNEs from emerging economies. 
Although the rise of MNEs from emerging economies has become an important 
phenomenon in the world economy, scholarly literature has not paid much attention to it 
(Child & Rodrigues, 2005). Many studies in this area are either theoretical (Child & 
Rodrigues, 2005; Morck et al., 2008) or investigate the role of country-level rather than 
firm-level factors in determining outward FDI from emerging economies (Buckley et al., 
2007). Empirical studies have documented that many MNEs from emerging economies 
invest abroad either to acquire strategic assets (Chen & Chen, 1998; Makino et al., 2002) 
or to exploit ownership advantages that are not the same as those for MNEs from 
developed countries (Lall, 1983). MNEs from emerging economies differ from those in 
developed countries in such important aspects as motivation for and patterns of 
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international expansion, thus calling for new theories to explain their rise (Guillen & 
Garcia-Canal, 2009). One important feature of MNEs from emerging economies is that 
many of them are or have been government corporations, such as CITIC Group from 
China, Oil And Natural Gas Corporation from India and Companhia Vale do Rio Doce 
from Brazil (UNCTAD, 2009). Therefore, it is important to investigate how government 
influences the globalization of firms from emerging economies.  
The rise of MNEs from emerging economies parallels with the vast privatization 
process worldwide since the 1980s. A stream of literature has focused on the structure, 
strategy, and performance of government corporations in comparison with private firms 
(Megginson & Netter, 2001). Because many government corporations face severe agency 
problems, these corporations are in general believed to be bureaucratic, less efficient, and 
slow to adapt to changes in the environment (Brouthers et al., 2007; Cuervo & 
Villalonga, 2000).  Privatization — the sale of a state-owned firm to the private sector 
(Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000) — is a popular way to revitalize state sectors. The strategic 
behavior of privatized firms has received some attention (de Castro & Uhlenbruck, 1997; 
Park, Li & Tse, 2006), and this stream of research largely assumes that privatization 
means 100% private ownership (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). In many countries, however, 
partially privatized enterprises (PPEs), defined as firms with non-controlling state 
ownership,12 are an important outcome of state divestments (Gupta, 2005; Ramamurti, 
2000). Relatively fewer studies have analyzed the strategic behavior of PPEs, especially 
their FDI decisions. 
                                                 
12
 A partially privatized enterprise with controlling state ownership is considered a state-owned enterprise because 
control rights are still in the hands of the state. In this circumstance, which is also called revenue privatization 
(Boubakri & Cosset, 1998), ownership is sold more to create a source of revenue for the state (Jing & Padgett, 2006) 
than to improve firm efficiency.  
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This paper bridges these two streams of literature by studying the globalization of 
government corporations from emerging economies. The existence of state ownership in 
MNEs from emerging economies provides scholars an opportunity to understand the role 
of government in the globalization process of firms. Although several studies have shown 
that state ownership does influence firm strategy, such as product diversification (Li, Lam 
& Moy, 2005), only a few studies have examined the role of state ownership in 
determining FDI (Delios et al., 2008b). It is still unclear how state ownership influences a 
firm’s globalization process. Moreover, the vast literature on the study of government 
corporations mainly compares the strategies of SOEs and private firms (Megginson & 
Netter, 2001); few studies have compared the strategies of three types of government 
corporations: SOEs, PPEs and FPEs (fully privatized enterprises). 
This paper fills these notable gaps in the literature by arguing that government 
influences both the motivation of firms to go abroad and their resources for doing so. 
First, I examine the role of state ownership in determining the propensity of firms to go 
abroad. More specifically, I argue that the level of state ownership influences the risk 
preference of managers, thus creating different motivations for firms to invest abroad. As 
a result, the likelihood of going abroad is hypothesized to decrease with the level of state 
ownership.  
After investigating how government influences the motivation of firms to invest 
abroad, this paper further examines how government influences the resources for firms to 
go abroad. Both internal resources and external resources can lead to foreign expansion. 
While SOEs rely on external resources such as total debts to go abroad rather than 
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internal resources, PPEs rely on internal resources such as intangible assets to invest 
abroad, as predicted by the internalization theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976). 
Finally, I explain how different government corporations react differently to a 
government policy encouraging firms to go abroad. Such a policy influences both the 
motivation and resources of going abroad. On the motivation side, the policy creates 
institutional pressure for firms to comply. On the resource side, it increases the 
availability of external resources. Since SOEs rely heavily on government resources to 
survive, the institutional pressure for them to comply is high; meanwhile, as SOEs also 
rely on external resources to go abroad, such a government policy provides more 
resources to them. As a result, SOEs are more likely to invest abroad after such a policy 
is announced.  Since PPEs and FPEs rely more on internal resources to invest abroad, the 
policy will not influence their probability to go abroad.  
I test these hypotheses in the setting of Chinese-listed high-tech firms from 1991 
to 2007. The empirical evidences generally support the hypotheses. The contributions of 
this paper are fourfold. First, it brings the role of state ownership into the theory of FDI. 
Although international business scholars have investigated various factors that determine 
the globalization of firms, including the role of government (Brewer, 1993), state 
ownership has been largely ignored. Most studies in this area focus on the role of 
government policy (Luo, Xue & Han, 2010) rather than state ownership. State ownership, 
together with government policy, plays an important role in explaining why firms go 
abroad, influencing both their motivation and resources. Second, the paper enriches the 
literature on government corporations by analyzing the strategic decision of PPEs, an 
important type of government corporations in the privatization process that has been 
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insufficiently studied. Third, this paper distinguishes two different types of resources, 
internal resources and external resource and show that different types of government 
corporations rely on different types of resources. It shows that the internalization theory 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976) – an internal focused theory, cannot fully explain the 
globalization of firms from emerging economies. External resource also plays an 
important role in determining FDI. Moreover, ownership identity determines which type 
of resource firms will rely on when they go abroad. These findings will help us better 
understand the globalization of firms in general, and especially of MNEs from emerging 
economies. Fourth, it shows that how the change of government policy influences the 
probability of firms to go abroad by influencing the motivation and the availability of 
external resources. 
3.2 Background 
3.2.1 MNEs from emerging economies 
3.2.1.1 Motivations of FDI 
FDI theorists have long recognized firms invest overseas for different reasons 
(Behrman, 1969). They first recognized the possession of tangible assets as a major 
source of value creation. Therefore, they focused on the need to access physical assets 
and markets, and to cut costs, as the major drivers of FDI (Behrman, 1974; Dunning, 
1993). With the growing importance of strategic assets such as knowledge as the 
fundamental rational for the existence of MNEs (Kogut & Zander, 1992), the search for 
strategic assets is also recognized as a major driver for FDI. 
Dunning (1993) categorized FDI into different types according to different 
motivations: market-seeking, natural resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking and strategic 
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asset-seeking. Market seeking FDI is undertaken to serve the foreign markets by local 
production and distribution. Natural resource-seeking FDI is driven by a need to gain 
access to natural resources that are either not available in the home countries or available 
at higher costs than in the host country. Efficiency-seeking FDI takes place when firms 
try to spread value-adding activities geographically to take advantage of differences in 
the availability and cost of factor endowments (Nachum & Zaheer, 2005). Strategic asset-
seeking FDI is conducted when firms invest abroad to acquire key strategic assets such as 
brand and technology (Chung & Alcacer, 2002). 
3.2.1.2 Studies have shown that firms from emerging economies invest abroad for all of 
the above described reasons (Dunning, 2006; Tsai & Eisingerich, 2010). For 
instance,, MNEs from emerging economies invest abroad to acquire strategic 
assets and overcome their competitive disadvantages (Child & Rodrigues, 2005). 
Lecraw (1993) found that Indonesian firms tend to invest in developed countries 
to acquire knowledge, technology, management, and marketing expertise. 
Similarly, Kumar (1998) finds that Asian firms go abroad to strengthen their 
non-price competitiveness.Firm-specific factors driving FDI 
Scholars also try to discover firm-specific factors driving FDI decisions. Along 
this line of research, the dominant theory to explain the globalization of firms is the 
internalization theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976). This theory views internationalization 
as firms’ attempts to exploit their firm-specific ownership advantages in new geographic 
markets, which in turn allows them to create competitive advantages over firms in foreign 
countries (Hymer, 1976). According to this theory, firms must possess firm-specific 
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resources that can be exploited abroad, such as R&D and marketing capabilities 
(Tallman, 1991). 
This theory, however, has been developed and tested in the setting of MNEs from 
developed countries (Delios & Beamish, 1999; Morck & Yeung, 1992). MNEs from 
emerging economies, which have captured the attention of scholars since the 1980s (Lall, 
1983), differ from MNEs in developed counties in many respects, such as the speed of 
internationalization, expansion path, and motivations for going abroad (Guillen & Garcia-
Canal, 2009). Scholars have been interested in understanding firm-specific factors that 
contribute to the rise of MNEs from emerging economies. One of the major findings in 
this line of research is that the ownership advantages possessed by MNEs from emerging 
economies can be different from those in developed countries (Guillen & Garcia-Canal, 
2009; Wells, 1983). For instance, Lall (1983) found that MNEs from Argentina, Brazil, 
Hong Kong, and India outperform their counterparts from developed countries when they 
enter other emerging economies because of their resource endowments of low-cost inputs, 
affiliation to business groups, and ethnic branding in host countries. 
Besides understanding the role of firm-specific factors in promoting FDI, scholars 
also investigates the role of country-level factors. Buckley and his colleagues (2007) 
found that outward FDI from China is associated with political risk and cultural 
proximity to host countries, and with host market size, host natural endowments, and 
geographic proximity. Morck, Yeung and Zhao (2008) claimed that a high savings rate, 
corporate ownership structure, and capital market distortion all contribute to the rapid 
growth of Chinese outward FDI.  
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3.2.2 Government corporations and private firms 
Scholars have long recognized the role of ownership identity in influencing firm 
strategy (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Palmer, Friedland, Jennings & Powers, 1987). 
The state is an important type of owner worldwide (Koppell, 2007). In the West, hybrid 
organizations are owned by the government but operate through market transactions, such 
as the Overseas Private Investment Corporation in the United States (Koppell, 2007). In 
emerging economies, the wave of privatization since the late 1980s has created many 
firms with partial state ownership (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009).  
Depending on different stages of privatization, there are three types of 
government corporations: SOEs, which have controlling state ownership; PPEs, which 
have non-controlling state ownership; and FPEs, which have no state ownership and 
resemble private firms the most. Firms with different levels of state ownership are 
inherently different in their strategic orientation and their ability to adapt to 
environmental turbulence (Gedajlovic, 1993). In other words, ownership type is a 
parsimonious and objective way to classify firms into different strategic groups (Peng, 
Tan & Tong, 2004). 
The existing literature on privatization focuses on the comparison between SOEs 
and FPEs. In general, SOEs and FPEs differ in terms of strategy, structure, and 
performance (Brouthers et al., 2007; Li & Xia, 2008). Scholars have adopted various 
theories to explain this difference. The agency theory explanation is that managers in 
SOEs are not carefully monitored by the state; therefore, managers can pursue their own 
interests rather than those of the state, resulting in poor SOE performance (Cauley & 
Sandler, 2001; Qu, 2003). Stakeholder theorists argue that managers respond to pressures 
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exerted by key stakeholders (Frooman, 1999). The state, as a key stakeholder of SOEs, 
can influence their strategy through ownership (Arens & Brouthers, 2001). These 
different theories generate similar predictions that SOEs are associated with defensive 
strategies (Arens & Brouthers, 2001; Parker, 1995), mechanistic structure (Brouthers et 
al., 2007), administrative tasks and empire-building strategies (Li & Xia, 2008), low total 
factor productivity (Jefferson & Rawski, 2000), labor redundancy (Dong & Putterman, 
2003), and poor performance (Brouthers et al., 2007; Li & Xia, 2008). 
3.3 Theory and Hypotheses 
3.3.1 State ownership and the motivation for FDI 
As mentioned earlier, ownership type is a parsimonious and objective way to 
classify firms into different strategic groups (Peng et al., 2004), and different strategic 
groups have different strategic orientations (Gedajlovic, 1993). The existing literature, 
however, largely neglects PPEs in the comparison. In this paper, I will compare the 
differences among SOEs, PPEs and FPEs in terms of FDI. 
To understand the likelihood of these firms to conduct FDI, I focus on their level 
of risk-tolerance because FDI is inherently risky. FDI involves investing a large amount 
of money in a foreign country. MNEs have to overcome the liability of foreignness in 
order to succeed (Hymer, 1976). The liability of foreignness is “the costs of doing 
business abroad that result in a competitive disadvantage for an MNE subunit . . . broadly 
defined as all additional costs a firm operating in a market overseas incurs that a local 
firm would not incur” (Zaheer, 1995: 342-3). It is especially difficult for MNEs from 
emerging markets to overcome these costs because they lack global experience, 
managerial competence, and professional expertise (Luo & Tung, 2007). As a result, they 
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will face substantial learning costs (Makino & Delios, 1996). It is not unusual for even 
large and prominent firms to fail in their FDI activities. One example is the failure of 
TCL, a Chinese electronic device manufacturer, in its acquisition of Thomson Electronics 
in France. The acquisition cost TCL millions of dollars, and the acquired firm lost money 
every year. High risk, however, also means high potential return. Once an MNE is able to 
overcome the liability of foreignness, it will benefit from the exploitation of its resources 
in multiple countries, thus improving firm performance (Delios & Beamish, 1999). 
Given the high risk of FDI, the level of risk-taking behavior of a firm largely 
determines the motivation of the firm to go abroad. The more risk a firm is willing to take; 
the more likely it is to conduct FDI. Next I consider the risk-taking attitude of SOEs, 
PPEs and FPEs. 
3.3.1.1 SOEs  
According to resource dependency theory, organizations rely on the external 
environment for scarce and valuable resources. Therefore, organizations will alter and 
change their structure or pattern of behavior to acquire and maintain needed resources 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). If one organization heavily relies on another for resources, 
the other organization exerts power over the focal organization. Because SOEs count on 
the state for various resources such as capital, the state has power over SOEs. The power 
is exemplified in many ways, including the state’s dominant role in appointing directors 
and top management team members in SOEs (Qu, 2003).  
Since the government has ample influence on SOEs, an important question to ask 
is whether managers have discretion to make strategic decisions such as FDI. I argue that 
firms do have such discretion if the government does not have specific requirements or 
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policies towards outward FDI. It is well recognized that the severe agency problem in 
SOEs are due to the government’s inability to monitor the strategy and operation of SOEs 
(Lin, Cai & Li, 1998; Zhang, 1997). As described by Cuervo and Villalonga (2000: 582): 
“the owner-manager relationship is broken down into two other agency relationships – 
the public as owners-to-politicians and politicians-to-managers –which effectively 
reduces the incentives for monitoring managers’ behavior”. In general, the agency 
problem leaves room for managers in SOEs to make strategic decisions in areas where 
there are no clear government requirements or policies (Li & Rwegasira, 2008; Xia et al., 
2009). It is also the case for China. The Chinese government has granted managers of 
SOEs decision-making autonomy by implementing the “contract-responsibility system” 
as early as the 1980s (Fernandez-Stembridge & Huchet, 2006). One example of the 
managerial discretion is that managers of SOEs may adopt diversification strategy 
(Delios et al., 2008b) to stabilize revenues and minimize their employment risks 
(Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Tosi & Gomez-Mejia, 1989). 
Since managers do have managerial discretion to make strategic decisions, they 
face the choice of whether to make risky decision. Previous studies have shown that 
SOEs are reluctant to take risks (Adler, Brahm & Graham, 1992; Tan, 2001). Given the 
fact that many of the managers in SOEs are political appointees, these managers are 
‘extra conservative’ (De Mente, 1989), as described by Brouthers, Gelderman and Arens 
(2007): 
“Since SOEs have their managers appointed by the government (Whitley and 
Czaban (1998)), these managers might be less willing to take risks, since risk-
taking implies changing or altering the strategies imposed by the State (Luo and 
Tan (1998); Carlin and Landesmann (1997); Estrin (1994)). Although such 
risks might be commercially attractive, they are not necessarily congruent with 
State goals. Since the State is the powerful stakeholder, it can replace managers 
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that take risks (i.e., those that do not follow State directions) with someone who 
is more likely to pursue governmental rather than commercial goals.” 
(Brouthers, Gelderman & Arens, 2007: 227). 
 
 
The risk-averseness of SOEs towards outward FDI can be explained by the 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). As Kahneman and Tversky (1979: 263) 
argued “people underweight outcomes that are merely probable in comparison with 
outcomes that are obtained with certainty”. For SOEs, one the one hand, staying in the 
home country is gains obtained with certainty while going abroad is an outcome that is 
merely probable. It is so because SOEs enjoy various advantages over other firms in their 
domestic markets. It is well recognized that SOEs have been subsidized by the 
government, either at the central level (Qin, 2004) or at the provincial level (Sternquist, 
Chen & Huang, 2003). With government subsidy and various other supports, such as 
orders from the government (Meyer & Boisot, 2008), SOEs  are enjoying certain gains by 
staying within domestic markets. On the other hand, going abroad for SOEs is only 
probable gains or maybe even losses. The decision of FDI poses additional risks to SOEs: 
the extra costs of SOEs from emerging economies operating in foreign countries are 
higher because SOEs from emerging economies are associated with negative images such 
as poor corporate governance and little transparency.  SOEs that become victims of such 
negative images are likely to perform poorly in foreign countries (Brouthers, O'Donnell 
& Hadjimarcou, 2005; Gaur & Kumar, 2009). Under this situation, SOEs will favor the 
choice of certain gain - staying at home - over the choice of possible gain or even losses – 
going abroad. 
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3.3.1.2 PPEs 
Unlike SOEs, PPEs are willing to take risks to conduct FDI. PPEs are partially 
privatized firms that were formerly SOEs. The pressure for them to improve firm 
performance is high, since such improvement is one of the primary goals of privatization 
of SOEs (Villalonga, 2000). It is well documented that privatization brings about changes 
in firms’ goals, incentives, control, strategy, structure, and culture (Cuervo & Villalonga, 
2000).  It is not unusual for managers to be replaced by more proactive, market oriented 
managers during the privatization process (Andrews & Dowling, 1998). These changes 
lead to outcomes such as more innovation and risk-taking by these firms (Zahra et al., 
2000).  
Prospect theory also suggests that people will favor choices risky decision that 
could result in probable losses rather than choices with certain losses (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979). In the case of PPEs regarding FDI, staying at home may turn out to be a 
choice with certain loss, because managers in PPEs cannot impress the owners positively 
by staying at home, which may then result in the loss of their jobs. As argued earlier, if 
managers of PPEs do not deliver better results, they may be replaced (Cuervo & 
Villalonga, 2000). Managers want to leave good impressions to enhance their job and 
career prospects. In an institutional environment where the accounting and stock market 
performance data is not perfectly reliable (Bai, Yen & Yang, 2008), it is not easy to 
evaluate the performance of a firm, and also the performance of managers running the 
firm. An easy point of evaluation, particularly in high growth economies, is the growth of 
a firm (Winter & Helfat, 2007). When managers of PPEs search for growth options, they 
face limited choices of growth if they stay at home. The economy in emerging economies 
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is usually highly fragmented, such as Russia (Berkowitz & DeJong, 2001) and China 
(Boisot & Child, 1988), and local governments pursue a local economic agenda that 
protects local firms (Wu, 2005). As a result, firms face high costs, such as capacity costs, 
operating costs, transaction costs, and administrative costs, when they enter other 
domestic markets (Meyer & Boisot, 2008). Moreover, they will have to compete with the 
subsidized SOEs. Without support from the government, it is hard for PPEs to expand 
domestically, and so going abroad may be a good choice for pursuing growth.  
Meanwhile, going abroad becomes a choice of probable gains. With limited 
growth option in the home market, going abroad becomes an attractive choice. Expanding 
abroad is an important means through which firms can develop new sources of revenues 
(Zahra, 1996). When the state is a controlling shareholder, firms are subject to various 
constraints such as location (Cuervo & Villalonga, 2000). Such constraints disappear if 
the state becomes a non-controlling shareholder. This point is illustrated by Cuervo and 
Villalonga (2000: 587): “the host markets a firm enters through merger are less likely to 
retaliate or to impede entry if the firm is privatized rather than state owned. This clearly 
affects foreign markets, since the nationalistic sentiments often voiced when local firms 
(especially large ones) are sold to a foreign company are likely to be magnified if the 
buyer is a foreign state.” When such constraints disappear as a result of privatization, a 
PPE can seize the opportunities in the environment and further develop its resources and 
capabilities. 
To summarize the above arguments, managers of PPEs face an important loss – 
losing their jobs – if they stay in their home country. Under such circumstance, they are 
willing to take the risk of investing abroad. As indicated by Megginson, Nash and van 
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Randenborgh (1994), “privatization promotes entrepreneur, former SOEs will have the 
incentive and the means to invest in growth option” (Megginson et al, 1994: 436). 
Expanding firm boundaries through internationalization is a growth option welcomed by 
PPEs.   
3.3.1.3 FPEs 
 Compared to SOEs, FPEs are smaller13  but more nimble, and they resemble 
private firms of being highly market-oriented (Peng et al., 2004). Emerging economies 
are characterized with ever-changing environment (He, 2009; Tan, 2005). The 
environmental turbulence provides ample opportunities for them to make profits (Tan, 
1996). They seize the opportunities to fill the unfulfilled market niches. Taking risky and 
innovative investment decisions is one way through which these firms challenge the 
status quo and create their own competitive advantages (D'Aveni, 1996). Therefore, 
compared to SOEs, they are more risk-seeking in making strategic decisions.  
To summarize, SOEs, PPEs, and FPEs differ in their level of risk-taking. Since 
the level of state ownership determines their risk-taking attitudes, I have the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: The probability of a firm investing abroad is negatively related to the level 
of the firm’s state ownership. 
 
3.3.2 State ownership and the resources for FDI 
3.3.2.1 Internal vs. External Resources  
Strategy and international business scholars have long recognized the important role 
of resources in firm growth (Penrose, 1959; Tallman, 1991) . There are many types of 
                                                 
13
 The result of “grasp the large, release the small” policy of the Chinese government (Barnathan & Roberts, 1997). 
Studies also shown that in other emerging economies, fully privatized firms are generally smaller than SOEs given the 
ease of privatization of smaller firms (Boubakri, Cosset & Saffar, 2008).  
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resources, such as physical capital, human capital, organizational capital, social capital, 
and financial capital. Typical resources include routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982), 
business experience (Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), organizational culture (Fiol, 1991), 
dynamic capability (Teece et al., 1997), innovation capability (Henderson & Cockburn, 
1994), and many others. Firms can acquire resources both internally and externally. 
Internally developed resources are resourced developed within a firm. The resource-
based view posits that resources that can create sustained competitive advantages have to 
be internally accumulated by the firm (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). The strategic factor 
market is largely incomplete when it comes to resources that can create sustained 
competitive advantages because these resources are imperfectly imitable. Imitability is 
related to the characteristics of asset accumulation process: time compression 
diseconomies, asset mass efficiencies, inter-connectedness, asset erosion and casual 
ambiguity (Dierickx & Cool, 1989). All these characteristics make it hard to decide 
market prices for the resources. Therefore, these resources cannot be acquired externally 
from strategic factor markets; they have to be generated internally. Resources that create 
competitive advantages also encourage firms to go abroad to benefit from exploitation. 
Since these resources are subject to market failure, firms will have to internalize them, as 
described by the internalization theory (Buckley & Casson, 1976). One example of the 
resources that face market failure is intangible assets, such as knowledge and technology. 
Empirical evidences in various settings have supported the internalization theory by 
showing that firms with more intangible assets are more likely to go abroad (Delios & 
Beamish, 2001; Kogut & Chang, 1991).  
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Besides internal resources, firms can also seek externally for resources. As 
resource dependence theory posits, organizations are not self-sustained and they will rely 
on other organizations for resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). Many resources that are 
crucial to a firm’s survival are acquired externally, such as land and capital. One 
important type of resources needed for foreign expansion is capital. FDI is a strategy that 
requires a large amount of capital inputs since setting up a foreign subsidiary or acquiring 
a foreign company is a capital-intensive activity. In emerging economies such as China, 
the availability of external capital is limited since the capital market is largely inefficient 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997). Since investors have limited access to information (Ferguson 
et al., 2002) and the information available is usually not as reliable as that in the 
developed countries (Bai et al., 2008), investors are reluctant to invest in new projects 
such as FDI. Firms have to rely heavily on debts as a source of external resources to 
conduct FDI. In China, the availability of external resources is largely influenced by the 
government because China is formally a centrally planned economy and government has 
great influence in all aspects of economic activities (Khan, Griffin & Riskin, 1999). 
Government controls many of the resources such as the land (physical capital) and money 
(financial capital). Banks, a large provider of debts, are mostly state-owned. Loans from 
the state, usually through state-owned banks that act as policy banks rather than 
commercial lending institutions, are a common type of external resources provided by the 
government (Qu, 2003). 
3.3.2.2 SOEs  
Previous studies have shown that many SOEs rely heavily on government support 
to survive, and they thrive in regulated industries such as energy, infrastructure, and 
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transportation (Wang et al., 2009). SOEs also enjoy many benefits such as access to key 
resources (Li & Xia, 2008). Under the wing of government protection, SOEs are not 
motivated to develop internal resources. As a result, they are less likely than other firms 
to possess competitive advantages to compete successfully in domestic markets, not to 
mention in the global markets (Wang et al., 2009).  
Since they do not have internal resources that can be exploited in foreign markets, 
it is natural for SOEs to rely on external resources from the government. In the case of 
China, stated-owned banks have been constantly pressed by the state to provide easy 
credit to SOEs (Li & Xia, 2008), and these loans become the SOEs’ debts. It is not 
unusual for SOEs to end up not paying back these loans (Xiao, 2005). Because of this 
favorable feature, the loans are welcomed by many SOEs.  
To summarize, SOEs are willing to rely on external resources, especially debts, to 
conduct FDI. Therefore, I have the following hypothesis: 
H2a: Total debts have a greater positive impact than intangible assets on the 
probability of an SOE going abroad. 
 
3.3.2.3 FPEs  
Unlike SOEs which rely on external resources to invest abroad, FPEs will rely on 
internal resources when they go abroad for two reasons. First, since the government 
controls many of the external resources, FPEs are disadvantageous when they compete 
for these resources with SOEs (Brandt & Li, 2003). Second, external resource is not a 
good choice for FPEs because relying solely on external resources such as debts will not 
guarantee the success of internationalization. They are unlikely to overcome the liability 
of foreignness by providing superior products or services (Zaheer, 1995). The failure of 
internationalization could lead to serious consequences such as take-over or bankruptcy 
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(Zahra et al., 2000). FPEs will not go abroad unless they believe going abroad will 
improve firm performance. 
As a result, FPEs will rely on internal resources to go abroad. The possession of 
valuable internal resources that can be exploited abroad will lead to improved firm 
performance. The next question is whether firms from emerging economies have 
intangible assets that can be exploited outside their home countries.  
I argue that firms from emerging economies do have intangible assets that can be 
exploited abroad to create competitive advantages in at least two ways. The first way is to 
enter emerging industries where firms from emerging economies and those from 
developed countries do not have gaps in technology or experience. For example, Suzlon, 
an Indian wind turbine manufacturing company, is one of the leading players in the 
global wind energy industry. Suzlon is able to compete with Western firms through its 
integrated solutions that provide high-quality products and services to its customers 
(Vietor & Seminerio, 2008). Alternatively, firms from emerging economies can 
accumulate resources and compete with Western firms by penetrating market niches that 
Western firms neglect (Zeng & Williamson, 2007). For example, Haier, a Chinese 
electronic appliance manufacturer, dominates the worldwide markets for wine-storage 
refrigerator. Both examples show that firms from emerging economies do have resources 
that they can exploit abroad.  
By exploiting these internal resources in foreign countries, they will benefit from 
the global expansion of internal resources (Delios & Beamish, 1999). FPEs are willing to 
go abroad to exploit these resources. Therefore, I have the following hypothesis: 
H2b: Intangible assets have a greater positive impact than total debts on the 
probability of a FPE going abroad.  
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3.3.2.4 PPEs  
PPEs lay somewhere between SOEs and FPEs. On the one hand, they have more 
access to external resources than FPEs because the government still holds some level of 
ownership; on the other hand, they are performance-oriented since managers are under 
the pressure to improve firm performance (Megginson & Netter, 2001; Villalonga, 2000; 
Zahra et al., 2000). Then, which type of resources will PPEs rely on when they invest 
abroad, internal intangible assets or external total debts or both?  
As argued earlier, if PPEs only utilize external government resources to invest 
abroad without having any intangible assets, the performance is likely to suffer because 
they do not have competitive advantage to compete with foreign firms and overcome 
liability of foreignness (Zaheer, 1995). Unlike SOEs, they will have to repay these debts14. 
Various studies have shown that privatized firms may go bankruptcy if they cannot repay 
their debts (He, 2010; Xu, 1996). In other words, government will not buffer them from 
losses in globalization. Therefore, PPEs will not rely on external government resources to 
go abroad. Instead, they are willing to exploit internal intangible assets in foreign markets. 
By exploiting these resources, they will benefit from globalization (Delios & Beamish, 
1999). Since the purpose of privatization is to improve performance, exploiting intangible 
assets abroad fits the purpose well. I have the following hypothesis:  
H2c: Intangible assets have a greater positive impact than total debts on the 
probability of a PPE going abroad. 
 
                                                 
14
 Interview with an executive director of a PPE in Beijing, August 2009. 
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3.3.3 The impact of a policy change 
The Chinese government has promoted outward FDI from Chinese firms since 
2001. Overseas investment has been viewed as part of China’s overall strategy for joining 
global competition since China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001. In the 
Tenth Five-Year Plan announced in 2001, the strategy of enterprises “going out” to invest 
abroad was described as one of the four key thrusts that would enable China to adjust to 
the trend of economic globalization. To encourage firms to go abroad, the Chinese 
government has initiated many incentives, including providing no-interest loans to firms 
that invest abroad. 
The government policy changes both the motivation and the availability of 
external resources when firms go abroad. On the motivation side, it creates institutional 
pressures for firms to invest abroad. Oliver (1991) argues that firms respond differently to 
institutional pressures, from passive conformity to manipulation. One of the determinants 
of strategic response is the level of resource dependence: “an organization will be less 
likely to resist external pressures when it is dependent on the sources of these pressures” 
(Oliver, 1991: 163-164). Since SOEs rely heavily on the state for various resources to 
survive, they will comply with the request of the state by going abroad.  Legitimacy 
rather than efficiency is the primary concern since the state may replace managers who 
do not adopt strategies it proposes (Luo & Tan, 1998).  
On the resource side, such a policy means that more external resources become 
available for firms to use when they go abroad. Since SOEs rely on external resources to 
invest abroad, the increase in the availability of external resources will increase their 
probability of going abroad. Even if SOEs suffer from internationalization, they will not 
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be blamed because in following the advocates of the state they are “paying tuition” for 
future success (Yiu, Lau & Bruton, 2007) and the government will back them up with 
government resources such as capital (He & Lyles, 2008).  
Unlike SOEs, PPEs and FPEs rely less on government for resources. As a result, 
their strategic response is different from that of SOEs: while SOEs adopts the compliance 
strategy by going abroad, FPEs and PPEs will choose to dismiss because they are very 
concerned about efficiency. Since they rely on the capital market for funding, they must 
be efficient. Otherwise, they will be taken-over or go bankruptcy (Zahra et al., 2000). 
Therefore, they are unlikely to react favorably to the policy unless they believe firm 
performance will improve after going abroad.  On the resource side, since they rely more 
on internal resources rather than external resources, the change in government policy will 
not influence the availability of resources when they go abroad. 
To summarize, a government policy encouraging firms to go abroad will promote 
FDI conducted by SOEs, but not necessarily by PPEs and FPEs. I have the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: SOEs, not PPEs or FPEs, are more likely to invest abroad after a 
policy change that favors internationalization. 
 
3.4 Methodology 
3.4.1 Empirical setting 
The empirical focus of this study is foreign entries by Chinese-listed firms in 
high- technology industries from 1991 to 2007. China is an appropriate setting because 
outward FDI from China is increasing rapidly: in 2003, it was only $2 billion but this 
number climbed to $18.7 billion in 2007. China has become the largest outward FDI 
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investor from an emerging economy, with a total of $61.6 billion by the end of 2006 
(Ministry of Commerce, 2007). 
High-tech industries include communications and related equipment 
manufacturing, computer and related equipment manufacturing, computer application 
service, computer software development and consultation, consumer electronics 
manufacturing, electrical machinery and equipment manufacturing, and electronic 
components and appliances. Among Chinese-listed firms, these firms are active players 
in globalization. They not only export their products worldwide, but also directly invest 
abroad. For example, Konka Group, a large manufacturer of consumer electronics 
including televisions, mobile phones, refrigerators and air conditioning, has set up eight 
foreign subsidiaries in countries such as Australia, the United States, India, and 
Indonesia. These Chinese firms invest in the developed world (the United States, Japan, 
and Europe) as well as in developing countries (for example, Vietnam, Thailand, and 
Tanzania).  
The sample consists of 259 Chinese-listed firms in high-tech industries. This 
empirical setting provides an excellent opportunity to study the interplay among state 
ownership, resources, and FDI, for three reasons. First, as mentioned earlier, these firms 
are active players in FDI. Second, there is a wide range of state ownership in these firms: 
the level of state ownership ranges from zero to 83.75. Third, I chose to examine high-
tech industries, where the role of internal firm resources, namely intangible assets, should 
be important in promoting FDI. This is a setting where the internalization theory of 
globalization should apply (Buckley & Casson, 1976). If I can find support for the role of 
external resources in promoting FDI, I can confidently argue that the other type of 
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resource, external resources, has explanatory power even in a setting where the role of 
internal resources is prominent. 
3.4.2 Data 
There were a total of 298 foreign subsidiaries owned by 65 Chinese-listed high-
tech firms from 1991 to 2007. I identified high-tech firms according to the industry 
description in their annual reports. Then, I went through the annual reports to identify the 
foreign subsidiaries. Listed firms usually disclose subsidiary information (including 
country of entry, the amount of capital invested, the percentage of ownership, and 
primary business activities of subsidiaries) in the appendix. After gathering this 
information, I next determined the establishment year of the subsidiaries. If this 
information was not in the annual report, I consulted the company’s website and also 
searched the Internet to determine the exact year of establishment. I gathered ownership 
information for listed firms from the ownership database of GTA (a research service 
center in China). Finally, I collected other financial data from CSMAR, a database that is 
part of Wharton Research Data Services. 
3.4.3 Variables 
3.4.3.1 Dependent Variable 
FDI. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm owns a foreign 
subsidiary in a certain year. It is zero otherwise. Therefore, the level of analysis in this 
paper is firm-year. 
3.4.3.2 Independent Variables 
State ownership. State ownership percentage is the sum of the percentage of a firm’s top 
ten shareholders that are classified as “state” by the official Chinese ownership 
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classification system. Besides “state,” ownership classifications are “legal,” “employee,” 
“A-share,” “B-share” and “H-share.” This classification distinguishes among three 
dominant groups of shareholders — state, legal person, and tradable A – each of which 
holds approximately 30% of the total stock in these listed companies (Sun, Tong & Tong, 
2002). One problem of the official scheme is that it fails to identify the identity of legal 
person. State-owned shares (guoyou gu) consist of two parts: state shares (guojia gu) and 
state-owned legal person shares (guoyou faren gu), however, these two parts lie in two 
different categories according to the official classification (Delios, Wu & Zhou, 2006). It 
is unclear whether the legal entities are state-owned or non-state-owned. To solve this 
problem, I measure state ownership by the percentage of state shares plus state-owned 
legal person shares.  
To test H2 and H3, I classify firms into three types according to their state 
ownership: SOEs, PPEs and FPEs. SOEs are defined as firms with a state ownership of 
over 50%, PPEs are firms with a state ownership of less than 50% but above zero, while 
FPEs are firms with zero state ownership15. I choose 50% of state ownership to classify 
SOEs because owners with over 50% of total shares are considered the controlling 
shareholders. They have important rights such as voting and cash flow rights (Claessens, 
Djankov & Lang, 2000). It is a common way to classify SOEs as firms with above 50% 
state ownership since many studies have adopted such an approach to identify SOEs (Li 
& Zhang, 2010; Zhang & Dong, 2008).  
Since the classification of SOEs and PPEs is crucial to test the hypotheses, I tried 
different methods to categorize SOEs and PPEs. One way to distinguish between SOEs 
                                                 
15
 It should be noted that firms with zero ownership can be either firms founded by private entrepreneurs or firms that 
have fully privatized. I excluded the former by tracing back the ownership identity of the largest owner of the firms. 
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and PPEs is by whether a firm is directly controlled by the SASAC (State-owned Assets 
Supervision and Administration Commission) or not. Another way is to use different 
levels of state ownership to differentiate SOEs and PPEs. I also tried 40% instead of 50% 
as the cutting point. The use of continuous variable state ownership to test H1 is another 
to avoid the arbitrary of dividing firms into these different categories.  
 It is also possible that the state controls a firm through a pyramid ownership 
structure (Wolfenzon, 1999). To avoid this problem, I adopted the ownership 
classification developed by Delios, Wu and Zhou (2006), which traces the ultimate 
ownership up to two levels. The coverage of this scheme, however, is only from 1993 to 
2002. Since the majority of the FDI in this sample was conducted after 2001, it is hard to 
replicate the regressions in this chapter using this new classification. Instead, I tested the 
first hypothesis using this new scheme. The results of the different categorizations are 
summarized in Models 1 to 5 in Table 3-4 as a robustness check. 
Intangible assets. This is one of the independent variables to test Hypothesis 2. Caves 
(1996) defined intangible assets as knowledge, technological or otherwise, that is unique 
to a firm. Intangible asset might also take the form of a trademark, patent, or brand. In 
this paper, intangible assets are calculated as the net original cost of patents, trademarks 
and copyrights proprietary, land use rights and commodity credit, after amortization 
(GTA, 2006). 
Total debts. This is the other independent variable to test H2. It is the sum of long-term 
and short-term debts that the company borrows from banks or other financial institutions. 
The ability to borrow measures the ability of the firm to acquire resources from the 
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government, because most of the banks and financial institutions are state-owned. It is a 
proxy for access to external government resources.  
Year after 2001. To test Hypothesis 3, I create a dummy variable Year after 2001 that 
equals to one for the years after 2001. As mentioned earlier in this paper, Chinese 
government has promoted outward FDI of Chinese firms purposefully since 2001. 
Entering into WTO marks a sharp shift in the Chinese economy, especially regarding the 
outward FDI policy. For example, “measures of capital support for small-and medium 
enterprises to develop international markets” was issued by Ministry of Finance and 
Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation in 2001. The “Notice on providing 
credit support to key OFDI projects encouraged by the state” is issued by the State 
Development and Reform Commission in 2002. Other studies that review the different 
stages of Chinese outward FDI has classified the period after 2001 as a distinctive stage 
(Buckley, Cross, Hui, Liu & Voss, 2008; Luo et al., 2010). I am following this literature 
to measure the shift in government policy using the year of 2001 is a cutting point. I 
expect to find more FDI after the year of 2001 conducted by SOEs. 
3.4.3.3 Control Variables 
Firm age. A firm’s age may have an influence on the pattern of its multinational activity 
(Swaminathan & Delacroix, 1991). Firm age is an indicator of a firm’s ability to survive; 
firms with a long history have been able to compete successfully over time. Therefore, 
older firms are more likely to go abroad because of their competitiveness. Moreover, 
young firms may lack the knowledge and experience to expand overseas (Guillen, 2002). 
Therefore, I control for firm age, which is measured by the number of years since the 
firm’s founding. 
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Firm performance. Better-performing firms are more likely to invest abroad since they 
have the resource and capability to do so. Therefore, I control for firm performance by 
measuring return on assets (ROA) of the parent firm. ROA is the ratio of net profit to 
total assets of the firm. Since no one measure is perfect for firm performance (Meyer, 
2002), there is no consensus in the literature regarding the most appropriate measure of 
firm performance. Unlike stock market returns, accounting-based performance measures 
are not affected by the divergence between shareholders and managers (Prowse, 1992). 
ROA has been widely used by others to measure firm performance (Chang & Singh, 
1999).  
Prior foreign experience. It is important to consider the possibility of learning in 
globalization. Scholars in international business describe the internationalization process 
as a gradual development taking place in distinct stages and over a relatively long period 
of time (Melin, 1992). The most influential stage model is the Uppsala 
internationalization model (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). This process, whereby a firm 
gradually increases its international involvement, is described as being sequential as firms 
gain more foreign experience in operations.  
One basic assumption of the Uppsala Model is that lack of knowledge about 
foreign markets is a major obstacle to international operations, but such knowledge can 
be acquired (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). However, because of the tacit character of 
knowledge, one important source is a firm’s own operations. An organization’s previous 
experience can serve as a guide to a related decision because organizations confine search 
to areas in which they are experienced when they face high uncertainty (March, 1988). 
The benefits of accumulated past experience for making decisions have been found in 
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various organizational settings (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Henisz & Delios, 2001). 
In the case of FDI, by operating in a foreign market, the firm acquires invaluable 
information about that market that cannot be acquired by other means. In this paper, I 
measure the firm’s past foreign investment experience using the total number of foreign 
subsidiaries in the years prior to the year of a foreign entry. This measure has been 
widely used in previous studies (Henisz & Delios, 2001). 
Ownership concentration. A firm with a low ownership concentration is more susceptible 
to a severe agency problem. Compared with large owners, such as institutional owners, 
small shareholders do not have the capability to monitor firm behavior. Therefore, there 
is a greater chance of management expropriation in firms held by a large number of small 
shareholders rather than in firms held by a few large shareholders. In the case of going 
abroad, it is possible that managers pursue their own interests in making the decision. 
Therefore, it is necessary to control for the agency problem. I use the percentage of the 
firm held by the top five shareholders as the measure of the firm’s ownership 
concentration.  
Legal person shares. Legal person shares (faren gu) are shares owned by domestic 
institutions with a legal person status, such as banks and mutual funds. Legal person 
shares in China resemble institutional shares in the West: they are relatively conservative 
in investment strategy to ensure the stability of returns (Menkhoff, 2002). The risk-
aversion of legal person shareholders could result in a reluctance of firms to invest 
abroad. As argued earlier, it is possible that legal person shares are owned by the state. I 
calculate legal person ownership percentage by adding the percentages owned by the top 
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ten shareholders that are officially classified as legal persons, excluding state-owned legal 
person shares. 
A-shares. Tradable A-shares are owned by domestic individual residents of China or 
institutions, but cannot be owned by foreign investors. A-shares are the only type of 
shares that can be publicly traded among domestic investors on the Shanghai or Shenzhen 
Stock Exchange. Individual investors are more risk-seeking than institutional investors, 
because they can diversify away the risk by holding different stocks (Verma & Verma, 
2008). Therefore, I expect A-shareholders to favor risky investment decisions such as 
going abroad. I calculate A-share percentage by adding the percentages owned by the top 
ten shareholders that are officially classified as tradable A-shareholders. 
Product diversification. Product diversification also influences the extent of 
internationalization. Since product diversification is resource-consuming, it competes 
with globalization for scarce resources such as capital. However, it is also possible that 
the experience generated from product diversification can be applied to globalization. 
The literature on the relationship between product diversification and globalization is 
inconclusive (Doukas & Lang, 2003; Tallman & Li, 1996). I control for product 
diversification as measured by the concentric index developed by Montgomery and 
Wernerfelt (1988).  
Time effects. To control for possible time effects, I include year dummies in the 
regressions. Industry dummies are unnecessary since the sample consists of the relatively 
homogeneous high-tech industries. 
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3.4.4 Estimation Method 
The dependent variable is whether a firm has a foreign subsidiary in a particular 
year, which is a dummy variable; therefore, probit regression is the suitable estimation 
model. There are two problems to solve in the empirical analyses: sample selection and 
endogeneity. 
The sample selection problem exists because none of the firms in the sample are 
100% state owned. It is the case since all listed firms have some shares owned by the 
public. Therefore, it is necessary to control for the sample selection bias by calculating 
the probability of a firm to be listed and enter that probability as a control variable in the 
following regressions, as suggested by Heckman (1979). To calculate the ratio, I gather 
information on all 100% state-owned unlisted firms in the high-tech industries. The data 
come from the registration records and include basic information such as location, 
establishment year, registration capital and annual sales. There are a total number of 
1,547 firms. I predict the probability of a firm being 100% SOE by running a probit 
regression as shown in model 1 in Table 3-2. The independent variables include number 
of patents a firm filed in the U.S., annual sales and province and year dummies. I use the 
number of patents as an independent variable to predict the probability of a firm being 
listed or not because firms may choose to be listed if they have certain capabilities (Tong, 
2009). In the case of high-tech firms, innovation capability is an important one. Patent 
data is acquired by searching company names at the USPTO website. Based on the 
results in this regression, I calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio and enter the ratio in all other 
regressions as a control variable. 
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One of the independent variables, state ownership, is endogenous because 
government may choose to privatize firms with certain characteristics that may lead to 
internationalization. Another independent variable, total debts, is also endogenous 
because investing abroad may cause an increase in the level of a firm’s debts. Therefore, 
another empirical challenge in this paper is controlling for the endogeneity of state 
ownership and total debts. Instrument variables that are related to the endogenous 
variables but unrelated to the probability that firms will go abroad are necessary to solve 
the problem of endogeneity.  
Since privatization could be viewed as one way through which government raises 
money to deal with financial deficits (Boubakri & Cosset, 1998; Jing & Padgett, 2006), 
the level of financial deficits of provincial government in which a firm is located may 
predict the probability of privatization of that firm. Financial deficit is calculated by 
subtracting financial expenses from financial revenues. Financial deficit at the provincial 
level of the previous year predicts the need for provincial government to privatize firms, 
not the probability of a firm to invest abroad. It is used as the instrument for state 
ownership.  
I use two instrument variables for total debts, one at firm level and the other at 
provincial level. Previous research has identified fixed assets as a determinant of total 
debts (Chui, Lloyd & Kwok, 2002; Friend & Lang, 1988). Since fixed assets can be used 
as collateral to secure debts, firms with a high level of fixed assets are expected to issue 
more debts (Titman & Wessels, 1988). I choose the amount of fixed assets of the 
previous year as the firm-level instrument. The provincial level instrument variable is the 
total number of branches of the four largest state-owned banks in the province in which a 
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firm is located. This variable predicts the availability of funds from state-owned banks. 
Both variables should be related to the level of total debts of a firm, but not related to the 
probability of the firm going abroad.  
To test the relevance and exogeneity of the instruments, I conduct first-stage F-
test and Sargan-Hansen test. The former is a test of instrument relevance; while the latter 
is a test of instrument exogeneity (Bascle, 2008).  The first-stage F-test can be viewed as 
a sophisticated F-test with the null hypothesis that the coefficients of instruments equal 
zero (Staiger & Stock, 1997). A rejection of the test means that instruments are relevant. 
The null hypothesis of Sargan-Hansen test is that the instruments are valid instruments, 
i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation.  A rejection casts doubt on the validity of   the 
instruments (StataCorp, 2009). I run ivreg2 to get the first-stage F-test and Sargan and 
Basman statistics because such tests have not been developed after ivprobit. For state 
ownership, the instrument has an F-test value of 2.68 (p-value=0.10) and Hansen J 
statistic is 0.00 (p-value=1.00). For total debt, the instruments have the F-test value is 
17.64 (p-value=0.00) and Hansen J statistics is 0.87 (P-value=0.35). These tests show that 
the instruments are relevant and exogenous. 
Model 2 and 3 in Table 3-2 are the models that calculate the predicted value of 
state ownership and total debts using the instrument variables and other control variables. 
I use these variables in model 2 and 3 in Table 3-3 to test Hypothesis 1. To test H2 and 
H3, I use the ivprobit command in STATA 11 to run the regression. Moreover, I use the 
cluster option in STATA to account for intra-group variance since I have panel data. I use 
the entire sample to test Hypothesis 1. To test Hypothesis 2 and 3, I split the sample into 
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three sub-samples: SOEs, PPEs and FPEs. I run the same regression in these different 
samples to investigate the potential differences of independent variables in influencing 
the probability that firms will go abroad. 
3.5 Results 
Table 3-1 shows the means, standard deviations, and correlations of variables 
used in the regressions. Table 3-2 includes three first-stage regressions. Model 1 
calculates the inverse Mill’s ratio of being listed. The regression shows that the more 
patents a firm filed in the U.S, the more likely it will be listed; the larger the annual sales, 
the more likely it will be listed. Model 2 and 3 calculates the predicted value of state 
ownership and total debts. The instrument variables are significant in expected signs.  
------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3-1 & 3-2 about here 
------------------------------------------- 
 
Table 3-3 reports the parameters and robust standard errors of eleven model 
specifications. Models 1, 2, 4, and 5 run probit regression while models 3 and 6 to 11 run 
ivprobit model. Model 1 is the baseline model that includes only the control variables. In 
model 2, I add the independent variable predicted state ownership to test H1. I run the 
ivprobit model and treat state ownership as the endogenous variable in model 3. In model 
4, I add the other independent variables predicted total debts, intangible assets, and year 
after 2001. In model 5, I further add the interaction terms between state ownership and 
total debts, and between state ownership and intangible assets. In these two models 
(models 4 and 5), I run probit model using the predicted value of state ownership and 
total debts because the command ivprobit can only accommodate one endogenous 
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variable at one time (since it is hard to find an instrument variable for both state 
ownership and total debts). 
The first five models use the full sample. In models 6, 7 and 8, I split the full 
sample into three categories: SOEs, PPEs, and FPEs, according to a firm’s level of state 
ownership. In these three models, the only endogenous variable is total debts. Therefore, 
I use ivprobit command and include fixed assets and the number of bank branches as the 
instrument variables in these three regressions. Similarly, in models 9, 10 and 11, I split 
the sample again, and add the interaction terms between total debts and year after 2001, 
and between intangible assets and year after 2001.  
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3-3 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
The first hypothesis, the probability of going abroad is negatively related to the 
level of state ownership, is strongly supported. The coefficient of state ownership is 
negatively significant in models 2 to  5. Previous studies have recognized the difficulty of 
interpreting the results of probit models; therefore, it is necessary to show the effects of 
independent variables in probit models by reporting their marginal effects (Hoetker, 2007; 
Wiersema & Bowen, 2009). I calculated the marginal effects of state ownership using the 
margins command in STATA. In model 4, the probability of conducting FDI decrease 
from 68% to 33% if the level of state ownership increase from one standard deviation 
below mean to the mean value, other variables constant at their mean values. The 
probability further decreases to 8% when state ownership increases from mean to one 
standard deviation above mean. 
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Both total debts and intangible assets are positively significant in models 4 and 5. 
However, when I split the sample according to ownership type, different factors influence 
the probability of SOEs and PPEs investing abroad. For SOEs, total debts are positively 
significant in models 6 and 9; therefore, hypothesis 2a is supported. The probability of 
going abroad increases from 5% to 23% when total debts increase from one standard 
deviation below mean to one standard deviation above mean in model 6. SOEs with high 
levels of total debts are more likely to invest abroad. Intangible assets are not significant 
for SOEs. For PPEs, on the contrary, intangible assets are positively significant, while 
total debts become non-significant in models 7 and 10. The probability of going abroad 
increases from 19% to 29% when intangible assets increase from one standard deviation 
below mean to one standard deviation above mean in model 7. Thus, hypothesis 2c is 
also supported. Hypothesis 2b, however, is not supported since total debts rather than 
intangible assets are significant for FPEs in models 8 and 11. The results in models 6 to 
11 suggest that while SOEs and FPEs rely on external government resources to invest 
abroad, PPEs rely on internal firm resources to invest abroad.  
I further conduct F-test to test the difference in the coefficients of total debts and 
intangible assets. The Chi-square test value is 14.09, 7.64, and 11.21 for models 4, 5, and 
6, and they are significant at p value of 0.01, 0.05 and 0.01, respectively. The test 
confirms that total debts and intangible assets do have different effects for these three 
different groups of government corporations. 
Year after 2001 is positively significant in models 6 and 9. Its effect on the 
probability of going abroad differs when I split the sample. Out of the three types of firms, 
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only SOEs are more likely to go abroad after the year of 2001. PPEs and FPEs do not 
react to the policy. This result supports Hypothesis 3. 
When we look at the interaction terms in model 5, the support is weaker. The 
interaction term between state ownership and intangible assets is marginally negatively 
significant, showing that the effects of intangible assets on the probability of foreign 
entry become weaker as state ownership increases, consistent with Hypotheses 2b and 2c. 
However, the interaction term between state ownership and total debts is not significant. 
Overall, the interaction effects are not strong, which may be due to the findings in model 
8 and 11: FPEs rely on total debts rather than intangible assets to invest abroad.  
For the interaction terms in models 9 to 11, only the interaction term between 
total debts and year after 2001 in model 9 is positively significant, showing that for SOEs, 
the effects of total debts on the probability of foreign entry is higher after the year of 
2001. The result is consistent with the prediction of Hypothesis 2a and 3. Since SOEs are 
more likely to invest abroad after the year of 2001 and they rely on total debts when they 
go abroad, the interaction term is positively significant. As for the interaction term 
between intangible assets and year after 2001, none of them are significant in the three 
models, showing that the effect of intangible assets on the probability of foreign entry is 
not influenced by the time period. The results are consistent with Hypothesis 2b/c and 3: 
since the government policy does not influence the internal resources, the effects of 
internal resources (intangible assets) on the probability of foreign entry is not influenced 
by the government policy. 
In short, all hypotheses are supported except for Hypothesis 2b. FPEs are found to 
rely on external government resources, rather than internal firm resources, to go abroad. 
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This is an unexpected finding that deserves further discussion. One possible explanation 
for this result is that FPEs may use government loans to establish connections to the 
government (Chan, Cheng & Szeto, 2002; Xin & Pearce, 1996). The attempt to invest 
abroad by utilizing government resources may be a good way for them to establish a link 
which they could utilize in the future. For example, managers in FPEs may become 
acquaintance to officials in banks or the government. Viewed in this way, the decision to 
invest abroad using government resource is a strategic step stone to gain further access to 
government resources.  
As for control variables, product diversification is negatively significant in most 
of the models, showing that firms are constrained by their resources. Those firms that 
conduct a high level of product diversification are less likely to invest abroad. Legal 
person share is negatively significant in all models except the first, indicating that legal 
person shareholders are risk-averse and deter firms from going abroad. Legal person 
shares are negatively significant in all models, indicating that institutional investors are 
more risk-averse. ROA is positively significant in models 1, 2, 6 and 11, indicating that 
better performing firms are more likely to go abroad. Firm age is negatively significant in 
models 3 to 6 and 9. Older firms may be subject to a high level of inertia (Freeman, 
Carroll & Hannan, 1983), making them less likely to conduct strategic changes. For 
SOEs, ownership concentration is negatively significant, which means that firms with a 
low ownership concentration are more likely to invest abroad. This is an indication that 
SOEs suffer from the agency problem. SOEs are likely to invest abroad just to cater to 
the advocates of the government. These managers only consider their political outlook 
rather than the performance of the firm (Qu, 2003). Therefore, in SOEs with a low 
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ownership concentration, managers pursue their own interests to invest abroad because 
the minority shareholders lack monitoring power. The situation is different for PPEs. In 
these firms, ownership concentration turns out to be positively significant. This result 
may reflect the fact that in PPEs, the lack of large shareholders makes it hard to agree on 
a big strategic move such as investing abroad (Edwards & Weichenrieder, 2009). 
The number of prior foreign investments made by a firm is positively significant 
for PPEs and FPEs, but is insignificant for SOEs. This measure reflects the experience of 
the firm. It is interesting that unlike PPEs and FPEs, SOEs generally do not rely on their 
past experience to invest abroad. Ideally, firms will gain enough foreign experience 
before they go abroad (Johanson & Vahlne, 1977); otherwise, they will suffer from their 
lack of market knowledge. However, this is not a concern for SOEs since they have 
enough capital to support a foreign failure even if the investment does turn out to be 
unsuccessful. In this case, SOEs are able to invest abroad even though they lack relevant 
foreign experience. 
Fixed asset is positively significant in models 6 to 11. It works well as an 
instrument variable, indicating that the level of total debts of a firm increases with the 
firm’s fixed assets. The number of bank branches in a province is positively significant in 
models 7 and 10. Firms located in provinces with more state bank branches are more 
likely to get loans. The Wald test for exogeneity shows that models 6, 7 and 10 suffer 
from endogeneity problem. Therefore, it is necessary to use instrument variables to solve 
the problem of endogeneity.   
Robustness check. I checked the robustness of the results in several ways. First, as I 
described earlier. I tried different methods to categorize SOEs and PPEs. The results are 
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summarized in Models 1 to 5 in Table 3-4. I also tried Cox regression rather than probit 
model to test the first hypothesis because Cox model is suitable for rare events (Cox, 
1975). I cannot test the other hypotheses using Cox model because Cox model will not 
accommodate the instrument variables in the regression. The results of Cox model are 
summarized in model 6 of Table 3-4. 
---------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3-4 about here 
---------------------------------- 
 
The results in Table 3-4 largely support the previous findings. Models 1 and 2 
shows the classification by SASAC: firms with state ownership above zero and is 
controlled by SASAC are considered as SOEs while firms with state ownership above 
zero but not controlled by SASAC are considered as PPEs.  When I classify SOEs and 
PPEs in this way, SOEs still rely on total debts rather than intangible assets to go abroad. 
Chi-square value to test differences in coefficients is 9.97, significant at p value of 0.01. 
For PPEs under this categorization, they rely on intangible assets rather than total debts. 
Chi-square value is 4.59 with p-value of 0.10. Model 3 and 4 use 40% as the cutting point 
to classify SOEs and PPEs and the results are similar. The chi-square value is 8.38 and 
7.22, with p value of 0.04 and 0.07 in model 3 and 4. Year of 2001 is also positively 
significant in model 3, but not in model 4. The tests in models 1 to 4 show the robustness 
of results supporting Hypotheses 2. The support of Hypothesis 3 is weaker since Year 
after 2001 is not significant in either model 1 or 2.   
In model 5, I use another measure of state ownership and again it is significant, 
supporting Hypothesis 1. Model 6 shows that the results hold if I choose a different 
model specification: Cox model. The coefficients reported in model 6 are the hazard ratio 
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of conducting FDI. Therefore, a coefficient larger than one means the variable increases 
the probability of FDI while a coefficient smaller than one means the variable decreases 
the probability. We can see that state ownership decreases the probability of investing 
abroad, consistent with the hypothesis. The results in models 5 and 6 show the robustness 
of Hypothesis 1. 
3.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
The globalization of firms from emerging economies has become a prominent 
phenomenon that deserves investigation. To better understand this phenomenon, this 
paper investigates the role of the government in the globalization of MNEs from 
emerging economies. Government plays an important role in this process by influencing 
both the motivation of firms to go abroad and their resources for doing so. To analyze 
how state ownership influences the probability that firms will go abroad, I compare the 
strategies of SOEs, PPEs and FPEs. The level of risk-taking of a firm decreases with the 
level of state ownership. Without favorable policies, SOEs are less likely than FPEs and 
PPEs to go abroad and the probability of going abroad is negatively related to state 
ownership. This finding shows that state ownership influences the strategic orientation of 
firms. 
Different types of government corporations also rely on different types of 
resources when they go abroad. While SOEs rely on external resources to fund their FDI 
activities, PPEs rely on internal resources. This difference is due to the fact that while 
SOEs are not performance-sensitive, PPEs want to improve performance from 
globalization. Solely relying on external resources such as debts to go abroad will only 
harm firm performance in the long run because firms will not be able to overcome the 
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liability of foreignness when they operate abroad. Therefore, PPEs will not rely on 
external resources to invest abroad. But SOEs do not have such concerns. This finding 
shows that internal firm-specific ownership advantage is not the only reason for firms to 
invest abroad; the ability to acquire external government resources will also enable them 
to go abroad. This result also indicates that theories developed in the Western context 
may not be applicable in the setting of emerging economies.  
It is interesting to note, however, that FPEs will rely on total debts rather than 
firm-specific advantages to go abroad, contrary to the prediction. This result may reflect 
the fact that FPEs may view utilizing government loans as one way to establish a 
relationship with banks that could be utilized in the future. Further studies are necessary 
to investigate the strategic behavior of FPEs, in comparison with other firms.  
Finally, this paper investigates how different firms react to a government policy 
encouraging firms to invest abroad. Such a policy influence both the motivation and 
resources of going abroad by creating institutional pressure and increasing the availability 
of external resources. As a result, SOEs are more likely to invest abroad after such a 
policy is announced while PPEs and FPEs will not be influenced since they depend less 
on the government for resources. 
Several implications follow from the results. First, from a theoretical perspective, 
bridging the research on MNEs from emerging economies and the research on 
government corporations helps us better understand MNEs from emerging economies. 
Government, especially state ownership, does influence the process of globalization to a 
large degree, as manifested in the FDI decisions made by managers. Second, this paper 
shows that SOEs and PPEs are different in their priorities and strategic orientations. 
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Therefore, when we consider government corporations, we should not treat PPEs the 
same as SOEs. This finding is applicable not only in emerging economies, but also in 
developed countries where there are a large number of PPEs (Koppell, 2007). Third, 
since SOEs rely largely on government support to invest abroad, the performance of 
SOEs after going abroad is likely to suffer because they cannot compete successfully 
abroad. Government may need to support SOEs’ foreign operations for a long time.  
From the perspective of the government, this paper shows that it is not enough to 
support FDI only with government resources such as no-interest loans. The ultimate goal 
is to help these firms compete successfully in foreign markets. To achieve this goal, it is 
vital to provide favorable environments in which firms can develop their firm-specific 
ownership advantages. Moreover, although the process of privatization has been going on 
for some time, a large number of SOEs in emerging economies still rely heavily on the 
government to survive. It is a crucial task for the government to maintain the balance 
between political control and enterprise independence in SOEs (Koppell, 2007). The 
over-reliance of SOEs on government will create inefficiencies, as described in this 
paper.  
This paper suffers from several limitations. First, the sample comes from only one 
country: China. It is well recognized that the Chinese government has been influential in 
firm strategy. It is not clear whether governments from other emerging economies can 
exert influential power over firms as the Chinese government does. Second, this paper 
focuses only on high-tech firms. Many MNEs from emerging economies are in natural 
resource industries. The motivations and strategies of such MNEs are different from 
those of MNEs in high-tech industries. The findings of this paper may not be applicable 
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to the setting of other industries, such as natural resource industry. Third, one natural 
extension of this study is to analyze performance implications after firms go abroad. 
Theoretically, firms that rely on government resources to invest abroad should suffer 
from internationalization, while firms that rely on intangible assets to invest abroad 
should benefit from internationalization. However, because these firms do not disclose 
performance information at the foreign subsidiary level in their annual reports, it is hard 
to verify this prediction. 
Despite these limitations, this paper contributes to the literature of both MNEs 
from emerging economies and the strategy of government corporations. Considering the 
role of state onwership helps scholars better understand the globalization of MNEs from 
emerging economies. Government can influence both the motivations of firms to go 
abroad and their resources for doing so. On the motivation side, SOEs are less likely than 
PPEs and FPEs to invest abroad. On the resource side, SOEs will rely on external 
government resources to invest abroad, while PPEs will rely on internal firm-specific 
ownership advantages. These key differences between SOEs and PPEs warrant further 
investigation.  
 
This chapter investigates how institutional environments, especially government, 
influence the availability of external resources, and thus the choice of firm scope. In the 
next chapter, I will examine how the unique institutional environments in emerging 
economies influence development of internal resources.  
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3.7 Tables 
Table 3-1 Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations16 
  Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
1 FDI 0.06  0.23  1.00              
2 State ownership 21.34  24.82  -0.05 1.00             
3 Total debts 3.76  5.44  0.24 0.13 1.00            
4 Predicted State 
ownership 21.28 11.88 0.00 0.62 0.14 1.00           
5 Predicted total 
debts 3.77 3.45 0.28 0.07 0.67 0.14 1.00          
6 Inverse Mill’s 
ratio 0.58 0.25 -0.01 0.15 0.10 0.27 0.08 1.00         
7 Intangible assets 5.07  9.37  0.22 0.02 0.45 0.11 0.64 -0.02 1.00        
8 Year after 2001 0.58  0.49  0.07 -0.11 0.05 -0.18 0.11 0.01 0.09 1.00       
9 ROA 0.01  0.27  0.02 0.03 -0.03 0.06 
-
0.01 0.15 -0.01 
-
0.10 1.00      
10 Age 7.84  4.24  0.02 -0.24 0.10 -0.37 0.23 
-
0.42 0.19 0.37 
-
0.18 1.00     
11 Product 
diversification 0.16  0.39  -0.09 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.19 
-
0.01 0.10 1.00    
12 Legal person 
shares 16.08  22.93  0.03 
-
0.41 
-
0.06 -0.33 
-
0.03 
-
0.03 -0.03 0.38 
-
0.12 0.29 0.06 1.00   
13 A-shares 2.07  3.86  0.09 -0.21 0.04 -0.30 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.39 0.03 0.21 0.05 0.36 1.00  
14 Ownership 
concentration 39.31  15.95  0.00 0.40 0.05 0.19 0.03 0.20 -0.04 
-
0.23 0.07 -0.37 -0.02 -0.19 -0.21 1.00 
15 Number of prior 
foreign entries 0.36  2.56  0.32 
-
0.03 0.31 -0.04 0.40 0.01 0.18 0.08 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.10 -0.07 
                                                 
16
 n=1270; correlations above .04 are significant at the .01 level (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 3-2 1st Stage Regressions 
 
 DV=100% 
SOE 
DV=State 
ownership 
DV=Total 
debts 
Financial deficit  
 
-0.42+ 
(0.20) 
 
Fixed assets  
 
 
 
0.60*** 
(0.03) 
Number of bank branches   
 
0.27** 
(0.10) 
Annual sales 0.43*** 
(0.01) 
  
Patent 0.86*** 
(0.11) 
  
Firm age  -0.36 
(0.29) 
0.11** 
(0.05) 
Product diversification  0.77 
(1.29) 
0.46+ 
(0.28) 
ROA  -0.20 
(0.15) 
-0.57+ 
(0.34) 
Legal person shares  -0.05*** 
(0.00) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
A-shares  -0.03+ 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
Ownership concentration  0.44*** 
(0.05) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
Number of prior FDI made by 
the firm 
 -0.17 
(0.25) 
0.12* 
(0.05) 
Intangible assets  
 
0.10+ 
(0.06) 
0.56*** 
(0.13) 
Year after 2001 
 
 
 
1.12 
(2.00) 
0.34 
(0.53) 
Province dummies Included Not included Not included 
Year dummies Included Included Included 
Constant -6.46*** 
(0.19) 
8.29 
(5.73) 
2.05+ 
(1.22) 
Inverse Mill’s ratio  -2.14 0.16 
 
 (7.77) (0.15) 
Number of observations 14398 1270 1270 
R-Square 0.31 0.37 0.44 
LR/Wald chi-square 3784.51 496.53 786.98 
Probability > chi-square 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 3-3 Results of Probit Regression17 
Variables Model 1 
 
Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 
Model 5 
Second stage: DV=FDI     
Independent Variables     
State ownership (H1)  -0.14** -0.05*** -0.44** -0.48** 
 (0.06) (0.00) (0.18) (0.19) 
Total debts (H2)    0.47** 
(0.18) 
0.49** 
(0.20) 
Intangible assets (H2)    0.57*** 
(0.18) 
0.58** 
(0.19) 
Year after 2001 (H3)    5.14** 
(2.02) 
5.58** 
(2.12) 
State ownership * Total debts     0.07 
(0.05) 
State ownership * Intangible assets     -0.02+ 
(0.01) 
Control Variables      
ROA 0.90* 
(0.40) 
1.02** 
(0.47) 
-0.01 
(0.27) 
-0.05 
(0.58) 
-0.09 
(0.59) 
Firm age -0.01 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.15** 
(0.05) 
-0.15** 
(0.05) 
Product diversification -0.28** 
(0.12) 
-0.32** 
(0.13) 
-0.03 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.17) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
Legal person shares -0.00 
(0.00) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.22* 
(0.09) 
-0.24** 
(0.09) 
A-shares 0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.11* 
(0.05) 
0.12* 
(0.05) 
Ownership concentration 0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.20** 
(0.08) 
0.22** 
(0.08) 
Number of prior FDI made by the 
firm 
0.32*** 
(0.05) 
0.32*** 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
0.19*** 
(0.05) 
0.18*** 
(0.06) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
Inverse Mill’s ratio -1.12+ 
(0.65) 
-0.85 
(0.80) 
-0.06 
(0.63) 
-0.88 
(0.75) 
-1.21 
(0.76) 
Constant -1.44** 
(0.53) 
-2.48 
(1.68) 
1.21* 
(0.60) 
-0.09 
(0.83) 
0.07 
(0.85) 
      
Wald test of exogeneity   2.02   
P value   0.16   
 
     
Number of observations 1270 1270 1270 1270 1270 
Log pseuolikelihood -210.58 -207.74 -5766.51 -197.85 -197.05 
Pseudo r-square 0.22 0.23  0.27 0.27 
Wald chi-square 104.11 109.26 1311.13 147.18 150.11 
Probability > chi-square 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
  
                                                 
17
 +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. All two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table 3-3 Continued 
 
Variables Model 6 
(SOE) 
Model 7  
(PPE) 
Model 8 
(FPE) 
Model 9 
(SOE) 
Model 10 
(PPE) 
Model 11 
(FPE) 
Second stage: 
DV=FDI 
 
    
 
Independent 
Variables 
 
  
 
 
 
Total debts (H2) 1.68*** 
(0.52) 
-1.19 
(4.26) 
1.54* 
(0.70) 
1.58** 
(0.56) 
-0.58 
(0.45) 
1.71* 
(0.71) 
Intangible assets 
(H2) 
0.49 
(0.37) 
0.36* 
(0.16) 
-0.16 
(0.16) 
0.43 
(0.38) 
0.40** 
(0.14) 
-0.21 
(0.17) 
Year after 2001 (H3) 3.11* 
(1.52) 
0.32 
(0.51) 
1.21 
(0.96) 
3.82+ 
(2.17) 
0.59 
(0.45) 
1.23 
(1.02) 
Total debts * Year 
after 2001 
   0.18*** 
(0.04) 
0.19 
(0.13) 
-0.28 
(0.70) 
Intangible assets * 
Year after 2001 
   0.91 
(2.26) 
0.42 
(0.32) 
0.21 
(2.51) 
Control Variables       
ROA 13.99** 
(4.80) 
2.03 
(2.39) 
1.14 
(0.76) 
13.79 
(15.08) 
1.55 
(2.14) 
0.98+ 
(0.56) 
Firm age -0.19* 
(0.08) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.88** 
(0.31) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
Product 
diversification 
-1.53+ 
(0.88) 
-0.37+ 
(0.22) 
-0.57*** 
(0.13) 
1.71 
(1.45) 
-0.34 
(0.22) 
-0.56*** 
(0.12) 
Legal person shares -0.17* 
(0.08) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.02+ 
(0.01) 
-0.12*** 
(0.23) 
-0.02+ 
(0.01) 
-0.02+ 
(0.01) 
A-shares -0.78 
(0.80) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.46** 
(0.18) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
Ownership 
concentration 
-0.04+ 
(0.02) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Number of prior FDI 
made by the firm 
0.86 
(0.77) 
0.35*** 
(0.06) 
0.22+ 
(0.13) 
0.50 
(1.27) 
0.31*** 
(0.05) 
0.19 
(0.14) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Inverse Mill’s ratio -1.12 
(2.54) 
1.23 
(1.16) 
-1.56 
(1.17) 
-4.23** 
(1.89) 
-0.96 
(0.62) 
-0.07 
(0.66) 
Constant 0.60 
(2.06) 
-4.12*** 
(0.89) 
-2.39* 
(1.09) 
0.72** 
(0.2.53) 
-2.42** 
(0.65) 
-3.42*** 
(0.98) 
First Stage: 
DV=Total debts 
      
Fixed assets 0.82** 
(0.27) 
0.71*** 
(0.12) 
0.26* 
(0.11) 
0.74** 
(0.25) 
0.83*** 
(0.13) 
0.26* 
(0.11) 
Number of bank 
branches 
0.34 
(0.27) 
0.35* 
(0.15) 
0.26 
(0.17) 
0.58 
(0.47) 
0.30* 
(0.13) 
0.22 
(0.16) 
ROA -0.52+ 
(0.31) 
-0.23*** 
(0.05) 
-0.44+ 
(0.27) 
-0.61* 
(0.31) 
-0.24*** 
(0.05) 
-0.56* 
(0.28) 
Firm age -0.18 
(0.21) 
0.66 
(0.91) 
-0.27 
(0.91) 
-0.07 
(0.21) 
1.15 
(1.01) 
0.70 
(0.95) 
Product 
diversification 
0.48* 
(0.21) 
1.20** 
(0.41) 
1.21** 
(0.39) 
0.43* 
(0.20) 
1.32*** 
(0.38) 
1.21** 
(0.39) 
Legal person shares -0.02 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.25) 
-0.06 
(0.21) 
-0.04 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.25) 
-0.03 
(0.22) 
A-shares -0.11+ 
(0.05) 
-0.08 
(0.61) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
-0.10+ 
(0.05) 
-0.09 
(0.59) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
Ownership 0.11 0.07 -0.11 -0.16 0.08 -0.13 
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concentration (0.41) (0.20) (0.20) (0.37) (0.20) (0.21) 
Number of prior FDI 
made by the firm 
0.22* 
(0.10) 
0.14* 
(0.07) 
0.59+ 
(0.31) 
0.21* 
(0.09) 
0.19** 
(0.07) 
0.57+ 
(0.33) 
Intangible assets -0.17 
(1.19) 
0.79+ 
(0.45) 
1.19* 
(0.57) 
0.05 
(0.99) 
0.38 
(0.44) 
1.16* 
(0.56) 
Year after 2001 
 
0.96 
(2.04) 
-0.57 
(1.19) 
-0.46 
(1.14) 
0.46 
(1.93) 
-0.91 
(1.22) 
-1.04 
(1.12) 
Inverse Mill’s ratio -1.12* 
(0.56) 
-0.30 
(0.24) 
-0.84 
(3.25) 
0.58* 
(0.24) 
1.56 
(1.10) 
2.12* 
(1.06) 
Total debts * Year 
after 2001 
    -0.53 
(0.38) 
-0.07 
(0.29) 
Intangible assets * 
Year after 2001 
    1.50 
(0.92) 
-0.10 
(0.90) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant 0.94* 
(0.47) 
2.84 
(2.26) 
3.81 
(1.68) 
-1.44 
(3.17) 
-0.61 
(1.22) 
1.68 
(1.49) 
       
Wald test of 
exogeneity 
4.29 2.73 1.35 1.44 7.87 1.77 
P value 0.04 0.10 0.25 0.23 0.01 0.18 
 
      
Number of 
observations 
293 498 583 293 498 583 
Log pseuolikelihood -4299.00 -7322.56 -10504.92 -4284.45 -7316.30 -10503.31 
Pseudo r-square       
Wald chi-square 114.55 108.74 111.10 345.89 186.32 121.47 
Probability > chi-
square 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Table 3-4 Robustness check18 
 
Variables Model 1 
SOE 
(SASAC) 
Model 2 
PPE 
(non-SASAC) 
Model 3 
SOE 
(>40%) 
Model 4 
PPE 
(<=40%) 
Model 5  
(Ultimate 
control) 
Model 6 
(Cox 
model) 
Second stage: DV=FDI    
  
Independent Variables    
  
State ownership 
(H1) 
    -0.00+ 0.91** 
    (0.00) (0.03) 
Total debts (H2) 2.72*** 
(0.74) 
0.79 
(0.53) 
1.64*** 
(0.32) 
0.03 
(0.38) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
1.00* 
(0.00) 
Intangible assets 
(H2) 
-1.09** 
(0.36) 
2.23+ 
(1.32) 
1.49 
(2.36) 
3.03* 
(1.48) 
0.10 
(0.08) 
1.00* 
(0.00) 
Year after 2001 
(H3) 
-0.59 
(0.85) 
0.91 
(0.74) 
2.07+ 
(1.14) 
0.69 
(0.51) 
0.39+ 
(0.22) 
Not 
included 
 
Control Variables       
ROA 7.85 
(9.56) 
0.92 
(1.82) 
14.02*** 
(3.69) 
1.62 
(2.22) 
0.34 
(0.26) 
1.86 
(1.05) 
Firm age 0.10 
(0.11) 
-0.08+ 
(0.04) 
-0.18** 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.93 
(0.06) 
Product 
diversification 
0.52 
(0.55) 
-0.06 
(0.24) 
-0.62 
(0.43) 
-0.31 
(0.22) 
-0.37* 
(0.16) 
0.60*** 
(0.08) 
Legal person shares 0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.09*** 
(0.03) 
-0.06 
(0.07) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
-0.01+ 
(0.00) 
0.95** 
(0.02) 
A-shares 0.00 
(0.17) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.33 
(0.22) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
1.00 
(0.04) 
Largest Ownership -0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
1.07*** 
(0.02) 
Number of prior 
FDI made by the 
firm 
0.04 
(0.31) 
1.29*** 
(0.37) 
0.14** 
(0.34) 
0.27*** 
(0.06) 
0.27*** 
(0.04) 
1.81*** 
(0.33) 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Not 
Included 
Inverse Mill’s ratio 0.34 
(1.15) 
-2.53*** 
(0.63) 
-1.66** 
(0.62) 
-0.88 
(0.65) 
-0.41 
(0.27) 
0.39 
(0.38) 
Constant -1.32+ 
(0.81) 
-0.25 
(0.65) 
-0.42 
(1.09) 
-2.88*** 
(0.68) 
-1.77*** 
(0.38) 
N.A. 
       
Wald test of 
exogeneity 
0.60 0.62 4.03 0.37   
P value 0.44 0.43 0.05 0.54   
 
      
Number of 
observations 
199 611 395 415 1398 1398 
Log pseuolikelihood -2110.22 -7914.81 -6312.39 -6106.55 -249.30 -155.70 
Wald chi-square 285.43 225.47 138.63 85.35 41.69 58.20 
Probability > chi-
square 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                                                 
18
 +p<0.1; *p<0.05; **p<0.01, ***p<0.001. All two-tailed tests. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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CHAPTER 4 RELATED DIVERSIFICATION AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
REVISITED: THE LIABILITY OF RELATED DIVERSIFICATION 
4.1 Introduction 
Product diversification, or diversification across business lines, is a common 
corporate strategy (Rumelt, 1974).  The extent of product diversification has important 
implications for both the competitiveness of a firm and its overall performance. 
According to the academic literature, firms should benefit from related diversification 
because related diversification adds value by exploiting existing resources and 
capabilities to several businesses (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988). Empirically, 
however, the literature has not provided a conclusive result on the relationship between 
related diversification and firm performance (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990; Ramanujam & 
Varadarajan, 1989). The literature largely contributes the lack of empirical supports to the 
measurement issue that the current measures of relatedness do not capture the true 
relatedness between businesses (Robins & Wiersema, 2003). 
Few studies documented the difficulty of realizing the benefits of related 
diversification.  Although firms can potentially benefit from related diversification 
through economies of scope (Seth, 1990), or the exploitation of resources (Montgomery 
& Wernerfelt, 1988), not every firm can benefit from it unless the firm has the 
appropriate capability (Teece et al., 1997). The lack of capability to benefit from related 
diversification may also contribute to the lack of support of the positive relationship 
between related diversification and firm performance.  
The theoretical conceptualization of this paper is based on the view that related 
diversification is a strategy to exploit existing resources of a firm. Previous studies on 
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related diversification implicitly assume that firms have the capability to benefit from 
such resource exploitation. This paper relaxes this assumption and tries to evaluate the 
relationship between related diversification and performance through a capability 
perspective. I argue that to benefit from related diversification, firms should have two 
types of capabilities: search and selection, and implementation (Helfat, 2007). Search and 
selection is the capability to recognize truly related businesses; and implementation is the 
capability to exploit resources in related businesses. I further argue that these capabilities 
are unusual in firms based in emerging economies, due to inexperience and weak investor 
oversight. Thus, the lack of capabilities of search and selection will contribute to what I 
call seemingly related diversification, a type of diversification focusing on the relatedness 
of technologies but not of markets, which will harm firm performance. Even though a 
firm is able to identify a truly related business, the lack of implementation capability will 
also contribute to deteriorative performance after related diversification for firms from 
emerging economies. Therefore, both seemingly related diversification and related 
diversification are negatively related to firm performance. 
This paper also investigates two contingencies that influence the relationship 
between related diversification and firm performance: experience and state ownership. 
The literature in capability suggests that capability can be acquired through learning 
(Blyler & Coff, 2003; Zollo & Winter, 2002). This paper shows that learning mitigates 
the negative impact of related diversification on firm performance, indicating that firms 
can conquer the difficulties of related diversification through learning. The literature also 
recognizes the role of ownership identity in firm strategies such as diversification (Li et 
al., 2005), but few studies have investigated how ownership identity influences the 
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development of capabilities. Therefore, this paper considers the role of ownership 
identity in harvesting from related diversification. State-owned enterprise (SOE) is an 
important type of firm in emerging economies and this paper investigates how SOEs 
perform in terms of related diversification.  
This paper draws on data capturing the population of H-share firms (firms that are 
listed on HKSE) from 1993 to 2006. It first examines the relationship between related 
diversification and firm performance. Then, it tests whether the relationship is moderated 
by firm experience and state ownership. The proposed relationship is summarized in 
Figure 4-1 and detailed later in the paper. 
------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4-1 about here 
------------------------------------ 
 
The contribution of this paper is four-fold. First, this paper documents the 
difficulties of benefiting from related diversification for firms from emerging economies 
and develops the concept of seemingly related diversification – a type of diversification 
focusing on the relatedness of technologies but not of markets. Second, it identifies two 
types of capability that are relevant to related diversification: search and selection, and 
implementation. Third, it shows that capabilities can be acquired through learning. 
Therefore, the relationship between related diversification is dynamic in nature. Lastly, it 
contributes to the literature on ownership identity by showing that the poor corporate 
governance in SOEs makes it hard to develop capabilities needed to benefit from related 
diversification. 
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4.2 Background 
4.2.1 Related Diversification and Firm Performance  
One of the dominant theories to explain the benefits of related diversification is 
the resource-based view. The resource-based view considers a firm as a combination of 
different resources that are rare, valuable, non-imitable and non-substitutable (Barney, 
1991). These resources create competitive advantages for the firms that possess them. 
Firms diversify to utilize their productive resources that are surplus to their current 
operations (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). Benefits of diversification come from the 
exploitation of resources. 
On the contrary, non-diversification limits a firm’s opportunity to leverage 
resources and capabilities across different industries. Lubatkin and Chatterjee (1994) 
found that single-business firms do not exploit between-unit capabilities. In other words, 
firms pursuing a single line of business do not obtain economies of scope. Moreover, 
single-business firms are subject to greater industry risk than diversified firms, which 
increases their cost of capital. Similar to non-diversification, unrelated diversification 
also incurs substantial costs. Grant, Jammine, and Thomas (1988) documented the 
growing strain on top management as it tries to manage increasingly disparate and less 
familiar lines of business. In addition, firms engaged in unrelated diversification 
sometimes invest too much in lines of business with poor investment opportunities (Stulz, 
1990) and in others merely to subsidize failing business segments (Berger & Ofek, 1995). 
The arguments clearly predict that related diversification should outperform both 
single business firms and unrelated diversifiers. The empirical support of this relationship 
is, however, mixed. In his seminal study, Rumelt (1974) found in a sample of Fortune 
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500 companies that firms with a moderate level of diversification—firms engaged in 
related diversification as distinct from firms in a single line of business or firms engaged 
in unrelated diversification—outperform both single-business firms and conglomerates. 
Subsequent research confirmed Rumelt’s results (Montgomery & Singh, 1984; Palich et 
al., 2000). But this result has been challenged by Christensen and Montgomery (1981), 
who showed that industry characteristics, rather than different diversification types, 
contribute to the differences in firm performance. Similarly, several studies find that 
firms do not benefit from related diversification (Johnson & Thomas, 1987; Lubatkin, 
1987). Strategy scholars recognize the mixed empirical results on the relationship 
between related diversification and firm performance and contribute it to measurement 
issues (Markides & Williamson, 1994; Robins & Wiersema, 2003). Robins and 
Wiersema (2003) showed that both concentric measure and entropy measure suffer from 
a lack of content validity. Accordingly, scholars begin to develop more appropriate 
measures of relatedness of diversification (Miller, 2006).  Few studies, however, explore 
the potential difficulties firms face when they conduct related diversification. 
Another gap in the diversification literature is that previous studies on the 
relationship between diversification and performance are mostly located in the context of 
developed countries. Although there have been an increasing number of studies that 
examine this relationship in emerging economies recently (Chakrabarti et al., 2007; 
Chang & Hong, 2002; Hoskisson et al., 2000; Khanna & Palepu, 1997), these studies 
largely focus on the benefits of unrelated diversification due to institutional voids in 
emerging economies (Khanna & Palepu, 2000b), also neglecting to address the 
difficulties of related diversification.  
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It is clear that there is an implicit assumption underlying the current studies of 
related diversification and firm performance: firms have the capability to benefit from 
related diversification. This assumption, I believe, does not always hold, especially in 
emerging economies. In the following discussion, I will relax this assumption.  
4.3 Hypotheses Development 
4.3.1 Capabilities and Related Diversification  
 I distinguish between two capabilities that are relevant to related diversification, 
namely search and selection, and implementation. According to Helfat et. al (2007), 
search and selection, and implementation are the two main functions served by dynamic 
capabilities with regard to the resource base of an organization. In the context of related 
diversification, search and selection means that a firm should be able to identify its key 
resource base and the related businesses where the key resource can be applied. 
Implementation means that the firm should be able to exploit its key resource in related 
businesses. I will discuss these two capabilities in the following sections. 
4.3.1.1 Search and Selection  
 Benefits from related diversification come from the identification, creation, and 
utilization of resources and competences across multiple business units (Li & Wong, 
2003). Thus, an initial step in related diversification is recognizing the key resources that 
have made a firm successful in one business and then finding out related businesses 
where the same resources can be utilized.  
It is not an easy task to identify the truly related business because there are many 
dimensions through which firms can diversify. Several scholars have documented the 
difficulties of finding out the best opportunities of related diversification. Markides and 
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Williamson (1994) argued that firms should go beyond the input/technology/production, 
and focus on the strategic assets behind different businesses when they search for 
opportunities of related diversification. Only such related diversification can create long-
run competitive advantages of a firm. More specifically, they describe strategic assets as 
customer assets, channel assets, input assets, process assets, and market knowledge 
assets. In other words, only the similarities between these assets will lead to improved 
performance. These five dimensions, although comprehensive, are somewhat redundant. 
Building on their research, I propose two dimensions of related diversification: 
technology and market.  
The current literature on related diversification mainly focuses on the technology 
(or product) dimension and the market (or customer) side is largely neglected. This fact is 
evident in the wide use of Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code, which is more 
technology/product-oriented than market/customer-oriented (Jacobs & O'Neill, 2003), as 
the measure of relatedness. Although there have been several attempts to refine the 
measure of relatedness, these efforts still largely focus on the technology side. For 
example, Miller (2006) identified technology diversity as a new measure of relatedness of 
diversification and showed that technology diversity is positively related to firm 
performance. The market dimension, however, is equally important. Three out of the five 
types of strategic assets outlined by Makides and Williamson (1994) are customer-
related: customer assets, channel assets, and market knowledge assets. Assuming that 
relatedness is limited to the technology side can result in a phenomenon I call “seemingly 
related diversification”— a type of diversification focusing on the relatedness of 
technologies but not of markets.  
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 For firms in emerging economies, such as China, it is not unusual that firms lack 
the capability of search and selection, thus falling into seemingly related diversification, 
for at least two reasons. First, many emerging economies have, until recently, 
experienced rising demand and rapid growth (UNCTAD, 2009), in such sellers’ markets, 
firms have most followed market demands. During their short history, these young firms 
have not had the chance of developing a coherent diversification strategy.  Thus, they 
lack relevant experience (Hitt, Dacin, Levitas, Arregle & Borza, 2000). 
Second, listed firms in emerging economies have little transparency. The 
influence of shareholders outside of the controlling state or family is limited, 
exacerbating information asymmetries (Berle & Means, 1932; Fama & Jensen, 1983; 
Jensen & Meckling, 1976) in both directions. Not only do minority shareholders lack full 
information about the firm, but the firm does not benefit from the full knowledge of its 
shareholders. Thus, when seeking opportunities for diversification, managers may be 
ignorant of the best opportunities and end up in a “synergy trap” (Sirower, 1997). 
Consequently, managers may seek the appearance of relatedness rather than 
understanding the resource base linking different businesses.  
Both inexperience and information asymmetries lead to the same prediction, that 
firms in emerging economies lack the capability of search and selection, thus relying on 
existing and widely used standards to determine the relatedness of businesses, which is 
technology side not market side of related diversification. This is exaggerated by the fact 
that many Chinese firms look for advice from western consultants or private equity firms 
when they choose the path to diversify (Furst-Mueller, 2000; Li & Wong, 2003). Western 
consultants are aware of the concept of core competence (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) and 
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believe related diversification based on technology/product relatedness is beneficial 
(Miller, 2006).  They will push Chinese firms to diversify along the technology/product 
side, neglecting the market/customer side. As a result, Chinese firms will jump into 
seemingly related diversification.  
Seemingly related diversification is likely to harm firm performance in emerging 
economies because unlike developed countries where markets are usually assumed to be 
large and homogeneous, markets in emerging economies are small and constrained by 
relationships with customers, government officials, and so forth (Peng & Luo, 2000). 
Doing business in these settings is not simply an arms-length exchange of products for 
payments; it more closely resembles social exchange or economic exchange embedded in 
the context of social relationships (Blau, 1964; Granovetter, 1985). In such 
circumstances, relatedness is more a function of markets—or customers—than of 
technologies or products. Markets for technologically similar products may be dissimilar 
and require fundamentally different capabilities. These differences may result in the 
inability of firms to benefit from related diversification in emerging economies. 
The experience of a large Chinese firm with its core business of marine shipping 
containers illustrates seemingly related diversification. The firm sought to diversify into a 
related industry and, with the help of consultants, converged on highway trailers or semi-
trailers. Highway trailers bear a close physical resemblance to shipping containers: 
trailers are essentially containers placed on a chassis with wheels, brakes, lights, and the 
like. The firm and its consultants overlooked the fact, however, that unlike shipping 
containers, which conform to international specifications, highway trailers in China are 
built to specifications controlled by provinces and sometimes municipalities. The result is 
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that customers from different regions of China require slightly different products. Thus, 
neither the economies of scale nor the dominant market share in the highway trailer 
business anticipated by the firm materialized and the firm’s strategy changed to 
production of highway trailer components rather than final assembly. The expected gain 
from related diversification is not realized due to the differences in markets even though 
there is similarity in terms of technology. 
Summarizing the above arguments, I have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Seemingly related diversification is negatively related to firm 
performance for firms from emerging economies.  
 
4.3.1.2 Implementation 
The second dimension of capability that is required for a firm to benefit from 
related diversification is implementation. In the case of related diversification, it is the 
capability of resource exploitation - utilizing existing capabilities in new businesses. 
Even though a firm is able to identify a truly related business, it still requires the 
capability of implementation to realize the gain from related diversification. Two factors 
impede effective resource exploitation in emerging economies.  
The first one is organizational challenge: the challenge of integrating separate 
businesses. Firms can diversify through various means, such as merger and acquisition 
(M&A), and internal development (Ramanujam & Varadarajan, 1989). No matter how 
firms diversify, they face the challenge of increasing size. In the case of M&A, post-
merger integration is difficult enough in developed countries (Datta, 1991; Zollo & 
Singh, 2004), because it is not easy to decide on important questions such as the degree to 
which pre-existing resources within the acquired firm are replaced with the equivalent 
resources of the acquirer (Zollo & Singh, 2004). Post-M&A integration is even more 
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difficult in settings like China due to endemic localism and the legacy of state ownership. 
Even the most powerful Chinese firms have had difficulty integrating newly acquired 
subsidiaries, as illustrated by the experiences at COSCO and Haier. Executives at 
COSCO deferred integration of its bulk shipping subsidiaries for more than a decade 
(Meyer, 2007), and those at Haier encountered, and eventually overcame, substantial 
resistance from workers after acquiring a television factory in Hefei, Anhui Province 
(Paine, 2002). In the case of internal development, the organizational challenge of 
increased size is also notable. There is growing strain on top management as it tries to 
manage increasingly lines of business (Grant et al., 1988). Growing size of a firm also 
brings in control losses, coordination costs, and inefficiencies from conflicting “dominant 
logics” of different businesses (Markides, 1992). These challenges are more prevalent for 
firms from emerging economies because firms are generally young and have not 
experienced such expansion (Hitt et al., 2000). 
The second challenge comes from the need to acquire complementary assets. 
Complementary assets include assets such as specialized manufacturing, distribution 
channels, or even complementary technologies (Teece, 1986). The realization of benefits 
of related diversification usually depends on the existence of complementary assets. As 
indicated by Wernerfelt (1984), complementary assets can foster successful entry into 
new product markets. Subsequently, the empirical study of Klepper and Simons (2000) 
and the theoretical work of Helfat and Lieberman (2002) documented the importance of 
complementary assets in explaining entry and survival of firms. Absent markets for 
complementary assets, related diversification is at risk. Let us illustrate with an example: 
a refrigerator manufacturer (Haier) entered the air conditioner market to exploit 
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refrigeration technology. The required complementary asset was installation, which was 
not needed for refrigerators. Therefore, Haier had to enter the installation business to sell 
air conditioners. The difficulty to acquire complementary assets in emerging economies 
due to the lack of markets for such assets (Khanna & Palepu, 1997; Leff, 1978) makes it 
hard for firms to implement the diversification strategy successfully. 
The difficulty in implementation of related diversification means that even though 
a firm successfully identifies a truly related business, the performance may still drop due 
to the lack of implementation capability. Therefore, related diversification, including both 
seemingly related diversification and truly related diversification, will contribute to poor 
performance in emerging economies, I have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Related diversification is negatively related to firm performance 
for firms from emerging economies.  
 
4.3.2 The Moderating Role of Experience 
Firms can overcome the liability of related diversification through learning. 
Capabilities can be described as complicated routines that are derived from path-
dependent processes (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Nelson & Winter, 1982). As suggested 
by Eisenhardt and Martin (2000), “path dependence is more accurately described in terms 
of learning mechanisms that have been identified principally within the psychological 
literature” (Page: 1114). In other words, learning fosters the development of capabilities. 
Various studies have documented that firms can obtain capabilities through 
organizational learning. In a conceptual piece, Zollo and Winter (2002) emphasized the 
role of learning in creating and developing capabilities. They argue that experience 
accumulation, knowledge articulation and knowledge codification will foster the 
development of capability. Scholars also document the importance of mistakes in 
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developing capabilities because mistakes motivate people to learn (Hayward, 1999). 
Hayward (1999) found that firms with a moderate number of small mistakes lead to 
higher acquisition skills in a sample of 120 U.S. firms in six sectors. 
Building on existing research, this paper argues that capabilities of conducting 
efficient related diversification can also be learned from a firm’s prior experience. 
Repeated practice helps a firm to understand the processes of related diversification and 
develop more efficient routines of search and selection and implementation. In terms of 
search and selection, prior experience makes the search and selection more efficient. An 
organization’s previous experience can serve as a guide to a related decision because 
organizations confine search to areas in which they are experienced (March, 1988). The 
benefits of accumulated past experience for making decisions have been found in various 
organizational settings (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1999; Henisz & Delios, 2001). Prior 
experience, either successful or unsuccessful, will help a firm identify its own key 
resources and the truly related businesses. A firm may develop certain routines to search 
for related businesses based on its prior experience (Ouchi & Watanabe, 2009).  
In terms of implementation, as shown by existing research, experience about 
certain mode of diversification, such as M&A, will enable firms to implement that mode 
more successfully in the future. Zollo and Singh (2004) showed that repeated practices 
with homogeneous acquisitions are positively associated with the accumulation of 
knowledge about how to execute acquisitions and how to benefit from acquisitions. 
Similarly, the skill of acquiring and developing complementary assets can also be 
enhanced through practice. Since these skills are largely intangible, experience is a 
valuable source through which a firm can acquire them (Zollo & Winter, 2002).  
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Summarizing the above arguments, the existence of prior experience helps a firm 
develop the capabilities needed to benefit from related diversification. The development 
of capabilities will attenuate the negative performance implication of related 
diversification.  Therefore, I have the following hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Prior experience of related diversification positively moderates 
the relationship between related diversification and firm performance. 
 
4.3.3 The Moderating Role of State Ownership  
Scholars have long recognized the role of ownership identity in influencing firm 
strategy (Chaganti & Damanpour, 1991; Palmer et al., 1987). The state has acted as one 
important type of owner for a long time worldwide (Koppell, 2007), especially in 
emerging economies. The existing literature recognizes that SOEs and private firms differ 
in terms of strategy, structure, and performance (Brouthers et al., 2007; Li & Xia, 2008). 
Various scholars have shown that SOEs are associated with defensive strategies (Arens & 
Brouthers, 2001; Parker, 1995), mechanistic structure (Brouthers et al., 2007), 
administrative tasks and empire-building strategies (Li & Xia, 2008), low total factor 
productivity (Jefferson & Rawski, 2000), labor redundancy (Dong & Putterman, 2003), 
and poor performance (Brouthers et al., 2007; Li & Xia, 2008; Villalonga, 2000). 
In terms of diversification strategy, scholars have found that SOEs are associated 
with severe agency problem, which may encourage mangers to diversify in their own 
interests rather than the owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Managers are generally more 
risk-averse than owners (Donaldson, 1961) and may pursue diversification to maintain 
stable revenue streams and to minimize losses (Hoskisson & Turk, 1990; Tosi & Gomez-
Mejia, 1989). Besides reducing risk, a strategy of diversification can also facilitate 
growth in assets and hence in managers’ compensation. Dyl (1988), for example, found 
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CEO compensation to be positively related to firm size, measured by total assets, in a 
sample of Fortune 500 firms.  
Scholars also recognize the role of ownership identity in shaping a firm’s 
capabilities. For example, Kor and Mahoney (2005) found that institutional investors 
boots economic returns from developing capabilities. However, no prior studies have 
investigated how state ownership influences the development of capabilities. 
This paper will try to examine how state ownership influences the development of 
capabilities by exploring the impact of state ownership on the relationship between 
related diversification and firm performance. State-owned enterprise (SOE) is an 
important type of firms in emerging economies (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). In SOEs, 
government shareholders rarely have the motivation or the expertise to monitor the 
operations. Given the fact that managers in SOEs are not evaluated by firm performance 
(Qu, 2003), it is no wonder that manages in SOEs may use diversification as a means to 
gain their personal interests. In search and selection process of related diversification, 
managers may choose to acquire another business just to increase firm size, which may 
lead to an increase in their compensation (Dyl, 1988), instead of carefully identifying the 
two dimensions of related diversification – technology and market. Alternatively, they 
may choose another business to acquire based on Guanxi rather than true relatedness 
(Chung, 2006). When they implement related diversification strategy, the learning 
mechanism will not work since decrease of firm performance will not trigger managers’ 
motives to learn (Qu, 2003). To summarize, it is hard for SOEs to benefit from related 
diversification. Thus, I have the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: State ownership negatively moderates the relationship between 
related diversification and firm performance. 
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4.4 Methodology 
4.4.1 Sample 
This paper covers all 96 Chinese firms listed on the HKSE (Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange), the so-called H-share firms, between 1993 and 2006. H-share firms are 
incorporated in China, but listed on the HKSE; these firms operate under Chinese law. 
There are also firms listed on the HKSE that are Chinese firms incorporated in Hong 
Kong: they operate under Hong Kong law. Their shares are called red-chip stocks. The 
Hong Kong listing of the Bank of China, for example, consists of H-shares while its 
Hong Kong subsidiary, Bank of China-Hong Kong, is a red chip listing. The sample 
includes only H-share firms. The first H-share issue traded on the HKSE was Tsingtao 
Brewery Co. Ltd., which was listed on July 15, 1993.  
Listed Chinese firms have diversified greatly in the past ten years (Zhou & 
Delios, Forthcoming). The high level of diversification of Chinese firms creates the 
possibility of studying the diversification-performance relationship among firms from an 
emerging economy.  The data are taken from annual shareholder reports, which are 
generally issued in early April. Since the first H-share listing was in mid-1993, I collected 
annual data of each H-share firm from the first full year of listing, 1994 or later, through 
2006, thirteen years in all.  
4.4.2 Measures 
Performance. Because there is no perfect measure of firm performance (Meyer, 2002), 
no consensus exists in the literature regarding the most appropriate measure to use. Two 
major types of measures for performance are generally applied: accounting-based 
 169 
 
measures and market-based measures. Given the fact that many Chinese firms are under-
priced in their IPOs and the sample consists mainly of newly listed firms, I choose 
accounting-based measures for performance. I focus on return on assets (ROA), defined 
as net income divided by total assets, which is widely used to measure firm performance 
(Audia & Greve, 2006).   
Related Diversification. This paper measures related diversification using a dummy 
variable. First, a firm is classified as a single business firm if the dominant business 
covers more than 95% of its total sales. The information of a firm’s major business lines 
is obtained through their annual reports. Second, for the firms that diversify, related 
diversification is identified through eleven different divisions of SIC codes19. If a firm 
conducts businesses in more than one category, it is regarded as unrelated diversifier. It is 
related diversifier otherwise. For example, Northeast Electric Development Co. Ltd. had 
four major businesses in 2001: manufacturing of transmission machinery (SIC code: 
3568)20, hotel and catering (SIC code: 7011), transformer equipment (SIC code: 3612), 
and entertainment (SIC code: 7929). Since it covers two different categories: 
manufacturing and service, it is classified as an unrelated diversifier. For another 
example, consider First Tractor Co. Ltd. It had two major businesses in 2005: agricultural 
machinery (SIC code: 3523) and construction machinery (SIC code: 3531). Since it only 
conducts business in manufacturing business, it is a related diversifier. 
Seemingly Related Diversification. Among related diversifiers, there are firms that 
conduct seemingly related diversification. This paper uses a dummy variable to measure 
                                                 
19
 The eleven divisions are: a) agricultural, fishing and forestry; b) mining; c) construction; d) manufacturing; e) 
transportation, communication, electronics, gas and sanitary service; f) wholesale trade; g) retail trade; h) finance, 
insurance and real estate; i) services; j) public administration; and k) nonclassifiable establishments. 
20
 I use U.S. SIC codes, not Chinese SIC codes, for consistency with the literature. 
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seemingly related diversification. Seemingly related diversification is defined as a 
diversification that focuses only on the technology side but overlooks the market side. To 
assess the similarity of two businesses, I use the input-out table as a reference (Fan & 
Lang, 2000). The input-out table is published by National Bureau of Statistics of China. It 
documents the input-output relationship of 42 types of products. I calculate the 
correlation matrix of these 42 types and regard two businesses as sharing markets if the 
correlation is higher than 0.9. Then, I match the correlation table with the SIC code. 
Diversifications that are within the same three-digit SIC code but with correlation lower 
than 0.9 is regarded as seemingly related diversification. This is an objective way to 
identify seemingly related diversification.  
I also checked on the objective measure by subjective coding. A research assistant 
is hired to double-check the coding of seemingly related diversification, based on the 
correlation table and her knowledge. Whenever there is a disagreement between her 
coding and the objective measure, the author of the paper consults an industry expert to 
decide. The correlation of subjective coding and objective coding is 0.92, showing a high 
level of consistency for the coding. 
One example of seemingly related diversification is Dongfeng Motor Group Co 
Ltd, it had three major businesses in 2005: manufacture and sale of commercial vehicles, 
manufacture and sale of passenger vehicles, and manufacture and sale of engines and 
other automotive parts. Although these three businesses share similar technology, they 
have different customers. 
Merger and acquisition experience. The data regarding M&As come from Zephyr, a 
database that collects information on M&A, IPO, joint venture, and private equity deals. I 
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identified all of the M&A deals made by H-share firms between 1993 and 2006. I exclude 
the deals that cover two different categories of SIC codes. Then, I calculated the total 
number of deals a firm had made in all of the previous years and created the variable 
M&A experience. It is not a perfect measure of experience but it is an appropriate one 
since 1) M&A is a favorable mode of market entry by firms from emerging economies 
(Batson, 2007; Luo & Tung, 2007); and 2) the existing literature has shown that firms can 
learn through M&A (Kale & Singh, 2007). 
State ownership. The major ownership categories in China include state shares, legal 
person shares, employee shares, A-shares, and B-shares. The three dominant types of 
shareholding are state, legal person, and tradable A-share, each making up approximately 
30 percent of the total shares in the companies listed in mainland China (Sun et al., 
2002). I measure state ownership by the percentage of state shares plus state-owned legal 
person shares, following Chinese ownership categories. Note that there may be multiple 
state and state-owned legal person shareholders. In fact, it is common for several 
governments and government-owned entities to hold shares in H-share firms. For 
example, Aluminum Corporation of China Ltd. has Chinalco, China Cinda, China 
Construction Bank, China Orient, and China Development Bank, most of which are 
government-owned entities, among its largest owners. 
Control variables. I control for several other factors that may influence firm 
performance. Firm size is controlled to remove its impact on performance. Larger firms 
generally command larger market shares, have greater market power, and are more 
capable of managing risks than smaller firms. Hence they tend to perform better than 
smaller firms (Fama & French, 1995). I use the log of a firm’s sales as the measure of 
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firm size. Highly leveraged firms have less capacity to raise the funds needed to execute a 
diversification strategy, compared to firms with lower debt ratios. Thus, another control 
variable, debt to equity ratio, is used to measure capital structure. Ownership 
concentration generally renders firms less susceptible to agency problems since large 
owners and institutional investors, in comparison with small shareholders, have greater 
capacity to monitor management. Agency problems can range from the loss of strategic 
focus to outright expropriation of firm assets, all of which will lead to poor performance 
(Bodolica & Spraggon, 2009; Xia et al., 2009). I use the percentage of shares held by the 
largest shareholder to measure ownership concentration. This measure has been widely 
used by other scholars (Claessens et al., 2000). I also control for whether the CEO of a 
firm currently or has held a government appointment before. It is measured by a dummy 
variable named CEO government. It is important to control for this variable because 
managers that held government positions may not consider improving performance as the 
most important task (Fan, Wong & Zhang, 2007). They have many other duties to fulfill 
(Bai & Xu, 2005), such as maintaining employment (Aghion & Schankerman, 2004). The 
information about the name of the CEO is available in the annual reports. I then search 
for the bibliography of the CEO through annual reports and the Internet to decide the 
value of this variable. Since diversification and performance differ by industry and year, I 
also included industry and year dummies in the regressions.  
4.4.3 Model Specification 
The analysis presents three important technological considerations. First, 
unobserved heterogeneity is a concern because the data is panel data, which means there 
are multiple observations for each firm. To account for potential unobserved 
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heterogeneity in error term, which is common in panel data, I first test for panel 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. The LR test shows that the panel has 
heteroskedasitc error terms with chi-square value of 65.83. The Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation shows that the panel data is auto-correlated with F-test value of 23.28 
(Wooldridge, 2002). Given the heteroskedasic and auto-correlated panel data, GLS is the 
proper estimation method (StataCorp, 2009). More specifically, I use the feasible GLS 
with heteroskedastic and correlated error structure (STATA command xtgls).   
Second, it is also possible that Chinese firms self-select to list on the HKSE. I 
used a two-stage model to control for the sample selection problem. In the first stage, all 
Chinese firms that were listed in both the Mainland China stock markets and the HKSE 
were included in a logit regression. The dependent variable in the first stage was a 
dummy variable with a value of one if the firm was listed in the HKSE. The independent 
variables included firm size (log of sales), performance (ROA), debt ratio and industry 
and year dummies. I calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio based on the predicted probability 
that a firm would be listed in the HKSE. The inverse Mill’s ratio is entered in all of the 
following regressions to control for selection bias.  
Third, various studies have shown that firms choose to diversify, thus creating an 
endogeneity problem (Campa & Kedia, 2002; Villalonga, 2004). There are several ways 
to reduce the problem of endogeneity. One way is to lag independent variables. 
Therefore, I lag all independent variables for one year. Another solution to the 
endogeneity problem is to use a two-stage least square instrument variable regression 
(2SLS). In the first stage, 2SLS estimates the endogenous variable on all of the 
independent variables and produces a predicted value of the endogenous variable. In the 
 174 
 
second stage, the predicted value is used to replace the endogenous variable. Although 
this approach solves the problem of endogeneity, it is less efficient because it produces 
large standard errors (Wooldridge, 2003). Therefore, even though a variable may be 
theoretically endogenous, it is better to test whether the endogeneity will cause statistical 
problems before one chooses to use the instrument variable regression (David, O'Brien, 
Yoshikawa & Delios, 2009).   
To test for the endogeneity problem, the first step is to find out instrument 
variables for the endogenous variable. In this study, I choose several instrument variables 
that have been used by previous studies: the net cash flow of a firm, a firm’s size relative 
to median firm in an industry per year, the fraction of diversified firms in an industry, the 
total value of announced M&A deals per year and GDP growth rate (Campa & Kedia, 
2002; David et al., 2009; Villalonga, 2004).  These instruments should be related to 
diversification but not directly related to firm performance. The first stage F-test value for 
seemingly related diversification and related diversification is 2.35 (P-value=0.04) and 
4.00 (P-value=0.00), this test shows that the instruments are relevant and strong (Staiger 
& Stock, 1997; Stock, Wright & Yogo, 2002). The Sargan-Hansen test is a test for 
instrument exogeneity. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are valid instruments, 
i.e., uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation (Hayashi, 2000).  A rejection casts doubt on the 
validity of the instruments.  The test value of chi-square is 4.02 (P-value=0.40) and 4.28 
(P-value=0.37) for seemingly related diversification and related diversification. These 
tests show that the instruments are relevant and exogenous.  
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After the two-stage least squares instrument variable regression, I run the Durbin-
Wu-Hausman test to test for the endogeneity problem (Durbin, 1954; Hausman, 1978; 
Wu, 1973). The null hypothesis for this test is that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator 
of the same equation would yield consistent estimates; that is, any endogeneity among the 
regressors would not have deleterious effects on OLS estimates. The Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test shows that neither seemingly related diversification nor related 
diversification creates an endogeneity problem. The test value for these two variables are 
1.93 (P-value=0.16) and 1.31 (P-value=0.25), respectively. Although the tests show that 
instrument variables are not necessary, I still conduct a 2SLS regression as a robustness 
check, the results are displayed in model 7 and 8 in Table 4-4. 
Moreover, the results of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test depend on the choice of 
instrument variables. To avoid the influence of the quality of instruments on the 
regression results, I adopt a third method to deal with the endogeneity problem: matching 
on propensity scores. Previous studies have shown that matching based on propensity 
score is an efficient way to deal with the problem of non-random selection of treatment 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). In this method, I first calculate the propensity score of 
conducting seemingly-related diversification, and then use the propensity score to match 
the observations to calculate the treatment effects. I use firm size (log of sales), firm 
diversification experience (the number of M&A deals conducted by the firm), state 
ownership, debt ratio and the probability of being listed on HKSE, industry as well as 
year dummies as the independent variables in the probit model to predict the probability 
of conducting seemingly related diversification.  Then, I estimate the average treatment 
effects of seemingly related diversification using nnmatch command in STATA. I use the 
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same method to calculate the propensity score and treatment effects for related 
diversification as well. This is the third way to deal with the potential endogeneity 
problem that firms self-select into seemingly related or related diversification. The results 
are summarized in models 2 and 3 in Table 4-2. 
4.5 Results 
Table 4-1 shows means, standard deviations, and correlations for variables used in 
the regressions. Note that all the significant correlations between the variables are less 
than 0.6. There is no serious problem of multicollinearity. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4-1 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
The results of the first stage regression to account for sample selection problem 
are reported in model 1 of Table 4-2.  The results show that better performed firms are 
more likely to be listed on the HKSE, while firms with heavier debts and larger size are 
more likely to be listed on the Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The results are 
consistent with the fact that the listing requirements on the HKSE are more stringent than 
domestic stock exchanges (Ferguson et al., 2002). It is also notable that the pseudo R-
square is 0.94, indicating that the independent variables account for much of the choice of 
listing on the HKSE. Based on this regression, I calculate the inverse Mill’s ratio, which 
is used in all of the following regressions. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4-2 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
The results of the probit model to calculate propensity score and average 
treatment effect of seemingly related diversification are reported in model 2 of Table 4-2. 
 177 
 
I conduct the same estimation for the variable related diversification, and the results are 
reported in model 3 of Table 4-2. The results show that the more M&A experience a firm 
has, the less likely this firm is conducting seemingly related diversification or related 
diversification.  The average treatment effects of seemingly related diversification and 
related diversification are both negatively significant. This result means that seemingly 
related diversification and related diversification do harm firm performance, after 
controlling for the endogeneity problem by propensity score matching. Hypotheses 1 and 
2 receive some preliminary supports. 
Table 4-3 summarizes the results from the test for the hypotheses, where 
performance (ROA) is the dependent variable. Model 1 is the baseline model, which 
includes only control variables. In Model 2, I add seemingly related diversification; in 
Model 3, I add related diversification; and in Model 4 and Model 5, the interaction 
between related diversification and M&A experience, and the interaction between related 
diversification and state ownership, are entered into the regression, respectively. In 
Model 6, I include both interaction terms at the same time. 
--------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4-3 about here 
--------------------------------- 
 
 Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 predict that seemingly related diversification and 
related diversification are negatively related to firm performance. As shown in Model 2 
and Model 3, both seemingly related diversification and related diversification are 
negatively significant at 0.001 level. Therefore, Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are 
strongly supported. Hypothesis 3 and Hypothesis 4 predict the moderating role of M&A 
experience and state ownership on the negative relationship between related 
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diversification and firm performance. In Model 4, the interaction term between related 
diversification and M&A experience is positively significant, indicating that the negative 
impact of related diversification is mitigated if a firm accumulate more experience about 
related diversification. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is supported. Similarly, in Model 5, the 
interaction term between related diversification and state ownership is negatively 
significant, showing that the negative impact of related diversification is exaggerated by 
high level of state ownership: the higher the state ownership, the worse the negative 
impact of related diversification on firm performance. Hypothesis 4 is also supported. 
Both interaction terms are entered into the regression simultaneously in Model 6. The 
results persist. 
 As for the effects of the control variables, debt ratio is negatively significant 
throughout the models, indicating that firms with high debt ratio are not performing well. 
The variable CEO government is negatively significant from models 4-6 in Table 4-3. If 
the CEO of a firm holds or held a government position, the performance of the firm is 
worse than other firms. It is within the expectation because these firms are not 
performance-oriented. Similarly, state ownership is negatively significant in models 1 
and 2, which means the agency problem in SOEs is associated with poor performance. 
Firm size, as measured by log of total sales, is marginally negatively significant in most 
of the models, showing that larger firms perform relatively worse than smaller firms.  
 To further illustrate the moderating role of M&A experience and state ownership, 
the interaction effects of M&A experience and state ownership on the relationship 
between related diversification and firm performance are plotted in Figure 4-2 and Figure 
4-3. In Figure 4-2, we can see that the slope of the line for firms with M&A experience 
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below mean is steeper than that of firms with M&A experience above mean, showing that 
firms with low M&A experience suffer more from related diversification. In Figure 4-3, 
the line for firms with state ownership below mean is only slightly downward, while the 
line for firms with state ownership above mean is sharply downward. The negative 
impact of related diversification on firm performance is much more severe for firms with 
high level of state ownership.  
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Figure 4-2 & 4-3 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Robustness check. I run different models to test the effects of seemingly related 
diversification and related diversification on firm performance. Table 4-4 summarizes the 
results of eight different models using four different regression methods. The first two 
models use OLS and the results hold, except that the moderating role of state ownership is 
not detected. Model 3 and 4 run firm fixed effect regression. Seemingly related 
diversification and related diversification remain negatively significant. However, neither 
of the interaction effects is significant. Model 5 and 6 run the firm random effect regression. 
Similar to the results of OLS, only the moderating role of state ownership is not supported. 
Model 7 and 8 run the 2SLS regression with the instrument variables: net cash flow, firm 
size relative to median firm by industry by year, the fraction of diversified firms by 
industry, the total value of announced M&A deals by year and GDP growth rate. 
Seemingly related diversification and related diversification remain negatively significant. 
Since interaction effects in 2SLS is hard to implement and explain, I do not include the 
interaction terms in the models. As for the control variables, debt to equity ratio remains 
negatively significant in most models, so is CEO government. Stat ownership is negatively 
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significant in the fixed effect models. Overall, the main effects of seemingly related 
diversification and related diversification remain robust. The moderating effects, especially 
the role of state ownership, are less robust than the main effects. 
------------------------------------------ 
Insert Table 4-4 about here 
------------------------------------------ 
 
I use other measures of related diversification to test the hypotheses as well. I 
replace the dummy variable of related diversification with the two widely-used measures of 
diversification, concentric measure (Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988) and entropy 
measure of related diversification (Jacquemin & Berry, 1979). The results hold for these 
two measures. I also try different measures for firm performance: ROS and Tobin’s Q. The 
results for different performance measures do not differ much. I also used an alternate 
measure for state ownership. Instead of using a continuous measure, I used a dummy 
variable that is equal to one if state ownership exceeds 50 percent. The results hold for that 
variance as well. 
Certain industries, such as natural resources and transportation, are subject to high 
levels of vertical integration. I excluded firms from these industries and the results 
remained robust.  Moreover, instead of matching by propensity score, I also tried other 
matching methods: coarse exact matching (CEM). CEM is a monotonic imbalance-
reducing matching method which temporarily coarsens the data to find out exact match 
(Blackwell, Iacus, King & Porro, 2009).  The results of average treatment effects are 
similar using this matching method. 
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4.6 Discussion and Conclusion 
4.6.1 Findings 
Diversification has been a crucial topic in the arena of strategic management for a 
considerable time. The relationship between firm performance and related diversification, 
however, remains unclear. Theoretically, related diversification should add value to a 
firm because it exploits the key resources into other businesses. However, there is a lack 
of empirical evidence for the benefits of related diversification. Although the literature 
has recognized the lack of empirical support, it has not attributed it to a firm’s lack of 
capabilities conducting related diversification. Therefore, a primary objective of this 
study has been to investigate the related diversification-performance relationship in an 
emerging economy from a capability perspective. More specifically, this paper focuses 
on the liabilities of related diversification in emerging economies. The liability results 
from the lack of capabilities that are associated with related diversification: search and 
selection, and implementation. The lack of search and selection capability will result in 
seemingly related diversification, which is harmful to firm performance especially in 
emerging economies. The lack of implementation capability shows that even though a 
firm is able to identify a truly related business, there are still many challenges to face in 
order to benefit from related diversification. The first two hypotheses document the 
difficulty of firms from emerging economies to benefit from related diversification.  
Then, this paper proceeds to investigate the moderators of the relationship 
between related diversification and firm performance. The literature on capabilities 
shows that capabilities can be acquired through learning.  Therefore, I predict that the 
negative impact of related diversification will mitigate as firms learn from their previous 
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experience. The empirical test supports the prediction. The support of this prediction also 
verifies the applicability of capability perspective to the issue of related diversification. 
I also consider the impact of state ownership in diversification. Ownership 
identity is important in both diversification and capabilities literature. The motivations 
and capabilities of different ownership identities influence the capability of a firm to 
benefit from related diversification in emerging economies. To better understand the role 
of ownership identity, I explore the moderating effects of state ownership. It is crucial to 
investigate the role of state ownership for two reasons. First, it reflects the severity of 
agency problem, and second, it is an important part of economy in emerging economies. 
The empirical test also supports the prediction that firms with high level of state 
ownership suffer more from related diversification than firms with low state ownership. 
4.6.2 Theoretical Implications 
Three theoretical implications follow from the results. First, it contributes to the 
literature of related diversification by showing that the lack of empirical support of the 
benefits of related diversification is not only the problem of measurement, but also the 
lack of capabilities. A firm’s capacity cannot be assumed, especially in settings like 
China where firms have existed under the Company Law for only less than twenty years. 
Rather, as the results show, the lack of capabilities of search and selection and 
implementation contributes to the liability of related diversification.  More specifically, I 
identify a type of related diversification – seemingly related diversification, which is 
prevalent in emerging economies. The concept of seemingly related diversification helps 
us better understand how firms are harmed by related diversification. 
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The second theoretical contribution is to the literature on capabilities, especially 
dynamic capabilities. Dynamic capability is the capacity of an organization to 
purposefully create, extend, or modify its resource base (Helfat, 2007). Although the 
literature on dynamic capabilities has developed fast during the last decade, several key 
issues still remain unclear. This paper empirically shows that 1) learning is an important 
mechanism for firms to develop dynamic capabilities; 2) dynamic capabilities can 
influence firm performance indirectly through intermediate outcomes such as related 
diversification; and 3) dynamic capabilities can be disentangled into two distinctive 
capabilities when it comes to the issue of related diversification – search and selection, 
and implementation. The findings in this paper shed some lights on how dynamic 
capabilities are developed and how dynamic capabilities influence firm strategy and 
performance. 
A third theoretical implication is to the studies of strategies of firms from 
emerging economies. Firms from emerging economies are different from firms in 
developed countries in many aspects such as strategy and organizational structure, due to 
the unique characteristics of institutional environments in emerging economies. The 
findings in this paper show that firms from emerging economies are more likely to suffer 
from the liability of related diversification due to inexperience and the lack of monitoring 
and incentives of managers. We should consider the different characteristics of firms 
from emerging economies when we evaluate their strategy and performance. The 
recognition of these differences help us better understand firms from emerging 
economies. 
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Finally, the findings in this chapter also speak to the “diversification discount” 
literature in finance. In finance literature, there has been ongoing debate on the existence 
of diversification discount21: some studies confirm its existence (Berger & Ofek, 1995) 
while others disagree (Villalonga, 2004). Different from scholars in the strategy area, 
scholars in the finance area do not distinguish between related and unrelated 
diversification. Not distinguishing between related and unrelated diversification hinders 
our understanding of diversification because related and unrelated diversification indeed 
have different rationales. The value creation or destruction mechanisms are different for 
these two types of diversification (Hoskisson & Hitt, 1990). Considering whether related 
diversification or unrelated diversification creates diversification discounts or 
diversification premium is necessary because I believe this relationship is contingent on a 
number of factors, such as the type of diversification and resources that firms have. It is 
hard to reach an overall conclusion. This chapter shows that diversification discount may 
occur if firms do not know how to benefit from related diversification. Another important 
contingency is the empirical context, while this chapter focuses on firms from China, the 
diversification discount literature focuses on firms from U.S. The difference in empirical 
settings may imply that firms have different resources in different settings, contributing 
to different relationships between diversification and firm performance. 
4.6.3 Practical Implications 
 The findings also have important implications for managers and policy makers in 
emerging economies. First, while it is well known that related diversification may 
provide benefits to firms, the value of related diversification might be hard to realize for 
                                                 
21
 Diversification discount is the phenomenon that diversified firms are traded at a discount prior to diversifying 
(Villalonga, 2004). 
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firms from emerging economies. Unlike their counterparties from developed countries, 
firms in emerging economies may lack the capabilities to benefit from related 
diversification. For managers in emerging economies, when they decide to conduct 
related diversification, it is extremely important to recognize the difficulties of related 
diversification. More specifically, they should try to avoid to be trapped into seemingly 
related diversification. Similarly for policy makers, they should not blindly encourage 
related diversification by offering favorable policies. Second, the findings from the study 
show that high levels of state ownership means severe agency problem. Since managers 
play an important role in conducting diversification and developing capabilities, the 
government should try to monitor and motivate managers in SOEs effectively.  
4.6.4 Limitations and Future Research 
Two technical issues require exploration. One arises from a measurement 
problem. The measure of seemingly related diversification is not perfect. Though it is 
coded according to the input-output table, the information of input-output table is 
inconclusive. Perhaps efforts can be made to develop a more accurate measure of 
seemingly related diversification relying on other sources of information.    
A further technical issue is whether listed Chinese firms, which in most instances 
are subsidiaries of larger business groups, are the proper units for analysis of the 
diversification-performance relationship. Many Chinese firms list only part of their 
assets, and many of these listed companies engage in extensive connected or related 
transactions with unlisted subsidiaries (Meyer & Lu, 2005). Since it is hard to gather 
information on unlisted assets other than their connected or related transactions with 
listed entities, I cannot control for interactions between listed and unlisted assets and, in 
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particular, the possibility that the latter either subsidize, or are subsidized by, the former. 
Future research on the diversification-performance relationship must explore whether 
diversification is best understood at the level of the listed entity or the larger group 
corporation or holding company.  
4.6.5 Conclusions 
Despite these limitations, this paper is among one of the first attempts to 
empirically investigate how capabilities and institutional environments influence 
diversification and firm performance. It highlights the opportunities for future research on 
these issues. Hopefully, the theoretical development and empirical support in this paper 
will provide a useful first step to better understand both diversification and capabilities.  
 
This chapter shows how the development of internal resources- the capabilities to 
benefit from related diversification, is missing for firms from emerging economies due to 
the unique institutional environments. Together, chapters 3 and 4 indicate that 
institutional environments influence the development of internal resources and the 
availability of external resources, thus influencing firm scope. 
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4.7 Tables 
Table 4-1 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix22 
 Variable Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 ROA  0.05  0.08  1.00           
2 Seemingly Related 
Diversification  0.20  0.40  -0.06  1.00        
 
 
3 Related 
Diversification 0.33  0.45  -0.08  0.59  1.00       
  
4 M&A experience 
0.26  1.13  0.09  -0.09  -0.12  1.00        
5 State Ownership  
0.43  0.28  0.01  -0.02  0.01  0.16  1.00       
6 Debt/Equity Ratio 
0.47  0.43  0.04  0.09  0.07  0.01  -0.08  1.00      
7 Log of Sales 7.95  1.48  0.09  0.05  0.00  0.07  0.00  0.17  1.00     
8 Largest Ownership 
53.55  13.83  0.02  -0.03  -0.09  0.05  0.12  -0.12  -0.05  1.00    
9 CEO government 
0.68  0.47  0.02  -0.15  -0.13  0.09  0.19  0.03  0.06  0.01  1.00   
1
0 
Inverse Mill’s 
Ratio 0.31 0.05 -0.11 0.05 0.06 -0.05 0.07 0.26 0.07 -0.04 -0.11 1.00 
                                                 
22
 Note: correlation>.10 is significant at 0.01 level, Pearson correlation, all two-tailed tests. N=416. 
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Table 4-2 Regression Results for Sample Selection and propensity score matching23 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Debt/Equity Ratio -2.35*** 
(0.58) 
0.12 
(0.15) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
 
  
Log of Sales 
-3.76*** 0.06 0.03 
(0.37) (0.04) (0.05) 
ROA 13.06***   
(4.50)   
M&A experience  -0.21* (0.11) 
-0.33** 
(0.13) 
State ownership  0.23 (0.25) 
0.32 
(0.22) 
Inverse Mill’s ratio  2.12 (1.43) 
1.47 
(1.23) 
  
  
Industry dummies Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included 
  
  
Average Treatment Effect  -0.02* (0.01) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
  
  
Number of observations 8031 
 
416 
 
416 
Wald (LR) Chi-square 448.72 69.35 62.64 
Log (pseudo)likelihood -122.57 -243.76 -308.69 
Pseudo R-square 0.94 0.12 0.09 
 
 
 
  
                                                 
23
 Note: +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<0.001. All two-tailed tests.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Industry and year dummies are omitted for lack of space. 
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Table 4-3 Regression Results24 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent Variables      
Seemingly 
Related 
Diversification 
 
-0.03***     
(0.01)     
Related 
Diversification 
  -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** -0.02** 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Related 
Diversification * 
M&A Experience 
 
  
 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
 
 
 
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
Related 
Diversification * 
State ownership 
 
  
 
 
-0.03+ 
(0.01) 
-0.03* 
(0.01) 
       
Control 
Variable     
  
M&A Experience -0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
State Ownership -0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
Debt/Equity 
Ratio 
-0.03** -0.02* -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log of Sales 
-0.00* -0.00+ -0.00+ -0.00 -0.00+ -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Largest 
Ownership 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO 
Government 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.02* 
(0.01) 
-0.01+ 
(0.00) 
-0.02** 
(0.01) 
Inverse Mill’s 
ratio 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
Industry 
dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Year dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Constant  0.09*** (0.03) Omitted Omitted Omitted 
0.09*** 
(0.03) 
0.08** 
(0.03) 
    
   
Wald Chi-square 220.37 938.95 814.51 889.52 276.47 316.69 
df 46 48 48 49 48 49 
Model 
significance 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 
 
                                                 
24
 Note: +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<0.001. All two-tailed tests.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Industry and year dummies are omitted for lack of space. 
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Table 4-4 Robustness Check25 
 
Variables Model 1 
(OLS) 
Model 2 
(OLS) 
Model 3 
(FE) 
Model 4 
(FE) 
Model 5 
(RE) 
Model 6 
(RE) 
Model 7 
(2SLS) 
Model 8 
(2SLS) 
 
Seemingly 
Related 
Diversification 
-0.04** 
(0.01) 
 -0.02+  -0.03*  -0.11+  
 (0.01)  (0.01)  (0.06)  
Related 
Diversification 
 -0.03** 
(0.01) 
 -0.02+ 
(0.01) 
 -0.02+ 
(0.01) 
 -0.08* 
(0.04) 
        
Related 
Diversification 
* M&A 
Experience 
  
0.04* 
(0.02) 
 0.03 
(0.02) 
 0.06** 
(0.02) 
  
 
 
Related 
Diversification 
* State 
ownership 
 -0.06 
(0.04) 
 -0.02 
(0.04) 
 -0.00 
(0.00) 
  
 
         
M&A 
Experience 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.00) 
State 
Ownership 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
-0.05* 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
Debt/Equity 
Ratio 
-0.03** -0.02+ -
0.09*** 
-
0.09*** 
-0.00 -0.00 -
0.09*** 
-
0.09*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Log of Sales 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Largest 
Ownership 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
CEO 
Government 
-0.03** 
(0.01) 
-
0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.00 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
-0.03* 
(0.01) 
-
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-
0.03*** 
(0.01) 
Inverse Mill’s 
ratio 
-0.19+ 
(0.10) 
-0.16 
(0.10) 
-0.15 
(0.11) 
-0.15 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.09) 
0.04 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
Industry 
dummies 
Include
d 
Include
d 
Include
d 
Include
d 
Include
d 
Include
d 
Include
d 
Include
d 
Year dummies Include
d 
Include
d 
Include
d 
Include
d 
Include
d 
Include
d 
Include
d 
Include
d 
Constant 0.14 
(0.09) 
0.12 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.06) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.08 
(0.06) 
0.04+ 
(0.03) 
0.05* 
(0.03) 
F value / Wald 
Chi-square 
2.99 3.01 7.91 7.33 75.78 83.86 5.55 6.07 
R-square 0.28 0.29     0.31 0.37 
Model 
significance 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
                                                 
25
 Note: +p<.10; *p<.05; **p<.01, ***p<0.001. All two-tailed tests.  Standard errors are in parentheses. 
Industry and year dummies are omitted for lack of space. 
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4.8 Figures 
Figure 4-1 Conceptual Framework 
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Figure 4-2 Moderating Effect of M&A Experience on the Relationship between Related 
Diversification and Firm Performance 
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Figure 4-3 Moderating Effect of State Ownership on the Relationship between Related 
Diversification and Firm Performance 
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CHAPTER 5 CONCLUSION 
5.1 Dissertation summary 
Product diversification is on the center stage of strategy research while 
geographic diversification (internationalization) is on the center stage of international 
business research. My dissertation seeks to bridge these two streams of research from the 
theoretical lenses of resource-based view, resource dependency theory and institutional 
theory. In this section, I will first summarize the findings of the dissertation, and then 
discuss the contribution and practical implication, and conclude with areas for future 
research.  
This dissertation explores how resources and institutional environments influence 
firm scope, with an area emphasis on emerging economies. Chapter 2 focuses on the 
concept of institutional distance, disaggregate it into eight dimensions and empirically 
shows the validity of the new measures. This chapter also compares the different impacts 
of institutional distances on foreign entry choices in U.S. and Chinese firms. By 
demonstrating the role of institutional distance in influencing firm strategy, this chapter 
highlights the importance of investigating firm strategy in different institutional 
environments, especially emerging economies. Chapter 3 and chapter 4 examine 
diversification strategy of Chinese listed firms. Chapter 3 explores the role of government 
in influencing the globalization strategy of government corporations. Government, as an 
important part of institutional environments, influences both the motivation and resources 
of firms to go abroad through ownership and policy. SOEs are less likely than PPEs and 
FPEs to invest abroad because of their risk-averse nature. They also differ in terms of the 
resources to rely on when they go abroad. While SOEs rely on external resources largely 
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influenced by the government, PPEs rely on internal firm resources. A government policy 
encouraging firms to go abroad will create institutional pressures for SOEs to comply 
with and also influence the availability of external resources to support such activities. As 
a result, SOEs are more likely to go abroad after such the policy, but not necessarily PPEs 
and FPEs. Chapter 4 introduces the concept of seemingly related diversification, a type of 
diversification that focuses on the relatedness of technology but not of markets. This 
chapter shows that firms from emerging economies suffer from seemingly related 
diversification, due to the unique institutional environments. Moreover, even if firms are 
able to identify truly related businesses, they still face the difficulty of implementing such 
a strategy. Therefore, it is hard for firms from emerging economies to benefit from 
related diversification. However, as firms learn from their own experience, the liability of 
related diversification will diminish. It is also worthwhile to notice that SOEs suffer more 
from the liability of related diversification due to the severe agency problem. Overall, this 
dissertation shows how institutional environments influence the development of internal 
resources and the availability of external resources and then the choice of firm scope. 
5.2 Contributions and implications 
The contribution of this dissertation is three-fold. First, theoretically, although 
RBV, RDT and IT have been applied to explain the relationship among resource, 
institutional environments and firm scope, there has not been an integrated framework 
that links these concepts using these theories. As suggested by Hillman, Withers and 
Collins (2009), the integration of RDT with other theoretical perspectives such as RBV 
and IT provides a promising future for the development of RDT. Likewise, the 
integration will also advance the theoretical development in RBV and IT. Chapter 1 
 196 
 
provides such a framework, as shown in Figure 1-2. This framework provides a roadmap 
to understand these relationships.  It compares these three different theories and shows 
that they can explain different relationships. For example, while RBV explains how the 
possession of resources encourages firms to increase their scope, RDT explains how the 
acquisition of resources as a result of the increase in firm scope.   
The relationships are interactive and complicated, and it is impossible to 
investigate all of them in a single dissertation. However, having the framework is a first 
attempt to understand these complicated relationships. In this dissertation, I examine how 
institutional environment influence resources and then firm scope. Chapter 2 examines 
how internal resources and capabilities can mitigate the negative impact of institutional 
distance on the internationalization process. Chapter 3 examines the motivation and the 
source of resources when firms go abroad. PPEs rely on internal resources and 
capabilities, as predicted by RBV while SOEs rely on external government resources to 
conduct FDI, as predicted by RDT. Government provides resources that firms can utilize 
when they go abroad. By providing these resources, government influences the 
availability of resources in external environment and thus firm scope. Chapter 4 shows 
institutional environments constrain the development of resources and capabilities, 
especially the capabilities to benefit from related diversification. 
Second, this dissertation advances our understanding of firm strategy in emerging 
economies. As acknowledge by various scholars, firm strategy in emerging economies 
are indeed different in emerging economies, due to the unique institutional environments.  
Emerging economies are characterized by various unique features, such as fast growth, 
institutional voids, a large number of government corporations, and young private sectors 
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(Peng & Delios, 2006). All of these characteristics render the applicability of theories and 
findings in the western context to emerging economies. Therefore, scholars interested in 
emerging economies should be cautious in applying existing theories and should try to 
develop new theories to explain firm strategy in emerging economies (Barney & Zhang, 
2009; Whetten, 2009).  
This dissertation aims to develop such theories and provide empirical evidence to 
better understand firm strategy in emerging economies. More specifically, I focus on the 
diversification strategy in emerging economies. Chapter 4 shows that the relationship 
between related product diversification and firm performance is different in emerging 
economies. This chapter contributes to the literature by showing that seemingly related 
diversification would harm firm performance in emerging economies and firms may 
actually need to learn how to benefit from truly related diversification. It is a good 
supplement to existing theories on the benefits of unrelated diversification (Guillen, 
2000; Khanna & Palepu, 2000a).  Together, they provide a relatively complete picture of 
the relationship between product diversification and firm performance for firms in 
emerging economies. Similarly, the findings of Chapter 3 also show the applicability of 
existing theories to emerging economies is limited. The internalization theory (Buckley & 
Casson, 1976), a dominant theory in explaining globalization, is only applicable to PPEs 
that seek to exploit their key resources in foreign markets. It is not applicable to SOEs 
which invest abroad to gain legitimacy. SOEs will rely on external government resources 
rather than internal firm resources to go abroad. 
This dissertation also contributes to the literature empirically. It contributes to 
international business literature empirically by providing a set of multi-dimensional 
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measures of institutional distances. Instead of relying on the widely-used Hofstede 
approach and measures of cultural distance, chapter 2 uses institutional theories of 
national business, governance and innovation systems to ground the conceptual 
definitions, analysis, and choice of empirical dimensions and indicators. The new 
measures are made publicly available to all researchers, with the intent to help them use 
distance measures that match their research questions. Perhaps this new approach can 
help resolve some of the inconsistencies reported in the literature concerning the effects 
of national distance on various strategies such as foreign entry mode choice and human 
resource practices, given that each of these questions may possibly require the use of 
different dimensions and measures of distance. This dissertation also contributes to the 
strategy literature by introducing the concept of seemingly related diversification and 
empirically measuring and testing the concept. The introduction and empirical tests of 
this concept help us understand the difficulty of realizing the gains of related 
diversification. 
This dissertation also has important practical implications. For managers in firms 
from emerging economies, it is important to notice that they should not blindly mimic the 
strategy of western firms. The same strategy that is successful in the west may turn out to 
be unsuccessful in emerging economies, such as related diversification. They should be 
aware of their firms’ internal resources and external environments and make the best 
strategic choices accordingly.  Similarly, for managers of MNEs operating in emerging 
economies, it is crucial that they recognize the role of institutional environments in 
influencing firm strategy and identify the best strategy for their firms. For policy makers 
in emerging economies, they should notice SOEs’ over reliance on the government for 
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various resources. Instead of providing easy capital to SOEs, they should try to find a 
way to help SOEs develop their own capabilities in order to survive in market 
competition. They should also be aware of the severe agency problem and mitigate its 
negative impact on firm performance by motivating managers in SOEs through various 
incentives such as stock option plan.  
5.3 Areas of future research 
Future research can explore several areas. First, since both product diversification 
and geographic diversification require resource inputs, it will be interesting to investigate 
the relationship between these two types of diversification. As described in the 
introduction, previous research has not been conclusive in the relationship between 
product and geographic diversification, while some scholars find they are substitute 
(Wiersema & Bowen, 2008), others find that they are complementary (Doukas & Lang, 
2003; Kim et al., 1989), still others find that they are not related to each other (Tallman & 
Li, 1996). There is much work to be done to clarify the relationship between product and 
geographic diversification (Geringer, Tallman & Olsen, 2000). As Hitt and his colleagues 
(1997) claimed, there is a need to understand the combined evolutionary path of product 
and geographic diversification. 
Along this line of advocate, this topic is extremely important in emerging 
economies because in fast developing emerging economies, many firms face the choice 
of product or geographic diversification as they grow. It is crucial for them to maintain 
the balance between product and geographic diversification in a way that best fits their 
growth strategy. For example, if product and geographic diversification are indeed 
substitute to each other, then, a firm should pursue either product or geographic 
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diversification, jumping into both will harm firm performance. Moreover, for those 
young firms facing the choice of diversification for the first time, which is the better way 
to go, product or geographic diversification? Choosing the wrong path may bring them 
enormous losses.  
The previous inconclusive findings on the relationship between product and 
geographic diversification may be the result of the contingency nature of this relationship, 
as I described in the introduction. Both resources and institutional environments can 
influence the relationship between product and geographic diversification. Applying the 
framework developed in this dissertation, since institutional environments can influence 
firm scope both directly and indirectly through the impacts on resources, it is crucial to 
identify the elements in institutional environments that foster specific types of resources 
and diversification.  
Institutional environments can directly influence the relationship between product 
and geographic diversification. Chapter 3 describes how government policies encourage 
firms to go abroad. As a result, firms may rush into geographic diversification rather than 
product diversification. Institutional environments can also indirectly influence the 
relationship through the impacts on resources. For example, the lack of markets for 
complementary assets as described in chapter 4 may contribute to a shortage of supply of 
complementary assets. This shortage of supply will further constrain the ability of firms 
to grow. Given the constraint, firms may have to choose one or the other dimension to 
grow, but not both (Kumar, 2009). Similarly, since many firms from emerging economies 
are inexperience when they grow as I described in chapter 4, it is unlikely that they will 
have the capability to replicate and transfer the tacit and intact competences in both 
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dimensions. All of the above arguments suggest that firms should seriously consider their 
own resources and the institutional environments to decide which way to go when they 
grow. 
Second, this dissertation shows that SOEs rely heavily on government for various 
resources. As a result, they lack the motivation and capabilities to develop their own 
resources. But one of the major arguments in resource dependence theory is that firms 
will seek to reduce their dependence over other parties (Hillman et al., 2009; Pfeffer & 
Salancik, 1978). If this is the case for SOEs, we may be able to find out conditions under 
which SOEs may seek to reduce the power from the government.  If this is true, several 
interesting questions may be worthwhile to explore: under what conditions will SOEs try 
to reduce their reliance on the government? Through which ways would SOEs achieve 
this goal? How would government react to the actions taken by SOEs? The answers to 
these questions will help us understand the development of SOEs in emerging economies. 
Third, emerging economies are characterized by rapidly-changing environment 
(Peng, 2006; Tan & Tan, 2005). Therefore, it is necessary to recognize the dynamic 
nature of various relationships. In this dissertation, I investigate how the relationship 
between related diversification and firm performance changes as firms gain more 
experience. Similarly, I also examine how the probability of going abroad changes as a 
government policy is announced. However, given the relatively short history of Chinese 
stock market, the time period covered in this study is only about 15 years. Studies that 
cover longer time period are desirable. Moreover, as firms are still in the process of 
conducting massive product and geographic diversification, firms may experience new 
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developments frequently. It is necessary to revisit the relationship every few years to 
explore the new developments.  
Fourth, the sample in this dissertation has several limitations. First, it only 
includes one emerging economy – China. Although China is the largest emerging 
economy and shares many characteristics of emerging economies. It has several unique 
features, such as the important role of government and Guanxi in business transactions 
(Peng & Luo, 2000). It is not clear whether the findings in this dissertation can be applied 
to other emerging economies. Second, the sample includes only listed firms. There are a 
large number of unlisted firms in China. These firms are also active in various business 
activities. Understanding the strategy of these firms is also important since they are a 
crucial part of the economy.  
Despite these limitations, this dissertation explores how firm resources and 
institutional environments influence the choice of firm scope in emerging economies. It 
contributes to the literature of strategy and international business by investigating the 
unique strategic choices for firms from emerging economies. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: World Values Survey Questions Used in the Calculation of Cultural 
Distance 
In the attempt to replicate Hofstede’s (1980) cultural scores with time-varying 
measures, I used the World Values Survey (Inglehart, 2004). I obtained data from four 
waves of the WVS conducted between 1980 and 2004 for as many as 69 countries, 
interpolating the years in between surveys. I used mean response scores by country as the 
input data for all calculations. 
To measure Hofstede’s power distance, I computed the percentage of respondents 
who chose “obedience” in response to question a042: “Here is a list of qualities that 
children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be 
especially important? Please choose up to five.” The other categories were leadership, 
self-control, thrift saving money and things, determination perseverance, religious faith, 
unselfishness, and loyalty. I also took into account the percentage of people who 
responded to question e018 that “it would be a good thing”: “I'm going to read out a list 
of various changes in our way of life that might take place in the near future. Please tell 
me for each one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a bad 
thing, or don't you mind? —Greater respect for authority.” 
To measure uncertainty avoidance I computed the percentage of people answering 
“very careful” to question a165: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people 
can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” I also took into 
consideration if they chose “good job security” in response to question c013: “Here are 
some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please look at them and tell me 
which ones you personally think are important in a job?” The other categories were good 
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pay, not too much pressure, a respected job, good hours, an opportunity to use initiatives, 
generous holidays, you can achieve something, a responsible job, a job that is interesting, 
a job that meets one’s abilities, pleasant people to work with, good chance for promotion, 
a useful job for society, meeting people, good physical working conditions, have time off 
at the weekends, and none of these. 
To measure individualism I computed the percentage of people who chose 
“independence” in response to question a029: “Here is a list of qualities that children can 
be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially 
important? Please choose up to five.” The other categories were good manners, politeness 
and neatness, hard work, honesty, feeling of responsibility, patience, and imagination. I 
also took into account the response to question e037: “Now I'd like you to tell me your 
views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you 
agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the 
statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any 
number in between: —The government should take more responsibility to ensure that 
everyone is provided for. —People should take more responsibility to provide for 
themselves.” 
Finally, to measure masculinity I computed the mean response on a scale from 1 
to 5 to the question: “For each of the following, indicate how important it is in your life: 
—a001 family, and —a005 work.  
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Appendix 2: Calculation of Euclidean and Mahalanobis Distance 
Euclidean Distance 
  
Suppose that for a specific country in any given year we observe   for   1. . . , where   is a 
characteristic of the specified dimension (e.g. for the economic dimension =imports, 	=GDP 
per capita etc).  Let 
  be the arithmetic mean of characteristic  across all countries in any given 
year.  Let   be the sample standard deviation of characteristic  across all countries in any given 
year.  We first standardized each dimension: 
 =   
    for each country in the given year. 
Then the Euclidean distance between two countries A and B is calculated as 
,      	  
where  and  are the values of the standardized characteristic  corresponding to 
countries A and B respectively. 
Mahalanobis Distance 
Suppose that for two countries in any given year, we observe two vectors    ,  	, … ,   
and b  "#, #	, … , #$ of p different characteristics.  Similarly, suppose there is an n-by-p 
matrix % with p columns representing characteristics, and n rows containing each country in each 
year (so the number of rows would be the summation over all years of the number of countries in 
each year).  We define &, a covariance matrix for %, as a p-by-p matrix with element &'( equal to 
the sample covariance of columns i and j in the matrix %.  Finally, let I be the p-by-p identity 
matrix.  Then the squared Mahalanobis distance between two countries is calculated as: 
  , #	    *&+  *, 
We can alternatively rewrite the Euclidean distance above as: 
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  , #  -  *.  *, 
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